financial ability to whatever extent necessary in each school district to provide a minimum program of education. Therefore the quintessence of the state's financial obligation for such a program can be expressed in a formula on a per pupil basis

as: State financial aid equals school district basic support guarantee for a minimum program minus local available funds produced by mandatory taxes. This formula is designated the Nevada plan."

A. General Provisions

1. Part I, Art. I-"All men are born equally free and independent; therefore, all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good."

a. H. P. Welch Co. v. State, 89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886 (1938), affirmed, 306 U.S. 79, 59 S. St. 438, "Under Part I of the Constitution of this State and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, persons similarly situated are guaranteed similarity of treatment. In this respect, the Fourteenth Amendment ‘adds nothing to the rights and liberties of the citizens of this State' (State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 115, 18 A. 878, 880), 'for our constitution secures to every person within its jurisdiction all the rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States by the amendment.' Not every legislative classification is within the ban of these constitutional limitations, however. 'Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited; but legislation which in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.' Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32. Or as stated in the Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H., 562, 564, 154 A. 217, 221: 'Classification to be valid must reasonably promote some proper object of public welfare in interest and may not be sustained when the selection and grouping is so arbitrary as to serve no useful purpose of a public nature.' Legislative classification to be constitutional must be based upon some substantial foundation, it may not be arbitrary, it must be germane to the purpose of

the law. Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 72, 73, 174 A. 193."

2. Part I, Art. II—“All men have certain natural, essential and inherent rights-among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness." a. Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 A. 193 (1934), "That the legislation may be of some public benefits is not enough, under the state constitution, to give it validity. In addition, it must not impair or destroy private rights guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . An equal property right is so specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights that it necessarily limits all subsequent grants of power to deal adversely therewith. . . . The test usually employed in this State to determine the constitutionality, not of the purpose the legislature had in view when it enacted a statute, but of the means it employed to effectuate a constitutional purpose, is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable . . . and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . . While the courts may not condemn police legislation because they regard it as inexpedient or unwise, yet the expediency is to be taken into account in respect to the importance of the public benefit the legislation seeks to promote, as well as the means it adopts to secure the benefit. Expediency involves utility, and if the legislation is directed to a public interest of minor concern, while imposing serious restrictions in regulation or bar of guaranteed rights to accomplish the interests, it tends to show its unreasonableness. On the other hand, the more insistent the public need of police measures, the

more may private rights be restricted to satisfy the need. . . . It is not that the courts say the legislation is inexpedient and therefore void, but that, finding the extent or character of the expediency they then balance it on the scales of reasonableness with the seriousness of the restriction of private rights sought to be imposed. . . .”

3. Part I, Art. III-"When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the protection of others; and, without such an equivalent, the surrender is void."

B. Education Provision

1. Part II, Art. LXXXIII—"Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage private and public institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and economy honesty and punctuality, sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the people. . . .”

a. Fogg v. Board of Education of Littleton, 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912), "The primary purposes of the maintenance of the common school system is the promotion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby to increase the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the government of society depends. Free schooling furnished by the State is not so much a right granted to the pupils as a duty imposed upon them for the public good. . . . While most people regard the public schools as the means of great personal advantage to the pupils, the fact is too often overlooked that they are governmental means of protecting the state from the consequences of an ignorant and incompetent citizenship. . . . [citing Art. LXXXIII] In accordance with this injunction, the state has always maintained for its protection and at great expense a common school system which long ago became

one of the most important governmental agencies....

... The duty of providing for the education of the children within its limits, through the support and maintenance of public schools, has always been regarded in this state in the light of a governmental duty resting upon the sovereign state. It is not a duty imposed by constitutional provision, but has always been assumed by the State, not only because the education of youth is a matter of great public utility, but also and chiefly because it is one of great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the state itself. In the performance of this duty, the State maintains and supports at great expense, and with an ever watchful solicitude, public schools throughout its territory, and secures to its youth the privilege of attendance therein. This is a privilege or advantage, rather than a right in the strict technical sense of the term. . . .

C. Taxing Provision

1. Part I, Art. XII-"Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such protection, and to yield his personal service when necessary. But no part of a man's property shall be taken from him, or applied to public uses without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people. Nor are the inhibitants of this state controllable by any other laws than those to which they, or their representative body, have given their consent."

a. Rollins v. City of Dover, 93 N.H. 448, 44 A. 2d 113 (1945), "Taxes must be not merely proportional, but in due proportion, so that each individual's just share, and no more shall fall upon him. Opinion of the Justices, 4 N.H. 565, 569. An equal division of burden requires that the same rate shall be applied to a proportional valuation of all property taxed in a given district. . . .

