A. General Provisions

1. Preamble, "We, the People of the State of Illinois-grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty which he has permitted us to enjoy and seeking his blessing upon our endeavors in order to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the people; maintain a representative and orderly government; eliminate poverty and inequality; assume legal, social and economic justice; provide opportunity for the fullest development of the individual; and secure domestic tranquility; provide for the common defense; and secure the blessings of freedom and liberty to ourselves and our posterity-do ordain and establish this Constitution for the State of Illinois." (Emphasis added.)

2. Art. I, Sec. 1-"All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inherent and inalienable rights among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and the protection of property, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

3. Art. I, Sec. 2-"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied equal protection of the laws."

a. James v. Ill. Dept. of Public Aid, 126 Ill. App. 2d 75, 261 N.E. 2d 420 (Appellate Ct., 1970), “We do not agree that Chapter 1032 of the Department's manual violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against the 14th Amendment merely because in practice it results in some inequality. It is enough if it rests upon a rational basis to secure the purpose for which it is intended. Laws are not deemed special or class legislation merely because they affect one class and not another, provided they affect all members of the same class alike. The statute and the regulations discriminate between types of educational programs not between groups of people. The classification is a rational one because it supports relatively short educational or vocational training programs for which most recipients will be qualified."

b. See McGinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (1968).

c. (Note: Many annotated cases on the standards

of equal protection (i.e., reasonableness, arbitrariness).)

4. Art. IV, Sec. 13-"The General Assembly shall pass no special law when a general law is or can be made applicable. . . ."

B. Education Provision

1. Art. X, Sec. 1-"A fundamental goal of the people of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capabilities.

"The state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.

"The state has the primary responsibilities for financing the system of public education."

a. McLain v. Phelps, 409 Ill. 393, 100 N.E. 2d 753 (1951), “It must be constantly kept in mind that the constitution has imposed upon the General Assembly a duty to establish a thorough and efficient system of free schools, and this provision has been construed as permitting the legislature unrestricted authority with reference to the formation of school districts and the agencies which it shall adopt to provide the system of free schools required by the constitution. Thus, the statutes authorize several different types of organized school districts, each of which may provide special advantages for the particular territory in which it is organized. We have repeatedly held that the question of the efficiency and fairness of the school system, established by legislative action, is solely one for the legislature to answer."

b. People v. Jackson-Highland Bldg. Corp., 400 Ill. 533, 81 N.E. 2d 578 (1948), "The legislature having the duty to provide a system of schools, it necessarily follows that it has the power to impose taxes for purposes incident to the maintenance or improvement thereof. The mandate of the constitution presupposes power in the General Assembly to carry out that mandate. . . . [T]he maintenance or preservation of a thorough and efficient system of free schools is a public and governmental function in Illinois, and is delegated to a municipality only that it may be more effectively exercised." (Accord,

People v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 286 Ill. 384, 121 N. E. 731 (1918).)

c. People v. Burson, 307 Ill. 533, 139 N.E. 139 (1923), "To hold that it is contemplated by the constitutional provision requiring all pupils receive a good common school education, that the situation of all students or pupils in a district shall be the same, would be to prevent the operation of any school district. No matter what the conveniences may be, children living in different parts of any school district will find the location of the school in that district one of varying convenience. The language of the constitution must receive a reasonable construction, and the rule a reasonable application."

d. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N.E. 2d 581 (1948), "We must first ascertain whether this court has the duty and the power to determine whether a specific school system is thorough and efficient. Where issues before this court involve the constitutionality of statutes permitting the creation of school districts, the court is necessarily limited in decision to a narrow field. This is true because of the inherent power of the legislature and section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution. The section simply operates as a mandate to the legislature to exercise its inherent power to carry out a primary, obligatory concept of our system of government, i.e., the children of the state are entitled to a good common school education in public schools, and at public expense. Prior decisions of this court have held the section to also place upon the legislature two limitations when implementing that concept: the schools established, i.e., the system, must be free and must be open to all without discrimination. . . . This court has consistently held the section to impose the two limitations, and no This court has also been consistent in holding that the question of the efficiency and thoroughness of the school system established by legislative permission is one solely for the legislature to answer and that the courts lack power to intrude. . . . In Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 166 N.E. 504, 509, we said, it is not for the court to determine if the system is the best which could be brought forth. School problems are essentially practical ones-what is best cannot be easily answered."

more.

