(138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264.) ly upon the fact that the father and mother had not yet been divorced, but that suit was pending, and the court concluded that at such a stage of the case the order of the trial court was unwarranted. There have arisen a great many cases involving the question of vocational training. Most of these cases have to do with courses in typewriting, stenography, or mechanical courses. It has been almost universally held that the question should be left to a jury to determine whether the commercial or vocational course was a necessary under all the circumstances shown by the evidence, including the situation of the minor and his parents. The decision in Cory v. Cook, 24 R. I. 421, 53 Atl. 315, involving the right to recover the cost of a commercial education in bookkeeping is interesting upon the point of what education is necessary. The court quoted approvingly from Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray 455, 12 Mor. Min. Rep. 293: "It would be difficult to lay lown any general rule upon this subject, and to say what would or would not be necessaries. It is a lexible, and not an absolute, term, having relation to the infant's conlition in life, to the habits and pursuits of the place in which and the people among whom he lives, and to the changes in those habits and pursuits occurring in the progress of society." The court then said: "It is clear from the foregoing statements of the law that the word 'nec essaries is a relative term, and is not limited to those things which are indispensable to the infant's personal support and comfort. Whether a college or a strictly professional education could be classed with necessaries under any circumstances, we are not called upon to decide. But that such an education and training as will fit one for the ordinary duties of life in the sphere in which he moves, and enable him to earn a respectable and honest living in his chosen vocation, should be so classed. we have no doubt." The purpose of the education of minors is very well stated by Schouler in his work on Domestic Relations, § 774: "The second duty of parents is that of education; a duty which Blackstone pronounces to be far the greatest of all these in importance. This importance is enhanced by the consideration that the usefulness of each new member of the human family to society depends chiefly upon his character, as developed by the training he receives in early life. Not the increase of population, but the increase of well-ordered, intelligent, and honorable population is to determine the strength of the state; and, as a civil writer observes, the parent who suffers his child to grow up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others and shameful to himself, has conferred a very questionable benefit upon him by bringing him into the world, and the education should be consistent with the station in life of the parties. Solon excused excused the children of Athens from maintaining their parents if they had neglected to train them up in some art or profession. So intimately is government concerned in the results of early training, that it interferes, and justly, too, both to aid the parent in giving his child a good education, and in compelling that education, where the parent himself, and not the child, is delinquent in improving the opportunities offered." Applying the rule as stated by the courts and the text-writers, it will be seen that the question of what sort of an education is necessary, being a relative one, the court should determine this in a proper case from all the facts and circumstances. Nor should the court be restricted to the station of the minor in society, but should, in determining this fact, take into consideration the progress of society, and the attendant requirements upon the citizens of to-day. The rule in Middlebury College v. Chandler, supra, was clearly based upon conditions which existed at that time. An op portunity at that early date for a common school education was small, for a high school education less, and for a college education was almost impossible to the average family, and was generally considered as being only within the reach of the most affluent citizens. While there is no reported case, it is hardly to be doubted that the courts at that time would have even held that a high school education was not necessary, inasmuch as very few were able to avail themselves of it. But conditions have changed greatly in almost a century that has elapsed since that time. Where the college graduate of that day was the exception, to-day such a person may almost be said to be the rule. The law in an attempt to keep up with the progress of society has gradually placed minimum standards for attendance upon public schools, and even provides punishment for those parents who fail to see that their children receive at least such minimum education. That it is the public policy of the state that a college education should be had, if possible, by all its citizens, is made manifest by the fact that the state of Washington maintains so many institutions of higher learning at public. expense. It cannot be doubted that the minor who is unable to secure a college education is generally handicapped in pursuing most of the trades or professions of life, for most of those with whom he is required to compete will be possessed of that greater skill and ability which comes from such an education. It seems to be contended that the minor in this case should be content with a commercial education, and it is argued that, since she is a graduate of the Lincoln High School, that fact demonstrates that she is able to earn her own living, and should no longer be a charge upon her father. But the record discloses that she has no aptitude for commercial work. It also appears that she completed her high school course in a little more than one-half the time usually taken, because her genius for that class of wor It would seem, then, that she is n only