"What each is bound to contribute being a debt of constitutional origin and obligation, no part of the share of one can be constitutionally exacted of another. . . .”

b. Hinsdale v. County of Cheshire, 106 N.H. 330, 211 A. 2d 405 (1965), "We hold that Southwestern is benefiting the county of Cheshire and is also benefiting or is available to benefit Hinsdale. Consequently Cheshire can properly raise the

moneys to support Southwestern throughout the county. . There is no contention that this tax is not levied equally and proportionately on all taxpayers in Cheshire which is the constitutional equality required."

c. Monadnock School District v. Fitzwilliam, 105 N.H. 487, 203 A. 2d 46 (1964), "To promote the general welfare by equalizing the educational opportunities of all the children of the State, the legislature can provide foundation aid to districts. and towns otherwise unable to provide adequate education for its inhabitants. See Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 508, 190 A. 801. The fact that the receipt of this aid together with the computation of the operating costs of the district school according to a formula contained in the act authorizing the creation of such a district results in one town in the district having to raise more dollars per pupil attending the cooperative school than another town in the same district does not place unequal tax burden on any inhabitant of a particular taxing district which is the constitutional equality required. The constitution does not guarantee that all taxing districts shall have an equal number of pupils to educate, or that the aggregate costs of education shall be identical."

D. Compulsory Attendance Statute

1. Tit. XV, Chapter 193:1-"Every child between six and sixteen years of age shall attend the public

school within the district or a public school outside the district to which he is assigned or an approved private school during all the time the public schools are in session. . . ."

a. State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902), "That education of the citizen is essential to the stability of the state is a proposition too plain for discussion. As a mere generalization of our own it would commend immediate and universal assent. But it rests upon a firmer foundation [Cites Part II, Art. LXXXIII]. . . . It thus being the constitutional duty of the legislature to diffuse knowledge and learning through the community, it must be within the constitutional power of the legislature to enforce school attendance to that end. . . .”

...

E. School Finance Policy Statement

1. Tit. XV, Chapter 198:8-"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of New Hampshire to share in the costs of public elementary and high school education of the local school districts of the State to the end that: (1) the more needy school districts may be assisted in providing an adequate education program, (2) education throughout New Hampshire may be improved; and (3) assistance and incentives may be provided for the formation of cooperative school districts and authorized regional enrollment areas."

2d 286 (1963), reversed on other grounds 45 N.J. 301, 212 A. 2d 345 (1965), "Any tear in the status quo inevitably does damage to those who have relied upon it. However, the fact that some financial injury may be suffered by property owners affected by the Law Against Discrimination does not, by itself, signify an invasion of due process. Private property rights and the needs for correction of public detriment are competing interests which must be weighed. Abridgement of private rights may thus be justified. . . .”

c. Bailey v. Engelman, 56 N.J. 54, 264 A. 2d 442 (1970), "Appellant correctly concedes the State is not required to meet the total needs of a recipient of aid. . . . Rather, as one has said, appellant argues that, whatever the level of assistance the State may choose to provide, the State must ration that assistance on the basis of each family's own circumstances, and hence may not make a generalized estimate of the needs of families and dispense aid upon that single basis.

"There can be no doubt that the regulation seeks to achieve equality of treatment. It seeks that end by determining the dollar amount of a basic budget, leaving it to those assisted to bring their individual situations within that budget..

"The practical problems which would be inevitable under appellant's approach would seem prohibitive in terms of time and cost. Nor is there a dependable promise that so personalized an approach would, overall, come closer to the ideal of equal treatment of the needy. In any event, the regulation proceeds upon a concept of equal treatment which cannot be called irrational. . . .” [Note: This court later relied heavily upon Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 A. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970).]

2. Art. I, Sec. 5-"No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”

a. Jenkins v. Morris Tp. School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A. 2d 619 (1971), “As the Supreme Court pointed out in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 535 (1964), political subdivisions of the States whether they be 'counties, cities or whatever' are not 'sovereign entities' and may readily be bridged when necessary to vindicate Federal constitutional rights and policies. . . . It seems clear to us that similarly, governmental subdivisions of the State may readily be bridged

when necessary to vindicate State constitutional rights and policies. . . ."