e. People v. Barrington Consolidated High School Dist., 396 Ill. 129, 71 N.E. 2d 86 (1947), "In Keime v. Community High Sch. Dist. 348 Ill. 228, 180 N.E. 858, 860, it was said: "There is no constitutional restriction or limitation placed upon the

f. Segar v. Board of Education, 317 Ill. 418, 148 N.E. 289 (1925), “The authorities seem to be uniform that a board of education has no power to furnish textbooks to the pupils at public expense without specific authority so to do. A system of schools, which permits all persons of school age residing in the district to attend classes and receive instructions in the subjects taught, without a tuition charge, provides free schools, and the fact that parents of pupils financially able (emphasis added) to do so are required to provide their children with textbooks, writing materials and other supplies required for the personal use of such pupils does not change the character of the school. . . .'

g. People v. Young, 309 Ill. 27, 139 N.E. 894 (1923), "The Legislature has unquestioned power and discretion under Article VIII, Section 1 [now Article X, Section 1], requiring the legislature to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools whereby all children of the state may receive a common school education, to determine what a common school education shall be; but whatever that determination is, there is no discretion in the legislature to provide a system which deprives any child of the state of the opportunity to obtain such education."

C. Taxing Provision

1. Art. IX, Sec. 4-"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law. (b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereinafter prescribe by law, counties of a population of more than 200,000 may classify or continue to classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each class. The level of assessment or rate of taxation of the highest class in a county shall not exceed two and one-half times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest class in that county.

a. People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1919), "... The great central

and dominant idea of the constitution is uniformity of taxation. . . . Therefore, one person cannot be compelled to pay a greater proportion of taxes, according to the value of his property, than another. . . ."

b. Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417 (1932), "Under our successive constitutions uniformity of taxation has been and is a mandate to the taxing authorities and lies at the foundation of all taxing power. This rule of uniformity requires that one person shall not be compelled to pay a greater proportion of the taxes, according to the value of his land, than another. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality cannot exist without uniformity in the basis of assessment as well as the rate of taxation.. (Emphasis added.)

c. Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 72 N.E. 2d 210 (1947), . . .There is no doubt there may be differences in rates between municipalities located in different counties, but differences in rates do not constitute a violation of the constitutional provision which demands that there be uniformity as to valuation so that every person or corporation will pay in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property. . . . The fixing of a rate

A. General Provisions

1. Art. I, Sec. 1-"We declare, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and well-being. For the advancement of these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government."

a. Dept. of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 72 N.E. 2d 747 (1947), "We have not found a

decision of the Supreme Court of the United States where a similar state regulation has been upheld in the light of the 14th Amendment, but had there been such a decision, this court would not be bound by the same when considering the involved statute as to whether it is in conflict with said Article I, Section 1 of our Constitution although this section and the 14th Amendment are similar in meaning and application. Such a decision would only be persuasive."

2. Art. I, Section 23-"The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."

a. Tinder v. Music Operating, Inc., 237 Ind. 33,

142 N.E. 2d 610 (1957), “In determining the validity of a classification, the court will, in every case, look behind the thing legislated upon and decide the issue on the basis of whether or not its purpose is reasonable and treats all members within the class alike. . . ."

b. School City of Elwood v. State, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N.E. 471 (1932), "The classification, to be constitutional, must be reasonable and natural, not capricious or arbitrary; it must embrace all who naturally belong to the class; there must be some inherent and substantial difference germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation between those included within the class and those excluded."

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c. Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372 (1935), "It is well settled that Article X, Section 1 which provides for uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, applies only to property taxes under a general levy. . . . Appellants contend that, if the tax in question is held to be an excise, the difference in rates as applied to the various classifications make it invalid and unconstitutional as denying the equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution. of Indiana. It is clear that, under the Constitution of Indiana, equality of taxation is not required except in a case of taxes affecting property by general levy; and the rule of equality, that there shall be no exemptions and no discrimination, does not apply under the Constitution of this State or of the United States so long as all persons in like circumstances are treated alike. The Legislature has full power to select one class for taxation to the exclusion of another, and to tax different classes at different rates."

