Representatives, 357 Mass. 827, 257 N.E. 2d 94 (1970), "The proposed bill seems clearly to fall within the language of the quoted decision [Shapiro v. Thompson]. In fact, the bill appears open to more serious objections than the statutes held invalid. Instead of a one-year waiting period the proposed bill has what upon analysis is a twoyear waiting period. In addition, the bill, if enacted, might lead to the creation of a number of different rates of welfare payments depending upon the number of applicants, the number of states from which the applicants respectively came, and the varying rates of welfare payments in those states....

"We believe that the section intended is Article X of the Declaration of Rights. The phrase, 'equal protection of the laws,' it will be noted, does not appear in those exact words. Nevertheless, that is the provision of our constitution which may be appropriately cited to raise the same constitutional principle."

b. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E. 2d 10 (1961), "The bills present for consideration . . . the question whether the whole 1961 property tax assessment scheme violates the constitution of the Commonwealth. . . . See also Article X of the Declaration of Rights, which reads 'Each individual . . . has a right to be protected... in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share (emphasis in text) to the expense of this protection. . . .' It is well settled that the words 'his share' in Article X of the Declaration of Rights 'forbid the imposition upon one taxpayer of a burden relatively greater or relatively less than that imposed upon other taxpayers'."

c. See also Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 738, 167 N.E. 2d 745 (1960).

B. Education Provision

1. Chapter V, Sec. II, Sec. 91-"Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunity and advantages of education in the various parts of the country and among different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially

a. City of Northhampton v. County of Hampshire, 145 Mass. 108, 13 N.E. 388 (1887), "It is obvious that the principal, perhaps the only, object of the constitutional provision that taxes shall be 'proportional and reasonable,' is the protection of the taxpayer against any arbitrary, unjust, or oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. If, for instance, the legislature should arbitrarily designate a certain class of persons on whom are imposed, without reference to any rule of proportion, or without regard to the share of the public charge which either should bear relatively to that borne by other persons or property or without regard to any special benefit which might accrue to the property subjected to the tax, such imposition would be unlawful. . . .

"

b. Carr v. Assessors of Springfield, 339 Mass. 89 157 N.E. 2d 880 (1959), “Article IV has been consistently construed as establishing the principle of uniformity of taxation of all classes of taxable property."

c. Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E. 2d 795 (1955), "For present purposes the emphasis in this article is upon the words 'proportional and reasonable.' Of this expression this court said in Chesire v. County Commissioners of Berkshire, 118 Mass. 359 at p. 389, that the provision requires that all taxes levied under its authority be 'proportional and reasonable' and forbids their imposition upon one class of persons or property at a different rate from that which is applied to other

classes, whether that discrimination is effected directly in the assessment or indirectly through arbitrary and unequal methods of valuation."

...

d. Opinion of the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 108 N.E. 570 (1915), “The answers to all these questions depend upon the interpretation of [section 36,] article IV of the Constitution of Massachusetts, whereby the General Court is empowered 'to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and taxes. . . .' These words contain the entire grant to tax. The power to tax, which includes the power to levy assessments, rates and taxes, relates to persons and property. The power in this respect is not boundless. It is restricted to the extent that it must be 'proportional and reasonable.' These are words of limitation. Capitation and property taxes must be levied in conformity to this limitation. The significant word in the present connection is 'proportional.' A general property tax, in order to be proportional, must be divided so that the amount to be raised shall be shared by the taxpayers according to the taxable real and personal estate of each.

e. Att'y General v. Board of Public Welfare, 313 Mass. 675, 48 N.E. 2d 689 (1943), "The legislature has a wide discretion under the constitution to determine the extent to which public burdens shall be borne directly by the Commonwealth or imposed upon the several cities and towns, and, if so imposed, the manner in which these burdens shall be distributed among the cities and towns,

so long, at least, as such burdens are imposed without unreasonable discrimination.”