B. Education Provisions

1. Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Para. 1-"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years."

a. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A. 2d 273 (1973), "In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said the 1875 amendments were intended to insure statewide equality among taxpayers. But we do not doubt that an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind. The mandate that there be maintained and supported 'a thorough and efficient system of free public schools . . .' can. have no other import. Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands."

b. Pingry Corp. v. Hillside Tp., 46 N.J. 457, 217 A. 2d 868 (1966), "As stated in the recent cases of State v. Vaughn, 44 N.J. 142, 145, 207 A. 2d 537 (1965), this State holds the education of children to be of the supreme importance. . . . Thus, it is clear that the State's duty to educate children is a matter of constitutional demand. In Title 18, N.J. S. A. 18:14-1 et. seq., the legislature has implemented this demand by providing for the public education of every child within the State...."

c. See also Justices of Rutgers College v. Morgan, 70 N.J.L. 460, 57 A. 250 (1904), affirmed, 71 N.J.L. 663, 60 A. 204.

2. Art. VIII, Sec. 4, Para. 2—"The fund for the support of free public schools . . . shall be annually appropriated to the support of free public schools, and for the equal benefit of all the people of the State; and it shall not be competent, except as hereinafter provided, for the legislature to borrow, appropriate or use the said fund or any part thereof for any other purpose, under any pretense whatever..

a. West Morris Regional Board of Ed. v. Sills, 58 N.J. 464, 279 A. 2d 609 (1971), "It, of course, is elementary that the equal protection clause does not require statewide uniformity in all things. Home rule necessarily runs the other way. . . . "This basic principle applies to education. Thus, it may be determined that education is so much

a matter of local concern that school districts may be established. . . . Although our State constitution mandates in Article VIII, Sec. 4, Para. 1, that ... [the state provide for public education] . . . it does not demand uniformity of results throughout the State.... Nor does the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bar the creation of local school districts or require equality of local appropriations for education. [Citing McGinnis v. Shapiro and Burrus v. Wilkerson]. . . . It, of course, would be another matter, if local option were designed for an invidious end, such as racial discrimination. The immediate point is that, at least

as of now . . . there is no constitutional fiat that educational expenditures be identical for all students throughout the State. Benefits may indeed depend upon the district of a student's residence. . . .'

"

3. Art. IV, Sec. 7, Para. 9-"The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws: . . . "(7) Providing for the management and control of free public schools."

a. Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895), "The prosecutor insists that the laws. delegating to each school district the power of determining for itself what amount, beyond the state appropriation, shall be raised by tax therein for the support of public schools in the district, and the power of building schoolhouses and employing teachers, result in affording different degrees of instruction to the children in different districts, while it is the duty of the legislature to see that the same facilities for education are furnished to every child in the state. Hence, it is argued, the laws are special and local. . . . A scheme to accomplish that result would compel either the abandonment of all public schools designed for the higher education of youth, or the establishment of such schools in every section of the state within the reach of daily attendance by all the children there residing. Neither of these consequences was contemplated by the amendment of 1875."

...

b. Riccio v. City of Hoboken, 69 N.J.L. 649, 55 A. 1109, 63 L.R.A. 485 (1903), "In Lowthrop v. Trenton . . . this court intimated a doubt whether under this clause any classification of schools or school districts was permissible. Upon full consideration we are now unanimously of the opinion that such classification, within due limits of generality, is permissible. . . . We are likewise

7 "We of course do not anticipate the question whether the State statutory scheme may, because of local failures, become unequal to the constitutional premise and command."

unanimous in the view that schools and school districts having characteristics so nearly alike as to require similar treatment in legislation may be grouped together in classes, and that such classification may be made the basis of divergent legislative provisions, appropriate to the different classes respectively. In the opinion of all, a legislative classification of school districts, proceeding on lines germane to the objects and purposes of the law, would serve to make general an enactment providing for the management and support of the free public schools."

c. See also Bd. of Education of Jersey City v. Lewis, 66, N.J.L. 582, 50 A. 346 (1901): Lowthrop v. Inhabitants of City of Trenton, 62 N.J.L. 795, 44 A. 755 (1899).

C. Taxing Provision

1. Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Para. 1—“(a) Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules. All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of value, except as otherwise permitted herein, and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing districts. . . ."

a. Jersey City v. Martin, 126 N.J.L. 353, 19 A. 2d 40 (1941), "Moreover, the issue here concerns the apportionment among the several municipalities of excise charges levied and collected by the State and the principles governing the levying of taxes have no relation to their distribution by the sovereign. . . . The constitutional provision that property shall be assessed for taxes according to its true value, and by uniform rules, relates only to the assessment of taxes, and in that respect it concerns only such equalization of the burden of taxation as will result from the designation of the property which shall be the subject of taxation, and the apportionment of the taxes thereon under general laws, by uniform rules and upon true valuations. The reasons which induced the adoption of this constitutional provision are deep-seated in principles of public policy. Its object was to secure to the people of the State the equalization of taxation so far as was practicable, by requiring the imposition of taxes on property by general laws, on the principle of uniformity in the subjects of taxation and in valuations. Trustees for Sup