the conduct of the school, the qualifications of teachers, the subjects to be taught therein, are all within its control." (Relating to the right of children to admission to the public schools in the school district in which they were living.)

b. Bond v. Public Schools of Ann Arbor School District, 383 Mich. 693, 178 N.W. 2d. 484 (1970), "The word 'free' is susceptible of various meanings, depending upon the context in which it is used. As the word is used in art. 8, § 2, Constitution of 1963, however, it clearly means without cost or charge and must have been so commonly understood by the people. . . . The test adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court-'necessary elements of any school's activity'-is a sound construction of the meaning of the word 'free,' as used in the Idaho Constitution. . . . Applying either the 'necessary elements of any school's activity' test or the 'integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education' test, it is clear that books and school supplies are an essential part of a system of free public elementary and secondary schools."

C. Taxing Provision

1. Art. IX, Sec. 3-"The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property not exempt by law. . . . Every tax other than the general ad valorem property tax shall be uniform upon the class or classes on which it operates."

a. Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Auth. v. Boards of Sup'rs, Etc., 304 Mich. 328, 8 N.W. 2d 84 (1943), "A constitutional provision requiring a uniform rule of taxation was considered in the case of Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1. The court said, 3 Ohio St. at page 15: 'What is meant by the words "taxing by a uniform rule?" And to what is the rule applied by the constitution? No language in the constitution, perhaps, is more important than this; and to accomplish the beneficial purposes intended, it is essential that they should be truly interpreted, and correctly applied. "Taxing" is required to be "by a uniform rule," that is, by one and the same unvarying standard. Taxing by a uniform rule requires uniformity, not only in the rate of taxation but also uniformity in the mode of the assessment upon the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation; and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the

mode of the assessment as well as in the rate of taxation. But this is not all. The uniformity must be co-extensive with the territory to which it applies. If a state tax, it must be uniform over all the state; if a county, town or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the extent of the territory to which it is applicable.'

b. Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560 (1853), "Before noticing the distinction urged by counsel upon the argument, it seems proper to remark that every species of taxation, in every mode, is in theory and principle, based upon an idea of compensation, benefit or advantage to the person or property taxed, either directly or indirectly. If the tax is levied for the support of the government and general police of the state, for the education and moral instruction of the citizens, or the construction of works of internal improvement, he is supposed to receive a just compensation in the security which the government affords to his person and property, the means of enjoying his possessions, and their enhanced capacity to contribute to his comfort and gratification, which constitute their value.

"Taxation, not based upon any idea of benefit to the person taxed, would be grossly unjust, tyrannical, and oppressive, and might well be characterized as 'public robbery'. . . .

"Some of the provisions of the constitution herein before referred to, and several others, were cited by the counsel for the complainant, for the purpose of showing that it enjoins a just principle of equality in regard to all public burdens, and prescribes as a limit to the exercise of the taxing power, that common burdens should be substained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule, and apportioned according to some uniform ratio of equality. This may be readily admitted as a just and equitable rule. The soundness of such a proposition is too well approved by good sense and too well supported by the theory of free government and equal rights to be seriously questioned. . . .

"Every general law, however wisely and carefully perfected, will, in its practical operation, work oppression and injustice to some. Equality, like perfection, when applied to man or his works, is a relative term. Legislators, however wise and honest they may be, can only hope to approximate that high standard of perfection in their laws, which would work equal and exact justice to all. . . ." (Emphases in original.)

c. See also School District Number 9 v. Board

549 (1912), "The people of the state have long believed in establishing schools at which the children should be educated. The taxpayer, though having no child, is taxed to support the public schools. To insure the education of all the children, the Truant Act, so called, was passed. These measures are justified upon the theory that in a republic all the citizens should be so educated as to be able when attaining maturity to intelligently act upon the questions awaiting solution by adult citizens. . .”

...

E. School Finance Policy Statement

None.