B. Education Provisions

I. Art. VIII, Sec. 1-"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide by law, for a general and uniform system of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all."

a. Adamson v. Auditor and Treasurer of Warren County, 9 Ind. 174 (1857), "The law conferring the authority to tax must be general, not special; but the exercise of the power need not be uniform throughout the state. That may vary with the

wants, tastes, and abilities of different localities...." (Regarding taxes to support public education.)

b. Schooltown of Windfall City v. Somerville, 181 Ind. 463, 104 N.E. 859 (1914), "By section 1 of Article [VIII] of our state constitution the people have issued a mandate to the Legislature 'to provide by law, for a general and uniform system of public schools.' This it has done and created administrative corporations to which it has delegated authority to perform what is declared in the constitution to be a state function. Manifestly the Legislature has supreme authority over these agents of it, save only as it is restrained by the state constitution. . . .”

c. Shepardson v. Gillett, 133 Ind. 125, 31 N.E. 788 (1892), "We are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant in his contention that the provision contained in Elliott's Supp. 5826, cl. 19, authorizing the board of trustees of incorporated towns to levy and collect annual taxes not exceeding 30 cents on the hundred dollars' valuation on property subject to taxation for the support of town schools within their corporations, is repugnant to article 8, section 1. . . . [W]hatever doubts and uncertainties may have rested upon this question... have been set at rest by the case of Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N.E. 698, which holds that the enactment of laws granting the power to the various local subdivisions of the state to levy and collect taxes for the support of their public schools, which applies to all local subdivisions of that class, is a general and uniform system within the meaning of the constitution. . . ." d. School City of Terre Haute v. Harrison School Tp., 184 Ind. 742, 112 N.E. 514 (1916), "It has always been the policy of this state to encourage education, upon the theory that knowledge and learning generally diffused throughout a community, is essential to the preservation of a free government. . . . Based upon these provisions of the Constitution [Article VII, Section 1], and fostered by laws passed in pursuance thereof, our system of free common schools has developed until it has become a source of pride to every citizen of the state.

"There can be no doubt that public education is a function of the state. The state in its sovereign capacity has a direct interest in the enlightenment and mental development of its citizens, to the end that free government may be preserved and may attain its highest efficiency. The school fund, from which the tuition revenue is derived, belongs to the state, and it is administered by the state in the

e. School City of Gary v. State, 253 Ind. 697, 256 N.E. 2d 909 (1970), "Appellant first argues that the Act is violative of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution of Indiana which provides for a general and uniform system of common schools. Specifically, it is argued that in cities of over 90,000 population there would exist a distinctly different educational facility. We disagree. The requirements of 'general and uniform' do not mean identical. The statutes in question are designed to operate uniformly in all parts of the state where the same circumstances and conditions exist.

"As a corollary to the first specification appellant argues that the Act is violative of Article 4, Section 22 of the Constitution of Indiana, which prohibits the legislature from passing local or special laws for the support of common schools. An Act is not local or special if it operates uniformly in all areas where the same conditions exist and applies equally to all who come within its provisions. As we noted above, this Act meets these requirements. Cities and towns may be classified upon the basis of population, and laws applicable to a particular class can be regarded as general and not local or special. The classification must be natural and reasonable. We are of the opinion the classification is not of the type which is unreasonable. The wisdom of public policy of such a classification is for the legislature."

a. Kerr v. Perry School Tp., 162 Ind. 310, 70 N.E. 246 (1904), "This provision of our fundamental law clearly applies to assessments and taxation, and does not profess to control the expenditure of money arising out of any assessment or taxation of property. It deals with uniformity and equal rate of assessment and taxation of property within the taxing district or locality in which the particular tax is levied. . . .

"Appellee insists that taxes are not equal and uniform when all persons within the district or locality do not share equally in the benefits derived therefrom. But benefits derived from taxes levied, and the uniformity of assessment and taxation within the particular district or locality, are entirely different questions."

b. Smith v. Stephens, 173 Ind. 564, 91 N.E. 167 (1910), "What property shall be assessed and how taxed, is a legislative question, so long as there is uniformity and equality of rate, as to those of the same class."

c. State v. Meeker, 182 Ind. 240, 105 N.E. 906 (1914), "While it is true that the operation of this law may in a varying degree affect the tax rate of the several counties of the state, that fact is not due to any imperfection in the law itself. A perfect and equal system of taxation throughout an entire state will remain an unattainable good as long as counties, townships or other political subdivisions are unequal in wealth or of unequal size. . . .

"It is sufficient if a tax for state purposes is uniform throughout the state; or, if for county or township purposes, then it must be uniform throughout the county or township."

d. See Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, Supra.

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Tit. 28, Sec. 505—“. . . .[E]very child between the ages of seven . . . and sixteen . . . shall attend public school or other school. . . ."

E. School Finance Policy Statement

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