they can get along without a council of conciliation to adjust and readjust matters between the many new states there created. We are interested in that problem. Our soldiers are over there to see that this peace is carried through. We are going to be involved in any mix-up that comes from an attempt to settle this war without having the instrumentality for making that settlement effective. It is not a remote thing. It is at your door. We have got the responsibility for this peace along with all the other nations. These nations have realized that responsibility and have established the League of Nations, founded now with fourteen members, with a view of enlarging it afterwards and letting in others as they shall show themselves fit. The covenant provides a way for the nations constantly to confer, to get closer together, to bring about a better understanding and to resort to joint action, when necessary, to secure justice. Can we avoid that? Are we going to retire into our shells and say, "We are all right; we have resources within ourselves; we can live against the boycott; we can go on chasing the dollar comfortably and keep our people prosperous. What is the use? Why should we bother ourselves about other nations?" That is what we thought before this war, but we thought wrong. Now, merely on selfish grounds, in order to avoid the disasters that may come to us in another war, we ought to do everything we can in the way of reasonable contribution to the general safety — and, certainly, all that is asked of us here is reasonable contribution. We are asked to join in a boycott, to unite with the other members of the League to say to any outlaw or recalcitrant nation that threatens to bring on war, "When you do, we will suspend all contracts and the payment of all monies which may be owing to your citizens; all the food, all the products, manufactures and raw materials, we are sending you will be stopped. We will withdraw our ambassadors and consular agents." And when all the world says that to a nation, that nation will occupy a position grand and gloomy, but peculiar. We agree among ourselves that if there is any special loss to individual nations, all the other nations of the League will share that loss. The boycott may prove to be expensive. It may prove troublesome to some of our merchants who have dealings with the outlaw nation. But we can indemnify them, and doubtless the country would be entirely willing to do so. So far as forcing this country into war is concerned, there is nothing in the constitution of the League that does this. Such a provision is found in the program of the League to Enforce Peace, and I should be glad to have it in the covenant. France wanted it. She is at the point of danger and she thinks she needs an obligation on the part of the other nations to come to her assistance; but the other nations did not agree to go so far. All they did was to provide that the executive council should recommend the number of forces that each country should contribute to make the League effective, and any neighbor of the outlaw nation is bound to allow the League's soldiers to go over its territory. The agreement does unite us with other nations; it does say that we shall live up to our ideals in dealing justly with other nations and respect their sovereignty; but that is all it entails. We are told in a set of lurid speeches that we are sur rendering our sovereignty and violating the Constitution. My friends, I recommend you to read the speeches that were made after the Constitution of the United States was framed, the speeches of George Mason and Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams, and of all those patriots who were vociferous in denunciation of the Constitution of the United States. You will find nothing in the present speeches in the Senate more startling. Accompanying a forward movement there are always some who are looking backward. You always have those who see the difficulties without seeing the advantages. In the enthusiasm of debate they exaggerate difficulties; whereas, after the thing is done, they are very willing to forget it, and others have not time to look back to see how lacking in foresight these men were. FROM AN ADDRESS AT SAN FRANCISCO, In addition to its functions in respect to peace and war and the administration of territories containing backward peoples formerly administered by the defeated Central Powers, there are to be gathered, to act under the auspices of the League, all existing international bureaus like the postal union and all future international bureaus, including a new international bureau of labor under which it is proposed that, by international agreement, more humane conditions in respect to labor of men, women and children may be effected. They give the Paris covenant wider scope and are greatly to be commended. They give the League substance and constant operation in some of its functions which will greatly promote the unity of nations. Out of this nucleus will come closer understanding and greater mutual interest suggesting new fields of international action for the betterment of mankind. The administration of the German colonies with backward peoples in Africa and in the Pacific and the government of countries like Palestine, Syria, Armenia, Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, not yet ready for selfgovernment, is a problem forced upon the League because these countries cannot be trusted to the suzerainty or government of the defeated Powers. Their previous conduct toward them has forfeited all right, if any ever existed, to have them restored. We agree to limit our armament in consideration of the other parties to this treaty limiting their armament, thus reducing the necessity for our maintaining an armament beyond that stipulated. The limitation upon our armament is not arbitrarily fixed by somebody else. It is to be fixed upon the recommendation of the executive council and agreed to by us. As our armament potentially threatens the other countries if used in a sinister way, so their armament potentially threatens us, and so by joint agreement we reduce the mutual threat by common proportionate reduction. To hold this beyond our power would be to hold that there is no possibility of curbing competitive armament, which, if it is to go on and it will go on unless restrained --will invite world suicide. FROM AN ADDRESS AT SALT LAKE CITY, FEBRUARY 22, 1919 When they object to certain features of this covenant let them tell us what they would substitute for them in order to accomplish the same purpose. Have you heard any constructive suggestions from them? They do not enter into the consideration of this League in the proper spirit. The President has been struggling over there, with his colleagues in that conference, to work out the most difficult problem that has ever been presented to a congress. They have criticized him for going over. I am glad he went, because he got into the atmosphere of the conference, and there on the ground it was brought home to him what a tremendous problem it is for those nations, in conference, to settle; and there he learned, as he never had before, the necessity for a league of nations. Why should we enter into the League? Well, I want to give you three commanding reasons: In the first place, we fought this war to secure permanent peace. That is what we promised our people when we came here and elsewhere, through our speakers, pleading for the Liberty Loan. They offered to you what? They offered to you the prospect of victory; and with the victory the defeat of militarism; and with the defeat of militarism, safety for democracy; and as a basis for safety for democracy, permanent peace. Those were the great objects proclaimed when we roused our people to action. Those were the objects proclaimed to our boys as they went over: "Go," we said; "we follow you with our hearts; we offer to make every necessary sacrifice because the struggle is worthy of every sacrifice." Did we mean that, or didn't we mean it? That is the |