A. General Provisions

1. Art. I, Sec. 2-"No member of this state shall be disenfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the state otherwise than the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

a. Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 295 N.W. 75 (1941), "Legislation which selects particular individuals from a class and imposes upon them special burdens from which others in the same class are exempt is class legislation, violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal constitution and of the uniformity clause of the state constitution. . . . These constitutional limitations do not curtail the power of the legislature to classify and to adopt different rules for different classes. They both require, however, that the classification be not unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, but that it operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances. . . . If the classification be based upon substantial distinctions which

make one class really different from another, it is not violative of the constitutional provisions even though some inequalities may result."

b. State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313 (1939), "The general principles to be applied are well established. Class legislation is forbidden by Article I, section 2 and Article IV, section 33 of the state constitution as well as by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. . . . The problem arises when a law selects particular individuals from a class and imposes on them special burdens from which others of the same class are exempt. . . . To operate uniformly, a law must bring within its influences all who are in the same condition and treat them alike. Legislative enactments which discriminate against some and favor others are prohibited unless they affect alike all persons similarly situated and the classification is not arbitrary. . . ."

c. C. Thomas Stores Sales System v. Spaeth, 209 Minn. 504, 297 N.W. 9 (1941), "The standards of equal protection under Constitution Article I, sect. 2, and Article IV, sections 33 and 34, and of uniformity under Article IX, section 1, are the same as the standard of equality required by the

equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. . . . "Equal protection does not require any iron rule of equality of taxation. The distribution of the tax burden in such a manner as seems equitable is recognized as a proper exercise of the power of taxation. The selection of subjects of taxation and exemption is inherent in that power. The process of selection involves classification with resulting diversity in the subjects selected for taxation and exemption as well as in the amount of the tax. Classification must not be arbitrary. By that is meant that distinction must rest upon some difference having a fair and substantial relation so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. . . .”

d. Village of Blaine v. Indpt. School Dist. No. 13, 272 Minn. 343, 138 N.W. 2d 32 (1965), "While school districts are not technically municipal corporations, they are at least public corporations. But they are not within Minn. Constitution, Article I, nor are they within U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, section 1. They are quasi-public corporations, governmental agencies with limited powers. They are arms of the state and are given corporate powers solely for the exercise of public functions for educational purposes."

2. Art. I, Sec. 7-"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. . .

a. Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-op, Marketing Ass'n v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 203 N.W. 420 (1925), "Due process of law and equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."

b. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940), "So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."

c. Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W. 2d 538 (1948), "The due process clause of our state constitution is not more restrictive than the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution."

d. See also Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W. 2d 343 (1951).

B. Education Provisions

1. Art. VIII, Sec. 1-"The stability of a republican form of government depends mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools."

a. State v. Erickson, 190 Minn. 216, 251 N.W. 519 (1934), "Article VIII, sections 1 and 3 of the state constitution, charges the legislature with the duty of creating and maintaining a general and uniform system of public schools. Under this provision the legislature is granted plenary powers over all matters relating to public schools excepting only as the same are restricted by constitutional provisions. Recognizing the existence of a limited local interest in the matter of education, this court so frequently has affirmed the doctrine that the maintenance of the public schools is a matter of state and not of local concern that it is unnecessary further to review the authorities at this date."

b. Board of Education v. Erickson, 209 Minn. 39, 295 N.W. 302 (1940), "By our constitution the mandate of establishing a general and uniform system of public schools was directed to the legis lature. Further, 'the legislature shall make such provisions, by taxation or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township in the state.' Minn. Constitution, Article VIII, section 3. The method by which these objectives were to be accomplished was left to legislative determination."

c. See also Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Houghton, 181 Minn. 576, 233 N.W. 834 (1930).

d. State v. School Dist. No. 70, Otter Tail County, 204 Minn. 279, 283 N.W. 397 (1939), "Plaintiffs contend that the statute should be construed as being mandatory because Article VIII provides that it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools (section 1) and that the legislature shall make such provisions as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township of the state (section 3). These provisions of the constitution are a mandate to the legislature."

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 3-"The legislature shall make such provision, by taxation or otherwise as, with the income arising from the school fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township in the state."

C. Taxing Provision

1. Art. IX, Sec. 1-".... Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. . . .”

a. C. Thomas Stores Sales System v. Spaeth, supra.

b. Village of Robbinsdale v. County of Hennepin, 199 Minn. 203, 271 N.W. 491 (1937), "It is plaintiff's contention that as the matter involved here is the distribution of taxes already levied and collected... the 'unformity clause' does not apply. The argument is that, as the levy made is upon all property and is spread uniformly throughout the county in the same manner as other county levies, the requirement of uniformity is satisfied. We do not agree.

