Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind
Since Descartes’s division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue.
In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument for the view that qualia are epiphenomenal, and investigates attempts to employ the controversial concept of supervenience to explain mental causation.
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and its History
Actions Reasons and Humean Causes
Hess on Reasons and Causes
Bad News for Anomalous Monism?
Can Supervenience and NonStrict Laws Save
Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance
Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties
Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation
MindBody Interaction and Supervenient Causation