insurance is not rendered void, by an alteration in the use to which the premises are put after the execution of the policy (m).

The profits of a business may be insured, quâ profits (n), but not under a general description, as "interest in the inn and offices."

CHAPTER XXVI.

LIBEL.

I. Of the Nature of a Libel, and in what Cases an Action may

be maintained for this Injury, p. 1045.

II. Of the Declaration and Pleadings, p. 1050.

III. Of the Evidence, p. 1054.

I. Of the Nature of a Libel, and in what Cases an Action
may be maintained for this Injury.

A LIBEL is a malicious defamation expressed in printing or writing, or by signs, pictures, &c., tending to injure the reputation of another, and thereby exposing such person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule (a) (1). And an action on the case is maintainable against any person who falsely and maliciously publishes any libel against another. Where the natural tendency and import of the language used in the publication, is to defame and injure another, it is a libel, and actionable; for the law will presume, that the defendant, by publishing it, intended to produce that injury which it was calculated to effect. In such case, the judge ought to direct the jury, that it is a libel, and not leave it as a question to the jury to say, whether the defendant intended (b) to injure the plaintiff: for every man must be presumed to intend the natural and ordinary consequences of his own act. As there is a difference between the ma

(a) Digby v. Thompson, 4 B. & Ad. 821; 1 Nev. & M. 485.

(b) Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 643; Fisher v. Clement, 10 B. & C. 472.

(1) "If any man deliberately or maliciously publishes anything in writing concerning another, which renders him ridiculous, or tends to hinder mankind from associating or having intercourse with him, an action lies against such publisher." Per Wilmot, C. J., 2 Wils. 403. "I have no doubt that the writing and publishing anything which renders a man ridiculous, is actionable." Per Bathurst, J., S. C. See also the same opinion expressed by Gould, J., S. C.

lignity and injurious consequences of slanderous words spoken or written (c), the one being sudden and fleeting, the other permanent, deliberate, and disseminated with greater ease; many words, which, if spoken, would not be actionable, are actionable if published in the way of libel (2). Hence the word swindler, if spoken of another, (unless it be spoken in relation to his trade or business,) is not actionable (d); but if it be published in the way of libel, it is actionable (e). Hence, also, the publication of a letter containing some verses, in which the plaintiff was called an itchy old toad, was deemed a libel (f). So the publication of a letter, in which the plaintiff was stated to be one of the most infernal villains that ever disgraced human nature, has been holden actionable, without proof of special damage (g).

A fair and candid comment on a place of public entertainment, in a newspaper, is not a libel (h). So a fair, temperate, and reasonable criticism on the buildings of an architect (i), is not libellous, however mistaken in point of taste the opinion may be, or however unfavourable to the merits of the architect. In like manner, a comment upon a literary production, exposing its follies and errors, and holding up the author to ridicule, will not be deemed a libel, provided such comment does not exceed the limits of fair and candid criticism, by attacking the character of the writer, unconnected with his publication: and a comment of this description every one has a right to publish, although the author may suffer a loss from it. Such a loss the law does not consider as an injury: it is a loss

(c) Austin v. Culpepper, 2 Show. 314; King v. Lake, Hardr. 470. Per Hale,

С. В.

(d) Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531. (e) J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748.

(f) Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403. (g) Bell v. Stone, 1 Bos. & Pul. 331. (h) Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 28, Kenyon, C. J.

(i) Soane v. Knight, 1 M. & Malk. 74.

(2) In Bradley v. Methwyn, B. R. M. 10 G. II., MSS., which was an action on the case for a libel, Lord Hardwicke, C. J., observed, that "the present case is not for words, but for a libel, in which the rule is different; for some words may be actionable, or prosecuted by way of indictment, if reduced into writing, which would not be so, if spoken only. For the crime in a libel does not arise merely from the scandal, but from the tendency which it has to occasion a breach of the peace, by making the scandal more public and lasting, and spreading it abroad; which was so determined in this court, in the case of King v. Griffin, Hil. 7 Geo. II." This subject was much discussed in Thorley v. E. of Kerry, on error in Exch. Chr., 4 Taunt. 355, where a defamatory writing, imputing hypocrisy to the earl, and that he used religion as a cloak for unworthy purposes, was holden to be actionable; Sir James Mansfield, who delivered the judgment observing, that he was bound by the later authorities, although the distinction between speaking and writing was not to be found in Rolle's Abridgment, or the earlier editions of Comyn's Digest: The action was a common action on the case, and not an action for scandalum magnatum.

which the party ought to sustain, inasmuch as it is the loss of fame and profits to which he was not fairly entitled (k). But if a person, under the pretence of criticising a literary work, defames the private character of the author, and instead of writing in the spirit, and for the purpose, of fair and candid discussion, travels into collateral matter, and introduces facts not stated in the work, accompanied with injurious comments upon them, such person is a libeller, and liable to an action (1). So where defendant published of a painting, publicly exhibited, that it was a mere daub, with other strong terms of censure; it was holden (m), that it was a question for the jury, whether it was a fair and temperate criticism, or only a vehicle of personal malignity towards the plaintiff. An advertisement in a public paper, strongly reflecting upon the character of an individual who has been declared bankrupt, is libellous (n), although published with the avowed intention of convening a meeting of the creditors for the purpose of consulting upon the measures proper to be adopted for their own security, if the legal object might have been attained by means less injurious.