"There is no sound basis for the contention of plaintiff. The argument made is a technical one, and asks that a distinction be made between distribution of tax proceeds and the tax levy itself with regard to the question of improper classification. It is obvious that a tax may be just as discriminatory by means of distribution of proceeds obtained by a uniform tax levy as it may be by discriminating the actual levy of the tax. Furthermore, to so hold would be to open the way for circumvention of the requirement of uniformity imposed by Article IX, section 1 of the Constitution."

c. Johnson v. Donovan, 290 Minn. 421, 188 N.W. 2d 864 (1971), “Generally, the uniformity requirement means that all property within a class must be treated equally, not that all classes must be so treated. . . ."

d. In Re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 136 N.W. 2d 782 (1965), "Minn. Constitution

Article IX, section 1, provides that taxes shall be 'uniform upon the same class of subjects.' The legislature has a wide discretion in classifying property for the purposes of taxation, but the classification must be based on differences which furnish a reasonable ground for making a distinction between several classes. The difference must not be so wanting in substance that the classification results in permitting one to escape a burden imposed on another under substantially similar circumstances and conditions.

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Sec. 120.10 "Every child between seven and sixteen years of age shall attend a public school, or a private school, for a period of not less than nine months during any school year."

E. School Finance Policy Statement

1. Sec. 124.66-"State aid shall be for the following purposes:

"a. to assist in providing equal educational opportunities for all the school children of the

state;

"b. to assist in establishing certain generally accepted minimum standards for all the public schools of the state;

"c. to assist districts whose tax levies for maintenance are exceptionally high; and

"d. to stimulate educational progress by grants of state aid for superior efficiency and high standards and for desirable educational undertakings not yet generally established."

A. General Provision

1. Art. III, Sec. 14-"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law."

a. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 M. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938), "In the course of [developing the concept of due process of law, the courts] have expanded it beyond its literal meaning of 'due procedure' and have brought within it substantive

1. Art. VIII, Sec. 201-"The Legislature may, in its discretion, provide for the maintenance and establishment of free public schools for all children between the ages of six (6) and twenty-one (21) years, by taxation or otherwise, and with such grades as the Legislature may prescribe."

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 205-"The Legislature may, in its discretion, provide for the maintenance and establishment of a free public school or schools in each county in the state, with such term, or terms, as the Legislature may prescribe."

3. Art. VIII, Sec. 213-B-"(a) Regardless of any provisions of Article VIII, or any other provisions of this constitution to the contrary, the Legislature may authorize the establishment, support, maintenance and operation of public schools."

"(b) Regardless of any provision of Article VIII, or any other provisions of this constitution to the contrary, the legislature shall be and is hereby authorized and empowered, by a majority vote of those present and voting in each House, to abolish the public schools in this state, and enact suitable legislation to effect the same.

"(c) Regardless of any provision of Article VIII, or any other provisions of this constitution to the contrary, the legislature shall be and is hereby authorized and empowered by a majority vote of those present and voting in each House, to authorize the counties and school districts to abolish their public schools, and enact suitable legislation to effect the same.

"(d) In the event the legislature shall abolish, or authorize the abolition of the public schools in

•Sections 201 and 205 were adopted in 1960 to replace the former section 201 which placed a mandatory duty on the Legislature to encourage education and to establish a uniform public school system.

this state, then the legislature shall be and is hereby authorized and empowered to enact suitable legislation to dispose of school buildings, land and other school property by lease, sale or otherwise.

"(e) The legislature may appropriate state funds and authorize counties, municipalities and other governmental sub-divisions and districts to appropriate funds. . . to aid educable children of this state to secure an education.

"(f) The legislature may do any and all acts and things necessary for the purposes of this section, and this section is declared to be, and is supplemental to all other provisions of this constitution, and legislation enacted under authority hereof shall prevail, whether in conflict with other sections or not."

C. Taxing Provision

1. Art. IV, Sec. 112-"Taxation shall be uniform and equal throughout the state. Property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws, and by uniform rules, and in proportion to its value."

a. Culley v. Pearl River Industrial Commission, 234 M. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959), "Furthermore, the taxes are imposed equally on property within the District. No requirement of uniformity or equal protection under the Mississippi and Federal Constitutions limits the power of the legislature in respect to the allocation, distribution and application of public funds. . . . The equal and uniform requirement relates to the levy of taxes, and not to the distribution or application of the revenue of the state."

b. Redmond v. City of Jackson, 143 M. 114, 108 So. 444 (1926), "We think in appeals of this kind that the property should be assessed on the basis of equality taking the city as a whole. The rule is not that the party can pick out a particular piece of property and claim that it is assessed of a relatively lower figure than his own property."

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Sec. 6509-Repealed by the laws of 1956.

E. School Finance Policy Statement

None.