Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind

Přední strana obálky
Neil Campbell
Broadview Press, 2. 1. 2003 - Počet stran: 304

Since Descartes’s division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue.

In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument for the view that qualia are epiphenomenal, and investigates attempts to employ the controversial concept of supervenience to explain mental causation.

 

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Obsah

Introduction
9
Sixth Meditation
17
and its History
44
Mental Events
85
Actions Reasons and Humean Causes
102
Hess on Reasons and Causes
108
Bad News for Anomalous Monism?
118
Thinking Causes
134
Can Supervenience and NonStrict Laws Save
148
Epiphenomenal Qualia
159
Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance
176
Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties
193
Epiphenomenal Qualia?
207
Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation
240
MindBody Interaction and Supervenient Causation
255
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O autorovi (2003)

Neil Campbell is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo. He has published numerous articles in philosophy of mind and is also the editor of Freedom, Determinism, and Responsibility: Readings in Metaphysics (Prentice Hall, 2002).

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