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Tit. XII, Chapter 76, Sec. 1-"Every child between the minimum and maximum ages established for school attendance by the board of education... [shall] attend a public school in said town, or some other day school approved by the school committee, during the entire time the public schools are in session. .

a. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402 (1893), "The great object of these provisions of the statutes has been that all the children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular way. To this end public schools are established, so that all children may be sent to them, unless other sufficient means of education are provided for them."

E. School Finance Policy Statement

1. Tit. XII, Chapter 70, Sec. 1—“The purpose of the financial assistance provided by this chapter shall be to promote the equalization of educational opportunity in the public schools of the commonwealth and the equalization of the burden of the cost of school support to the respective cities and towns. Assistance provided under this chapter shall be designated as school aid."

A. General Provisions

1. Art. II, Sec. 1-"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection."

a. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Co., 360 Mich. 510, 104 N.W. 2d 182 (1960), "Michigan has previously held that article 2, § 1, of its Constitution affords the same rights

as the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution." (Accord, Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W. 2d 98 (1966); People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W. 2d. 16 (1959); Fox v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich. 579, 153 N.W. 2d. 644 (1967); People v. Harper, 1 Mich. App. 480, 136 N.W. 2d. 768 (1965).)

b. McDaniel v. Campbell, Wyant and Cannon

Foundry Co., 367 Mich. 356, 116 N.W. 2d. 835 (1962), "Plaintiff seems to suggest that if the reasons which would justify the classification in a particular case are not the ones of which the legislature can be shown to have been thinking at the time it made the classification, then the latter must fall when the reason the legislature did have in mind is insufficient for that case. There is no support for this doctrine. It is enough if a state of facts can be conceived which would form a reasonable basis for the classification." (See also Council 23 v. Civil Service Commission, Wayne Co., 32 Mich. App. 243, 188 N.W. 2d. 206 (1971); Baldwin v. North Shores Estates Association, 384 Mich. 42, 179 N.W. 2d. 398 (1970).)

c. Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 34 Mich. App. 489, 192 N.W. 2d. 52 (1972). This case was an unsuccessful constitutional attack, using a fundamental interest argument, on a statute that excluded migrant farm workers from workmen's compensation benefits.

2. Art. I, Sec. 2-"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation." (Note: Convention comment, ... the convention record notes that 'the principal, but not exclusive, areas of concern are equal opportunities in employment, education, housing and public accommodations.'")

a. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 61 N.W. 2d. 102 (1953), ". . . [T]he guaranty of equal protection of the law is not one of equality of operation or application to all citizens of the state or nation, but rather one of equality of operation or applicability within the particular class affected, which classification must, of course, be reasonable." (Relating to an unsuccessful contention that a pretrial discovery procedure is unconstitutional as it is only limited to judicial circuits having a pretrial calendar.)

b. In re Fox's Estate, 154 Mich. 5, 117 N.W. 558 (1908), reversed on other grounds 124 N.W. 60, 159 Mich. 420, "But every Constitution in the Union is founded upon the principle 'that all men are equal before the law, and that life, liberty, and property are secured for all alike.' Such principle, however, is no broader in its scope and effect than the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, and no law which can be sustained under such provisions of the federal

Constitution can be held, in those respects, to violate either the letter or the spirit of our State Constitution." (Relating to the assessment of inheritance tax.)

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c. People's Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v. City of Flint, 358 Mich. 34, 99 N.M. 2d. 522 (1959), ". . . .It has been generally held that legislative bodies may distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation. It suffices if the classification is practical. They may prescribe different regulations for different classes, and discrimination as between classes is not such as to invalidate the legislative enactment. The one requirement is that the ordinance must affect all persons similarly situated or engaged in the same business without discrimination. (Relating to Sunday closing laws.) (Accord, People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W. 2d. 18 (1942).)

d. Palmer Park Theatre Co. v. City of Highland Park, 362 Mich. 326, 106 N.W. 2d. 845 (1961), "The general rule is stated in Mulloy v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 246 Mich. 632, 638, 225, N.W. 615, 615, where this court quoted with approval the following language: 'The classification must be based upon substantial and real differences in the classes, which are germane to the purpose of the law and reasonably suggest the propriety of substantially different legislation [emphasis in original throughout], the legislation must apply to each member of the class, and the classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, but must be so framed as to include in the class additional members as they acquire the characteristics of the class. Bingham v. Board of Supervisors, 127 Wis. 344, 106 N.W. 1071.

