Obrázky stránek
PDF
ePub

rendered, suspended or contracted away; and all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects throughout the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied for public purpose only. . . . The valuation and classification fixed for state purposes shall be the valuation and classification for local purposes; but the taxing authorities of the local subdivision may adopt a different percentage of such valuation for purposes of local taxation."

a. Bel Oil Corporation v. Roland, 242 La. 498, 137 So. 2d 308, appeal dismissed 83 S. Ct. 22, 371 U.S. 2 (1962), "The legislature of a state may exercise a wide discretion in selecting the subjects of taxation. It may select those who are engaged in one class of business and exclude those engaged in others, if all similarly situated are brought within the class and all members of the class are dealt with according to uniform rules. . . .

"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution nor the equality and uniformity requirements of the State Constitution prohibit the making of classifications in legislation relating to taxation.”

b. Drouin v. Board of Directors, 136 La. 393, 67 So. 191 (1915), "While article 225 [now Art. I, Sec. 1] provides that 'taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax,' the several parish boards of directors of the public schools throughout the state are authorized to impose additional taxes for the support of the public schools in the school districts of the parishes. The property taxpayers in any one school district of a parish may authorize additional taxation within their district for additional support of the public schools, and for the purpose of erecting school houses in such district, although taxpayers in other school districts, in the same parish, may not impose upon themselves the same or an equal amount of taxation. The objection of plaintiff, therefore, that the tax in district No. 50 is not equal and uniform with the tax imposed in school district No. 37, or other districts in Avayelles Parish, is not well founded."

c. Woodard v. Bienville Parish School Board, 169 La. 831, 126 So. 207 (1930), "The complaint that the tax levied or to be levied in the district as enlarged will not be equal and uniform because the people residing in the original district will be required to pay more taxes than those residing in the added territory is equally untenable. .

"It may be true that the people who reside in the original school district will be required to pay

more taxes for school purposes than their neighbors who live within the added territory. This amounts to an increase of the taxes exacted from those who reside in the old district, but does not make the tax unequal within the meaning of the constitution.

"The tax in the old district is equal and uniform throughout that district, and so likewise is the tax equal and uniform throughout the district as enlarged.

"The authority to create the larger district necessarily included the authority to levy an additional tax throughout the larger district, provided, of course, that the latter tax added to the first does not exceed the limit fixed in the Constitution, which is not the case."

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Tit. XVII, Sec. 221-"Every parent, tutor, or other person residing within the State of Louisiana, having control or charge of any child between the ages of seven and fifteen, both inclusive (i.e., from the seventh to the sixteenth birthday), shall send such child to a public or private day school provided that any child below the ages of seven who legally enrolls in school shall also be subject to the provisions of this sub-part. Every parent, tutor, or other person responsible for sending a child to a public or private day school under provisions of this sub-part shall also assure the attendance of such child in regularly assigned classes during regular school hours established by the school board."

E. School Finance Policy Statement

1. Art. XII, Sec. 14-"State funds for the support of public common schools of elementary and secondary grades shall be derived from the following sources and shall be apportioned to the parish school boards in the manner herein provided: . . .

"FIFTH: Such funds as the legislature has or hereafter may designate, allocate, appropriate, or otherwise provide thereafter or destine thereto; . . . . "(a) Three-fourths (34) of this State fund shall be apportioned and distributed to the several parish school boards in this State and shall be paid in monthly installments, in the proportion that the number of educable children from six (6) to eighteen (18) years of age, inclusive, in each parish, bears to the total number of such educable children in the state; . . . .

[ocr errors]

"(b) One-fourth (14) of this State fund shall be apportioned and distributed to the parish school board on the basis of equalization, so as to provide and insure a minimum educational program in the common public schools of the state. . . ." (Note: Constitutional provision.)

a. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 215 La. 703, 41 So. 2d 509 (1949), "The provisions of the present section 14 of Article XII of our Constitution, however, are not free of ambiguity; and, when considered in the light of the history of their development, they

can reasonably be construed as requiring the legislature only to maintain in the State Public School Fund, to be apportioned and distributed therefrom under the prescribed formula, an annual sum of at least $10,000,000.00. Any excess in such fund, it logically follows under that construction, may be similarly apportioned, or it may be otherwise distributed in such manner as the legislature deems advisable, because, subject only to constitutional restrictions, that body's power over state funds is plenary."

