has been abandoned, so far as concerns the President coming in person to sit in a chair on the right of the presiding officer to confer with members of the Senate, as our rules still provide he shall do should he come here personally, showing we recognize the propriety of his coming and his right to come.73 But nevertheless during my official term it has been the practice of Presidents and Secretaries of State to confer with Senators as to the propriety of negotiating or attempting to negotiate a treaty.

"I know in my own experience that it was the frequent practice of Secretary Hay, not simply after a proposed treaty had been negotiated, but before he had ever conferred with the representatives of the foreign power, to seek to have conferences with Senators to know what they thought of such and such a proposition; and if the subject-matter was a proper matter for negotiation, what Senators thought as to certain provisions; and he advised with them as to what provisions should be incorporated.

"I recollect two treaties in particular. One is the general arbitration treaty. I do not know whether he conferred with all Senators, but I think he did. I think he conferred with every Senator in this Chamber, either in writing or in person, as to the general arbitration treaty. He certainly conferred with me."

74

Such informal conferences clearly lack legal significance. They do not bind the Senate in any way. The practice, however, indicates the development of an important constitutional understanding.75

On some occasions, notably for concluding the Treaty of Paris. ending the Spanish war, Senators have been appointed as commissioners to negotiate, a practice deplored by Senator Hoar on the grounds that it prevents an independent consideration of the treaty by the Senate.76

Signature of treaties has, since very early times, been under the authority of the President alone. On several occasions the American negotiators have appended reservations to their signatures of multilateral treaties such as the Hague Conventions."

77

73 But see opinion of Senator Lodge, infra, sec. 266, note 35.

74 See Senator Spooner's suggestion following Senator Bacon's remarks, and Corwin, op. cit., p. 188, footnote.

75 Infra, sec. 266, par. 4.

76 Cong. Rec., 57th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2695; Senator Hoar, Autobiography, 2: 50; Crandall, op. cit., p. 78; Corwin, op. cit., p. 66. Senators Lodge and Underwood were appointed delegates to the conference on limitation of armament, 1921.

77 Crandall, op. cit., pp. 76, 93; Scott, ed., Reports of the Hague Conferences, Introduction, pp. xxv et seq.; A. D. White, Autobiography, 2: 339-341.

PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC., VOL. LX, W, MARCH 13, 1922.

177. Consent to the Ratification of Treaties.

79

The need of Senate consent to treaties is absolute, consequently the Senate may reject a treaty altogether, though, according to Jay, such action would be improper if it had consented to the full powers and instructions of the negotiators and these instructions had been faithfully observed.78 But with the present practice of presidential negotiation and signature, this limitation is unimportant. Of about 650 signed treaties the Senate has refused consent to ratification of about twenty. Among the more important treaties thus vetoed may be mentioned commercial and reciprocity treaties with Switzerland, 1835; with the German Zollverein, 1844; with Great Britain for Canada in settlement of the fisheries question, 1888; and the Kasson reciprocity treaties of 1899; annexation treaties with Texas, 1844; Hawaii, 1855; San Domingo, 1869; and Denmark for the Virgin Islands, 1868; arbitration and claims treaties including the Johnson-Clarendon treaty for settlement of the Alabama claims, 1868; and the Olney-Pauncefote general arbitration treaty with Great Britain, 1897; canal treaties with Colombia, 1869 and 1870; the Knox financial administration treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras, 1911; and the Treaty of Versailles, 1920. It is to be noticed that in most of these cases, the end sought was eventually achieved, though in the cases of annexation of Hawaii and the Virgin Islands, and settlement of the Canadian fisheries question, not until many years later. This practice appears to conflict with the assertion of John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State, that the King of Spain was under an absolute obligation to ratify the Florida purchase treaty of 1819 on failure of which the United States would be entitled "to compel the performance of the engagement as far as compulsion can accomplish it." 80 Other Secretaries of State have

78 Crandall, op. cit., p. 79, supra, sec. 25.

79 Crandall, op. cit., p. 82; Moore, Digest, 3: 26; Latané, U. S. and Latin America, N. Y., 1920, p. 283; Jones, Caribbean Interests of the U. S., N. Y., 1916, pp. 170, 179. For resolution rejecting Treaty of Versailles, see Cong. Rec., March 19, 1920, 59: 4916. For summary of Senate Proceedings on this treaty see League of Nations (World Peace Foundation), vol. 3, No. 4. For Proceedings in cases of treaties rejected by the Senate see 66th Cong., Ist Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 26, pp. 80 et seq.

80 Moore, Digest, 5: 189-190.