"In Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 141-142, 166 N.W. 938, 940, this court said: "It is elementary that legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose for the common good, is limited by reasonable and justifiable differentiation to a distinct type or class of persons is not for that reason unconstitutional, because class legislation, if germane to the object of the enactment and made uniform in its operation upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies; but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one portion and denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary sub-classification it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.'" (Relating to a successful challenge to a city ordinance imposing a license fee on use of non-recirculating air-conditioning

equipment having a capacity of five tons or more.)

e. Burgess v. City of Detroit, 359 Mich. 269, 102 N.W. 2d. 483 (1960)—“The remaining question is whether such exclusion (i.e., widows of firemen and policemen who died prior to a 1940 Amendment to the City Charter) makes the amendment unconstitutional. All widows of policemen and firemen whose husbands were members of the new policemen and firemen retirement system at date of death or retirement are in one class and subject to the new provisions for benefits. All widows prior to the amendment are in another class. This Court has many times held that legislation is not unconstitutional because it is legislation of a particular kind or character, or because it benefits a particular class, so long as the law operates equally upon those within the particular class. . . . This amendment includes all within the respective classes; consequently, it is not arbitrary or unreasonable. The legislative body in its wisdom determines who shall receive benefits. In this instance it chose to exclude plaintiffs. This Court cannot and will not question its reasons unless they appear to be palpably arbitrary or unreasonable."

f. Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Beuland, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353 (1921), "We shall discuss the question of uniformity under the state constitution and of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment together. Both involve the question of classification. The objection here made grows out of the fixing of a maximum and a minimum in the amount of tax to be paid. It is pointed out in the briefs and upon the argument the difference in percentage paid by the small corporation and the large one. We might not find difficulty in agreeing that the law was economically unjust, that in policy it is wrong, but the question of policy belongs to another branch of government.

That absolute uniformity, absolute equality, in taxation is Utopian has long been recognized. That the legislature has the power to classify has also long been recognized. That it is the abuse of such power, not its exercise, that is within the constitutional inhibition, numerous decisions demonstrate. . . .

180 N.W. 2d. 778 (1970), "In discussing the due process of law question we must consider the nature of its guarantee. The constitutional guarantee that 'no person shall be deprived of property, without due process of law' is, in its most fundamental sense, a limitation upon arbitrary power and a guarantee against arbitrary legislation demanding that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object to be attained."

b. See also Lucking v. People, 320 Mich. 495, 31 N.W. 2d. 707 (1948).

B. Education Provisions

1. Art. 8, Sec. 1-"Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

a. Michigan Female Seminary v. Secretary of State, 115 Mich. 118, 73 N.W. 131 (1897), "It has always been the policy of this state, as indicated by the provisions of the constitution and a long line of legislative enactments to encourage the cause of education. . . ." (Relating to the question of whether a franchise fee law applies to an educational institution.)

b. School District of City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591, 116 N.W. 2d. 866 (1962), "Unlike the delegation of other powers by the legislature to local governments, education is not inherently a part of the local self-government of a municipality except insofar as the legislature may choose to make it such. Control of our public school system is a State matter delegated and lodged in the State legislature by the Constitution. The policy of the State has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies organized with plenary powers to carry out the delegated functions given it by the legislature." (Relating to transfer of property between school districts under a state law. View not followed in subsequent cases.)

