must be submitted to the Council or Assembly and if no solution is reached the Council or Assembly make a report.

"If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report." (Art. XV, sec. 6.)

If the dispute is submitted to the Assembly it has the same effect "if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the Council and by a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute." (Art. XV, sec. 10.)

Although binding decisions may be given in the first two cases by unanimous action of the Council, the power exercised would not be "legislative" but merely a carrying out of the policy already agreed upon in the treaties providing for disarmament or acceptance of the mandatory. Decision on such a question clearly may be delegated.00 In the third case which relates to the settlement of political controversies which the parties have not agreed to submit to arbitration, it will be observed that the decision even if unanimous with exception of the parties to the dispute is not strictly binding. If the United States were a party to the dispute it would not be legally bound to follow the report, even if all other members of the Council or Assembly had signed it. Doubtless, however, there would be a practical compulsion, in view of the fact that it could get no members of the League as allies in case it went to war with the other party to the dispute.1

(3) A third consideration which should be noticed is that the most discussed provisions of the Covenant such as Articles X, XII, and XVI do not delegate power at all. They are guarantees which leave to the members of the League discretion in deciding upon the method for carrying them out in concrete cases.92 Of course the United States would have to follow constitutional provisions in 90 Supra, sec. 60.

91 See British Commentary, Pollock, op. cit., p. 212; Swiss Commentary, op. cit., p. 137.

92 Lowell, The Covenanter, p. 37.

doing so. It does not appear that there is any unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in the League of Nations Cov

enant.

64. Limitations Derived from Powers of the Judiciary.

The constitutionality of a treaty seems never to have been questioned on the ground that it was itself an exercise of judicial power though treaties or arbitrations based upon them have interpreted statutes and international law and the courts have followed such decisions." Nor is there any encroachment upon the judicial power when treaties vest judicial powers in bodies. other than the supreme and inferior courts of the United States. Consular courts abroad and international courts founded on treaty do not exercise "the judicial power of the United States" in the meaning of Article III of the Constitution and foreign consular courts in the United States for the trial of seamen of vessels of the consul's nationality have been held of "ministerial" rather than judicial character, though the grounds for this distinction is not apparent.96

93 W. H. Taft, The Covenanter, p. 60 et seq. See also Wright, Am. Jl. Int. Law, 12: 75, and supra, sec. 59.

94 U. S. v. La Ninfa, 75 Fed. 513; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193 (1828); Meade v. U. S., 9 Wall. 691; Wright, Am. Jl. Int. Law, 12: 85, and supra,

note 75.

95" The treaty-making power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments. It can, equally with any of the former or present governments of Europe, make treaties providing for the exercise of judicial authority in other countries by its officers appointed to reside therein. . . . The Constitution can have no operation in another country. When, therefore, the representatives or officers of our government are permitted to exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such conditions as, the two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon the other." In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453 (1890). Nor is the "Judicial power of the United States exercised by congressional courts in the territories (Am. Ins. Co. v. Cater, 1 Pet. 511); nor by presidential courts organized in territory under military occupation (Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109) or in annexed territory under military government. (Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Magoon, Reports, pp. 16, 30.) Such presidential courts may exercise local jurisdiction but may not be given an admiralty and prize jurisdiction. (Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. 498.)

96 Cushing, Att. Gen., 8 Op. 390, 1857. See also the Königin Luise, 184 Fed. 170 (1910), and Wright, Am. J. Int. Law, 12: 71.

PROC. AMER, PHIL., SOC., VOL. LX., O, MARCH 8, 1922.

A treaty depriving courts of any inherent right, privilege or power would, undoubtedly, be void," though a treaty may exempt certain persons from the judicial power of subpoenas and need not provide security of tenure and compensation for the judges in consular and other courts it establishes, as they do not exercise the "judicial power of the United States." 99

Treaties cannot vest courts exercising "the judicial power of the United States" with non-judicial functions.100 Thus doubt has been expressed whether treaties could provide for appeal from federal courts to an international tribunal, since with such a review by an authority not exercising "the judicial power of the United States" the original hearing by the federal court would be rendered non-judicial in character. Such an international tribunal could not not be endowed by Congress with the "judicial power of the United States" since its judges could not be assured the security of tenure and compensation required of courts exercising that power and the Supreme Court has expressly held that courts established by Congress in the territories and courts established abroad or in the United States by treaty do not exercise that power.101 In the case of Gordon v. United States the Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from the Court of Claims which would subsequently be reviewable by the Secretary of the Treasury, saying: 102

"The Supreme Court's jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part, of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. . . . Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress."