In the celebrated case of Stockdale v. Hansard (o), it was holden, that it is no defence in law to an action for publishing a libel, that the defamatory matter is part of a document, which was, by order of the House of Commons laid before the House, and thereupon became part of the proceedings of the House, and which was afterwards, by order of the House, printed and published by defendant; and that the House of Commons heretofore resolved, declared, and adjudged, "that the power of publishing such of its reports, votes, and proceedings, as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the public interest, is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parliament, more especially to the Commons House of Parliament as the representative portion of it." On demurrer, to a plea suggesting such a defence, a court of law is competent to determine whether or not the House of Commons has such privilege as will support the plea. S. C.

The consequences resulting from the foregoing decision belong rather to history than to a work of this kind: it is sufficient to state that (as on all similar occasions) the authority of the law prevailed; and, the legislature having interposed, it was, by stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9, enacted, "that all proceedings, criminal or civil, against any person for the publication of any report, paper, votes, or proceedings, under the authority of either House of Parliament, shall be stayed, by bringing before the court or judge a certificate, under the hand of the Chancellor, or of the Speaker of the House of Commons, to

(k) Carr v. Hood, 1 Campb. 355, n., Ellenborough, C. J.; MʻLeod v. Wakley, 3 C. & P. 311.

(1) Nightingale v. Stockdale, London Sittings after H. T. 49 Geo. III., Ellenborough, C. J.

(m) Thompson v. Shackell, M. & Malk. 187, Best, C. J. See Green v. Chapman, 4 Bingh. N. C. 92.

(n) Browne v. Croome, 2 Stark. N. P. C. 297.

(0) 9 Α. & Ε. 1.

the effect that such publication is by order of either House of Parliament, together with an affidavit verifying such certificate."

A fair, plain, unvarnished account of the proceedings of a court of justice, is not a libel (p) (3), but a highly coloured account of such proceedings mixed up with insinuations of perjury (q), cannot be justified; nor can a statement of the circumstances, given as from the mouth of counsel (r), instead of being accompanied or corrected by the evidence. Nor is it lawful to publish even a correct account of the proceedings of a court of justice, or of a preliminary inquiry before a magistrate, if such account (s) contain matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or indecent nature. A false or scandalous matter contained in a petition to a committee of Parliament (t), or in articles of the peace exhibited to justices of the peace, or in any other proceeding in a regular court of justice, will not make the complaint amount to a libel. So, fairly to comment on a petition, which has been presented to the House of Commons, is not libellous (u). Although that which is written may be injurious to

(p) Curry v. Walter, 1 Bos. & Pul. 525; but see 1 M. & S. 279, 281. (q) Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 493.

(r) Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bingh. 213; see Delegal v. Highley, 3 Bingh. N. C. 950.

(8) R. v. Mary Carlile, 3 B. & A. 167;

Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556.

(t) 1 Hawk. B. 1, c. 73, s. 8; Moulton v. Clapham, B. R. E. 15 Car. I., Sir W. Jones, 431; March. 20, S. C.

(u) Dunne v. Anderson, Ry. & M. 287. See also 3 Bingh. 88.

(3) "It must not be taken for granted, that the publication of every matter which passes in a court of justice, however truly represented, is, • under all circumstances, and with whatever motive published, justifiable; but that doctrine must be taken with grains of allowance." Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., and Grose, J., in Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 503. "It often happens that circumstances necessary for the sake of public justice to be disclosed by a witness in a judicial inquiry, are very distressing to the feelings of individuals, on whom they reflect; and if such circumstances were afterwards wantonly published, I should hesitate to say, that such unnecessary publication was not libellous, merely because the matter had been given in evidence in a court of justice." Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J., S. C. "If a member of Parliament publishes in the newspapers his speech, as delivered in Parliament, and it contains charges of a slanderous nature against an individual, an information will lie for a libel; though, had the words been merely delivered in Parliament, they would be dispunishable in the courts at Westminster." The King v. Ld. Abingdon, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 226; The King v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273, S. P., and that the circumstance of the speech being published for the purpose of correcting a misrepresentation, will not render the author less amenable to the common law in respect of the publication. "It does not follow, that because a counsel is privileged as to what he delivers in a court of justice, a publisher may circulate his expressions in a printed paper." Per Park, J., Roberts v. Brown, 10 Bingh. 525; 4 M. & Sc. 407, S. C.