c. Dennis v. Wrigley, 175 Mich. 621, 141 N.W. 605 (1913), "The Constitution of 1908, art. 11, § 1 [now art. VIII, §1], provides . . . [cites provision]. This language is taken from the ordinance of 1787. The reassertion of this doctrine after the lapse of more than a century and a quarter, coupled with the fact that legislation in this state upon the subject of education has from the beginning been

of the most liberal character, indicates a settled purpose on the part of the state to provide, foster, and protect educational facilities for all." (Relating to the duty of a school board that has discontinued the school in the district to provide transportation for pupils to another school.)

d. Stuart v. School District No. 1 of Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 (1874), "We supposed it had always been understood in this state that education, not merely in the rudiments, but in an enlarged sense, was regarded as an important practical advantage to be supplied at their option to rich and poor alike, and not as something pertaining merely to culture and accomplishment to be brought as such within the reach of those whose accumulated wealth enabled them to pay for it. . . .

"It would be instructive to make liberal extracts from this report did time and space permit. The superintendent would have teachers thoroughly trained, and he would have the great object of common school 'to furnish good instruction in all the elementary and common branches of knowledge, for all classes of community, as good indeed, for the poorest boy of the state as the rich man can furnish for his children with all his wealth'. . . (Emphasis in original.)

"We content ourselves with the statement that neither in our state policy, in our constitution, or in our laws, do we find the primary school districts restricted in the branches of knowledge which their officers may cause to be taught, or the grade of instruction that may be given, if their voters consent in regular form to bear the expense and raise the taxes for the purpose."

e. Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1, 84 N.W. 2d. 327 (1957), "We are in accord with the finding of the trial judge that under the present school code the defendant school district is not charged with the duty of accepting nonresident pupils. The language of the statute must be construed as it reads. It is not within the province of this Court to read therein a mandate that the legislature has not seen fit to incorporate. . . . If the school code in its present form results in injustice to the plaintiffs, and to others in like situations, the remedy lies with the legislature."

f. Board of Education of City of Detroit v. Elliott, 319 Mich. 436, 29 N.W. 2d. 902 (1947), "It is contended that it is not within the power of the legislature to create a school district embracing the entire state. . . Conceding such measure of authority, however, the conclusion does not follow that the entire state can be declared a school

district within the meaning of that term as used in art. 10 § 23 of the Constitution. . . . [T]he school district is commonly regarded as a state agency. Such concept is scarcely consistent with the idea of the state making itself a school district and treating such district as an agency of the state. . . .

...

...

"The practical situation presented is that the legislature did not appropriate to school districts of the state entitled to annual grants under . . . the Constitution. . . . It did not, in other words, comply with the mandatory formula hereinbefore discussed. . . . However, . . . the court may not direct or control legislative action. In consequence, whether the deficiency is made up by a further appropriation rests wholly with the legislature."

g. Pingree v. Board of Education of City of Detroit, 99 Mich. 404, 58 N.W. 333 (1894), "As we understand it, counsel means by this contention that the school system must be uniform throughout the state. But these are not the only acts of the legislature which, in a measure, have given a different interpretation to these provisions of the constitution than that contended for. Uniformity of districts has not been kept up; graded schools have been established. . . In Perrizo v. Kessler, 93 Mich. 280, 53 N.W. 391, it was said: "The constitution of 1850 left to the legislature, as did the preceding constitution, the establishment of a system of primary schools; restricting the legislature only by providing that a school shall be kept, without charge for tuition at least three months in each year, and that all instruction in said schools shall be conducted in the English language. . . . It is apparent that with the restrictions mentioned in Perrizo v. Kessler, supra, the whole primary school system was confided to the legislature by the constitution. . . ."

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 2-"The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin."

a. Child Welfare Society v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 189 N.W. 1002 (1922), "The primary school system must be continued. The foundation stone of this system was and is free education. It guarantees to the child of the state the right to secure a primary education free of charge. . . . The legislature has entire control over the schools of the state, subject only to the provisions above referred to [education provisions]. The division of the territory of the state into districts,