MAINE

A. General Provisions

1. Art. I, Sec. 1-"All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."

a. State v. Mitchell, 97 Me. 66, 53 A. 887 (1902), "No one now questions that these constitutional provisions prevent a state making discrimination as to their legal rights and duties between persons on account of their nativity, their ancestry, their race, their creed, their previous condition, their color of skin or eyes or hair, their height, weight, physical or mental strength, their wealth or poverty, or other personal characteristics or attributes, or the amount of business they do. It must be conceded, on the other hand, that these constitutional provisions do not prevent a state diversifying its legislation or other action to meet diversities in situations and conditions within its borders." (Unconstitutional license fee.)

2. Art. I, Sec. 6-"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not . . . be deprived of his life, liberty, property or privileges, but by . . . the law of the land."

a. Jordan v. Gaines, 136 Me. 291, 8 A. 2d 585

(1939), "The phrase 'due process of law' and 'law of the land' are identical in meaning. They are of equivalent import and interchangeable."

B. Education Provision

1. Art. VIII, Sec. 1—“A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote this important object, the legislatures are authorized and it shall be their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable provision at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools, and it shall further be their duty to encourage and suitably endow, from time to time, as the circumstances of the people may authorize, all academies, colleges and seminaries of learning within the state. . . ."

a. Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912), “. . . .Objections, however, are raised to the manner of distribution, and the plaintiff contends that in considering the constitutionality of a statute creating revenue by taxation the method of distribution as well as of assessment should be scrutinized. . . . In other words, while four subdivisions of the state are made to contribute to the fund, only three are permitted to share in the financial benefits.

"This objection, however, is without legal foundation. The legislature has the right under the Constitution to impose an equal rate of taxation upon all the property in the state, including the property in unorganized townships, for the purpose of distributing the proceeds thereof among the cities, towns and plantations for common school purposes, and the mere fact that the tax is assessed upon the property in four municipal subdivisions and distributed among three is not in itself fatal. . . .

". . . .In order that taxation may be equal and uniform in the constitutional sense, it is not necessary that the benefits arising therefrom should be enjoyed by all the people in equal degree, nor that each one of the people should participate in each particular benefit.

[ocr errors]
[merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

a. Shawmut Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Benton, 123 Me. 121, 122 A. 49 (1923), "The principle of equality, as courts and economists have observed, is cardinal in taxation. It requires a fair and equitable distribution so that each taxpayer shall contribute in proportion to his property. 'Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation, and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of the assessment, as well as in the rate of taxation.' Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U.S. 153, 25 L. Ed. 903, a case holding that equity will interfere to restrain the operation of an unconstitutional exercise of power.

(Petition for an abatement of assessed taxes.) b. Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 239, 80 A. 2d 421, (1951), "On that occasion the two questions asked were whether a proposed enactment, if it becomes a law, would violate the provisions of (1) section 8 of Article IX of the Constitution, or (2) any of the provisions thereof. The Justices restate the more inclusive issue thus raised as follows: 'In levying a state tax, is the legislature prohibited by the Constitution from fixing a higher rate of taxation upon lands outside of incorporated cities, towns and plantations than the rate. . . within such municipalities?' They answered it affirmatively, relying on said section 8, and advised that the proposed legislation was 'contrary to the Constitution'....

"We cannot doubt that Question No. 1 involves a more fundamental and underlying one, which might be stated as follows: 'Has the legislature any option, if it desires that the property in the unorganized territory of the state shall continue to contribute to the cost of government, or to the maintenance of schools, except to continue to tax all the property within the state, not exempt from taxation, at a uniform rate, according to its just value'?

"Statements of Justices of this court, not only in Opinions such as this but in decided cases, require a negative answer to that question. . . ."

d. Dyar v. Farmington Village Corp., 70 Me. 515 (1878), "One portion of the real estate of a town cannot be burdened with a tax from which

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

the remainder is exempt. It cannot be material whether the exempt or the non-exempt portion is the one mentioned. The result is the same. One portion is taxed and the other is exempt. Or, to speak with entire exactness, one portion has an additional tax placed upon it from which the remainder is exempt. And it is this result-this inequality of taxation—that renders the proceeding unconstitutional. . . .

'. . . .And we wish again to repeat, that no importance should be attached to the fact that the community or territory to be taxed is first created into a territorial corporation for some local purpose. . . . Such an act of incorporation relates only to the means-it does not affect the end. The objection is to the end; to the inequality of taxation for public purposes thereby produced, not to the machinery by which it is accomplished.