unfitted for commercial lif but that she is exceptionally we fitted for her chosen vocation. If required, the necessity for the education can be grounded upon tl. authority of those cases involvin vocational education. While the are many ways other than a colles course to fit one for most of th vocations, there is no other suitab way to fit the minor -duty to profor teaching Eng- vide college lish in the modern education. high school. But we think th court's order should be sustaine upon the broader ground indicate herein. Appellant's counsel strenuousl argued that it is the father's righ to determine what education he wi give his children, and that if he de cides not to give them a college edu cation, and to save his money fo other purposes, the courts shoul not interfere. This rule is a salu tary one, and should always be ap plied to a proper case. Wheneve a father has the custody of a child, mines what edu the law presumes can have. that he will provide -who deter cation a child (138 Wash, 174, 244 Pac. 264.) one who holds the purse and whose earning capacity ater than that of the mother, he one who is able to give the ra proper education. To adopt le contended for by appellant ibe to put the court, in providfor the custody of the child, in emma of knowing that if the is given to the mother the fawould, in very many cases, reto give it an education greater that required under the penalthe law, and that the mother not do so. The court would be under the necessity of givthe child to the mother, who apred to be the proper person to for it, and leave the child withhope of an adequate education, the father, who perhaps was mproper person, with the hope it will receive its just opportu r conclusion is that, since the her has the custody of this child, amount is provided, and we think the financial situation of decedent demonstrated that the payments could be met without difficulty. There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed. its character and ability, she position to determine what eduon it should have, what course d be pursued, and, this having ed the approval of the court, think it follows that the court's should be upheld. Tolman, Ch. J., and Holcomb, Main, and Mackintosh, JJ., concur. Parker, J., dissenting. I dissent from the view that a father is under legal obligation to furnish means for this child to acquire more than a high school education, situated as this father was prior to his decease; though I am ready to somewhat reluctantly yield to the amount of the award viewing the needs of the child apart from her claimed educational necessities. A petition for rehearing having been filed the following Per Curiam response was handed down on May 24, 1926 (— Wash., 246 Pac. 27): By reference to the Departmental opinion it will be noted that the father of a minor child appealed from the decision of the trial court providing maintenance for the minor, and that during the pendency of the appeal he died, and his executrix was substituted as appellant in his stead. These facts are stated in the opinion. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. e other minor point remains to Considered. Many of the cases that a father will not be read to pay the expenses of ng the child in a private or ing school when the public intions of the state are, in his alon, as good, and where the exse of maintaining such child in institutions will be less than a private school. That point is aly not involved in this case, for reason that no contention is de that the minor could attend of the state institutions at less pense than she could attend the e of Puget Sound while living the home of her mother. The amount allowed, $60 per month, seems reaount allowed sonable under all education of the circumstances. The minor child ot attend college unless that ild. Appellant urges upon petition for rehearing that the trial court may construe the decision as requiring the executrix to continue the payments after the decedent's demise, and asks us to change the wording of the opinion to remove any doubt as to whether we intended to hold that the order providing for the maintenance should, in spite of the father's death, be effective until the minor becomes of age, thereby requiring the executrix to continue the monthly payments specified. We think the opinion not open to such construction. In order, however, to remove any doubt, we hold that the monthly amounts provided for in the decree are payable only until decedent's death. The order was a personal one, requiring the father to pay, and could not be effective as to his estate in any manner after his death, except as to payments theretofore due and unpaid. ANNOTATION. Allowance in decree against parent for education of child. This annotation is supplementary to the annotation in 18 A.L.R. 899. Only two cases in point have been reported since the original annotation. In both of these the right of the trial court to allow the claim for educational expenses in the decree was upheld on appeal. In the reported case (ESTEB V. ESTEB, ante, 110) an allowance of $60 per month, nominally for the support of the minor daughter, whose custody had been committed to the respondent (mother) by a decree of divorce, but in reality to enable the daughter to attend college and fit herself for the teaching profession, for which she was especially adapted, was upheld, the financial situation of the father being such that the payment could be made without difficulty. And in Stoner v. Weiss (1924) 96 Okla. 285, 222 Pac. 547, where a modification was entered in a decree, and a certain amount per month ordered paid to the clerk of the court, although the court found that the child did not need any additional support at that time, since the fund was to be used to provide for the education of the child, the court said: "The statute does not require that the fund provided for the custody, support, and education of the child should be for its immediate support, and there can be no good reason for holding that the court