97 Infra, sec. 53.

98 Dillon's case, supra, sec. 46.

99 Supra, note 95.

100 Supra, sec. 55.

101 Supra, note 95.

102 Gordon v. U. S., 117 U. S. 697.

The XII Hague Convention of 1907 proposed an International Prize Court with appellate jurisdiction in prize cases. Doubts as to its constitutionality were felt by Secretary Root, on the grounds of this case, and he instructed the American delegation to the London Naval Conference (designed to codify the law for this court) to propose a supplementary protocol, whereby, instead of subjecting decisions of the United States courts to appeal and possible reversal in the International Prize Court, a direct claim might be brought there against the United States "in the form of an action in damages for the injury caused by the capture." 103 This suggestion was adopted by the Naval Conference in a final protocol104 and was ultimately incorporated in a protocol signed by all signatories of the original Prize Court Convention.105

"The (American) delegation remarked that for certain states the functioning of the International Prize Court is not compatible with that of the Constitution. The decision of national courts cannot be annulled by foreign decisions in certain countries, such as the United States of America. Recourse to the Prize Court might have that effect of annulling a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, a result incompatible with their Constitution." 106

The option permitted by the protocol would eliminate this possibility. It seems probable that the difficulty might have been equally met by domestic legislation providing special courts for the original hearing of Prize Cases.

"Congress," said the Supreme Court in the Gordon Case, “may undoubtedly establish tribunals with special powers to examine testimony and decide, in the first instance, upon the validity and justice of any claim for money against the United States, subject to the supervision and control of Congress, or a head of any of the executive departments." 107

The establishment of such special tribunals not exercising the judicial power of the United States would, however, be a cumber

103 U. S. For. Rel., 1909, p. 303.

104 Ibid., p. 318; Report of U. S. delegates, Ibid., p. 305, and President Taft's message, Dec. 6, 1910, Ibid., 1910, p. viii.

105 Charles, Treaties, p. 263. Neither the Protocol nor the original convention has been ratified though ratification was advised by the Senate, Feb.

15, 1911.

106 Proceedings, London Naval Conference, British Par. Pap. Misc. No. 5 (1909), p. 222. See American statement, Ibid., p. 216.

107 Gordon v. U. S., 117 U. S. 697.

some process if applied merely to prize courts and would become impracticable if appeal to an international tribunal were provided in all cases involving international law or treaty.

65. Limitations Derived from Powers of the President.

A treaty may delegate ministerial powers within the United States but it may not deprive the President of rights, privileges, or powers inherent or expressly granted by the Constitution. Some of the proposed Senate reservations to the Treaty of Versailles seemed to be unconstitutional as in certain circumstances they would deprive the President of his veto,1 108 of his power to direct the movement of troops,109 of his power to conduct foreign negotiations in person or through agents110 and of his power to make interim appointments.111

108"Notice of withdrawal by the United States (from the League of Nations) may be given by concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States," i.e., by a resolution not submitted to the President. Lodge Reservations, No. 1. See Wright, Col. Law Rev., 20: 128, and supra, sec. 62.

109 "Congress. . . under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States." Lodge Reservations, No. 2. "The President is made Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy by the Constitution, evidently for the purpose of enabling him to defend the country against invasion, to suppress insurrection, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of the army for any of these purposes, the action would be void." Taft, Our Chief Magistrate, pp. 128-129. See also Wright, Col. Law Rev., 20: 134-136.

110" Until such participation and appointment have been so provided for (ie., by act of Congress) and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the treaty of peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder." Lodge Reservation No. 7. This was somewhat modified in the reservations as voted on March 19, 1920. With reference to the independent powers of the President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported in 1894: Many precedents could be noted to show that such power has been exercised by the President on various occasions without dissent on the part of Congress. These precedents also show that the Senate of the United States, though in session, need not be consulted as to the appointment of such agents." (Cong. Rec., 2d Sess., p. 127, quoted Corwin, op. cit., p. 64.) See also Wright, Col. Law Rev., 20: 136-137.

111 "No citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the U. S." Lodge