"Nor must such special taxation be confounded with a distribution of the public burdens. Such a distribution has always existed. County expenses are distributed among the several counties; town expenses among the several towns; and a portion of the expenses of our public schools among the several school districts. . . . All are burdened alike and by the same public laws. And, although such a distribution creates temporary inequalities of taxation, those differences ultimately adjust themselves, and that degree of equality which the constitution contemplates is obtained. .

“..

...

[N]or do we mean to say that for public purposes the state may not be divided into districts and the public burdens distributed among them. . . . What we mean to say is that one public district cannot be created within another, nor be allowed to overlap another, so that for the same public purpose, or for any other public purpose, one

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

A. General Provision

1. Bill of Rights, Art. 23-"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or deseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land."

a. Celanese Corp. of America v. Davis, 186 Md. 463, 47 A. 2d 379 (1946), "Of course, a statute to be constitutional, which applies only to those persons who fall within a specific class, must be reasonable and not arbitrary in its manner of classification. The grounds of difference must have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation in order that all persons in similar circumstances will be treated alike."

b. Howard Sports Daily v. Wellar, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210 (1941), “Unquestionably, if a law is applied and administered by public authority 'with an evil eye and an unequal hand' so as to make unjust discrimination between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, such denial of equal justice is within the prohibition of the Constitution."

B. Education Provisions

1. Bill of Rights, Art. 43-"That the legislature ought to encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious system of general education, the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, agriculture, commerce and manu

factures, and the general melioration of the condition of the people."

a. State v. Maryland Inst. for Promotion of Mechanical Arts, 87 Md. 643, 41 A. 126 (1898), "The forty-third article of the Declaration of Rights seems to have been intended to impress upon it [the legislature] the necessity of exercising for the public good the vast powers which it possesses."

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 1-"The General Assembly, at its First Session after the adoption of this constitution, shall by law establish throughout the state a thorough and efficient system of free public schools; and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance."

C. Taxing Provision

1. Bill of Rights, Art. XV-". . . . [T]hat the General Assembly shall, by uniform rules, provide for separate assessment of land and classification and sub-classifications of improvements on land and personal property, as it may deem proper; and all taxes thereafter provided to be levied by the state for the support of the General State Government, and by the counties and by the City of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to land within the taxing district, and uniform within the class or sub-class of improvements on land and personal property which the respective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy; yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community."

a. Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940), "The late Judge Alfred Niles in his work on Maryland Constitutional Law, pages 32, 33 makes the following comment: 'The last clause of the 15th article of the Declaration of Rights is considered as enlarging the taxing power of the legislature. And taxes laid under this enlargement of power are of a different class from 'property taxes.' Taxes laid with a political view are not 'property taxes' but are such taxes as the legislature may levy not upon property, but upon occupations, privileges, contracts, and things of that nature, and as to these the rule of equality is not applicable.'"

b. Miller v. Wicomico County Comm'rs, 107 Md. 438, 69 A. 118 (1908), "There can be no question as to the power of the legislature to create separate taxing districts within a county or city, provided the rate, assessment and taxation be made equal and uniform as to all property within the taxing district." (An act provided for a tax on the interest from mortgages to be applied only to certain counties.)

c. Rogan v. County Comm'rs of Calvert County, 194 Md. 299, 71 A. 2d 47 (1950), "It has long been recognized in this state that the legislature has the power to divide any county into taxing districts and that each county or taxing district can have its own rate of taxing without contravening article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. This

court has held that the provision in the amendment of Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights. . . declaring that all taxes levied by the state for the support of the State Government, and by the counties and by the City of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform as to land within the taxing district, refers to levies of taxes and not to assessments."

d. McGraw v. Merryman, 133 Md. 247, 104 A. 540 (1918), "Most of the argument on that subject [taxation] is met by the decision in Daly v. Morgan. . . . It is there held that the principle of equality in taxation was fully gratified by making local taxation equal and uniform as to all property within the limits of the taxing district...."

[blocks in formation]

MASSACHUSETTS

A. General Provisions

1. Declaration of Rights, Art. I, Sec. 2-"All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property. . . ."

a. Att'y General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916), "The right to vote is a fundamental personal and

political right. The equal right of all qualified to elect officers is one of the securities of the Bill of Rights, Articles 1-9."

2. Declaration of Rights, Art. X, Sec. 1—“Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently to contribute his share to the expense of this protection; to give his personal services, or an equivalent, when necessary. . . .” a. Opinion of the Justices to the House of

« PředchozíPokračovat »