cannot provide a fund which, if properly safeguarded, will enable the child to have an education, which she otherwise would never have, and which can be accomplished without working a hardship on any person." After the decision in Ziesel v. Ziesel, 18 A.L.R. 896, to which the original annotation was appended, a decree entered below on motion to settle the form of decree on remittitur was affirmed (Ziesel v. Ziesel (1923) 94 N. J. Eq. 571, 125 Atl. 318) upon the opinion of the vice chancellor, which, however, involved no further point as to allowance for education, it being eoncerned merely with the increase of the original item for support in consequence of the disallowance of the item for educational expenses at a preparatory school, which covered board for the nine months' period. G. R. B. STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. J. B. JOHNSON, Attorney General, V. L. E. GOODGAME et al. Florida Supreme Court. May 5, 1926. (Fla. 108 So. 836.) Municipal corporations, §§ 21, 22 abolition right to property. 1. If a municipal corporation goes out of existence by being annexed to, or merged in, another corporation, and if no legislative provision is made respecting the property. and liabilities of the corporation which ceases to exist, the corporation to which it is annexed, or in which it is merged, is entitled to all its property, and is answerable for all its liabilities. [See anotation on this question beginning on page 128.] Headnotes by BUFORD, J. (Fla., 108 So. 836.) Municipal corporations, §§ 21, 22 power to abolish. 2. It was within the province of the legislature, under the provision of § 8, art. 8, of the Constitution, to abolish either or all of the abolished municipal corporations, but when doing so the legislature was bound to provide for the protection of the creditors of such corporations. This might have been done by providing for the continuation of the assessment and collection of taxes and the disbursement of funds by proper officials named for that purpose, without the continuation of any corporate existence, or the legislature might have done just as it did in this case; that is, provided for the protection of creditors by the creation of a new corporation, and the creation of which had the legal effect of establishing a successor entitled to all the rights, and responsible for all the liabilities, of the abolished corporation. [See 19 R. C. L. 731; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1044.] Municipal corporations, §§ 9, 19 - liability for debts of annexed territory. 3. Where a municipal or public corporation is legislated out of existence, and its territory annexed to other corporations, the latter, unless the legislature otherwise provides, are entitled to its property, and severally liable for a proportionate share of its then subsisting legal debts, and vested with the power to raise revenue wherewith to pay them, by levying taxes upon the property transferred and the persons residing therein. [See 19 R. C. L. 737, 738.] Municipal corporations, § 22— dissolution liability for debts. 4. Where the legislature of a state has given a local community, living within designated boundaries, a municipal organization, and by subsequent act or series of acts repeals its charter, and dissolves the corporation, and incorporates substantially the same people as a municipal body under a new name, for the same general purpose, and the great mass of the taxable property of the old corporation is included within the limits of the new, and the property of the old corporation used for public purposes is transferred without consideration to the new corporation for the same public uses, the latter is the successor in law of the former, and liable for its debts. [See 19 R. C. L. 705.] Municipal corporations, § 32 - grant of power construction. 5. Where particular powers are expressly conferred, and there is also a general grant of power, such general grant by intendment includes all powers that are fairly within the terms of the grant and are essential to the purposes of the municipality, and not in conflict with the particular powers expressly conferred. [See 19 R. C. L. 768; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 971; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1288; 6 R. C. L Supp. 1136.] Statutes, § 219 hold. construction to up 6. It must be assumed that in passing a law the legislature intended a valid enactment rather than one in conflict with the Constitution; the statutes should, if possible, be so construed as to be constitutional rather than as conflicting with organic law. [See 6 R. C. L. 78; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 18; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 378; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 317; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 353; 25 R. C. L. 1001; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1437; 4 R C. L. Supp. 1615; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1358; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1498.] Courts, § 78 validity of statute. 7. Unless a statute is in positive conflict with some designated or identified provision of the Constitution, it should not be held unconstitutional. [See 6 R. C. L. 75; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 16; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 377; 5 R. C. L Supp. 317; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 353.] (Whitfield and Strum, JJ., dissent.) INFORMATION in the nature of quo warranto to determine the constitutionality of chapter 11,678 of the Florida Laws purporting to abolish three existing municipalities and to create the municipality of the city of Panama City, of which respondents claim to be commissioners. Writ quashed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Carter & Yonge, for plain tiff: The power to abolish rests in the legislature alone, and the command to provide for the protection of creditors is addressed to the same body and lim |