(119 Kan. 12, 237 Pac. 1041.) well-nigh indispensable to efficiency, which the commission could not otherwise possess, and the opinion prevails that the model minimum wage law must provide for representation of interests in fixing minimum wages. "The highest place in the American scheme of constitutional government is that occupied by investigation. But the investigations required are not merely those of experts, as seems often to be assumed when the term 'scientific' legislation is used. The investigations of experts, such as physicians, engineers, economists, statisticians, and lawyers, are likely to end in conclusions that may be ideally perfect from a technical point of view, but not reasonable from the constitutional point of view. They do not include all of the facts. The latter can be ascertained only through adding the experience and testimony of employers and employees-those who are daily in contact with the facts, and whose common knowledge corrects the narrow knowledge of specialists." Commons & Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, p. 479. The judgments of the District Court are reversed, and the causes are remanded, with direction to grant the injunctions prayed for. Mason, Marshall, and Dawson, JJ., concur. Harvey, J., dissenting: In determining whether the Adkins Case controls the decision in the case before us, it should be construed in the light of the facts of that case, and in harmony, if possible, with decisions of the court which announced it and other courts of last resort upon similar questions, and in harmony with the purposes of the constitutional and statutory provisions involved. The function of the Supreme Court of the United States in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress pertaining to the District of Columbia is like the function of this court in determining the validity of an act of the Leg islature of this state; hence, as a judicial determination of the question, it is persuasive only rather than authoritative, just as would be the decision of the highest court of another state in interpreting a statute of that state. In the Adkins Case the court was dealing only with a wage-fixing statute as it applies to adult women, while in this case we are dealing with a statute pertaining to hours of service, working conditions and wages of women and minors. The Adkins Case deals with adult women employees in hospitals and operating passenger elevators in buildings. In this case we are dealing with the employees in laundries and factories. In this state there has been no order pertaining to the class of employees such as was before the court in the Adkins Case. In this case we are dealing with an order fixing the minimum wage of $11 per week for adult women employees. In that case the court was dealing with an order fixing the minimum wage of $16.50 per week. In that case an employee desired to take employment, or continue employment, operating an elevator in a hotel for a limited number of hours per day, under pleasant and satisfactory working conditions, at a wage of $35 per month and two meals per day, which was all she was capable of earning, and the court held she should be permitted to take such employment. In this case there is no employee asking to be permitted to work under satisfactory and agreeable conditions and at a wage less than the minimum. In this case the employers are complaining, largely in an academic manner; that is to say, the evidence discloses that at the time this order was made each of them was paying adult women employees more than the minimum wage named in the order. There is a little difference with reference to apprentices and irregular employees and perhaps a slight change in the general labor situation between the time of the hearing before the commission and the time of the trial in this case, but these are matters that could have been adjusted by a proper application to the commission, though no such application was made. In the main, the complaint of the plaintiffs in these cases is that their constitutional rights of freedom of contract are theoretically interfered with by the statute and the order of the commission. An examination of the pleadings and evidence in this case convinces me that the plaintiffs have brought this action, not because they are hurt at all by the order in any substantial sense, but largely to have the law nullified, because theoretically, as they claim, it infringes upon their constitutional right of contract as to the amount of wages to be paid. There is no halo about the constitutional right of parties to contract as to the quantum of wages to be paid which is distinct, fundamentally, from the constitutional right of parties to contract as to hours of labor, or their constitutional right to contract to work under specified conditions. So far as the constitutional rights are concerned, they are just as strong in the one case as they are in the other. The courts generally have upheld reasonable statutes or orders of authorized commissions with reference to the hours of service and working conditions made to promote the general welfare under the police power of the government. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 61 L. ed. 830, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1043; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 13 Ann. Cas. 957; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325. Also the courts have generally upheld reasonable statutory provisions or orders similarly enacted or made pertaining to the amount of wages. More than a dozen states have enacted statutes directing the fixing of a minimum wage for women and minors, or authorizing to be fixed, after a hearing, by some board or commission. Arizona, Laws 1917, chap. 38; Arkansas, No. 191, Laws 1915; California Stat. 1913, chap. 324; Colorado, Laws 1917, chap. 98; Kansas, Laws 1915, chap. 275; Massachusetts, Stat. 1912, chap. 706; Minnesota, Laws 1913, chap. 547; North Dakota, Laws 1919, chap. 174; Oregon, Laws 1913, chap. 62; South Dakota, Laws 1923, chap. 309; Texas, Laws 1919, chap. 160; Utah, Laws 1913, chap. 63; Washington, Laws 1913, chap. 174; Wisconsin, Laws 1913, chap. 712. Many of the other states have taken some steps in that direction. In at least five of the states the constitutionality of such statutes has been questioned in the courts, and the statutes have been invariably sustained. State v. Crowe, 130 Ark. 272, L.R.A.1918A, 567, 197 S. W. 4, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 460; Holcombe v. Creamer, 231 Mass. 99, 120 N. E. 354; Williams v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, L.R.A.1918F, 542, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504; Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, L.R.A.1917C, 944, 139 Pac. 743, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217; and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Or. 261, 141 Pac. 158; Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037. In the other states having similar statutes it appears that their constitutionality has not been questioned. The Oregon cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and affirmed by an equally divided court. 243 U. S. 629, 61 L. ed. 937, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld statutes fixing the amount, the time and manner of payment of wages even of adult men employees. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. ed. 755, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024; Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 47 L. ed. 1002, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206. The primary question as to the validity of any of these statutes is: Does the public good require it? The constitutional rights of individuals yield to the common good when (119 Kan. 12, 237 Pac. 1041.) the necessity therefor exists; that is, primarily a legislative question as distinct from a judicial one, and the courts should not interfere with the legislative determination of that matter unless it be clearly unnecessary or unjust. Our statute has been in effect 10 years. Generally speaking, it has been beneficial both to employees and employers, and also to the public at large. Employees have been better fed, better clothed, more intelligent, employers have better establishments and have made as good or better profits, and the state has had a higher type of citizenship. We should use our judgment as to the validity of this statute, rather than be controlled by a decision of another jurisdiction, which at best is persuasive rather than authoritative. Johnston, Ch. J., and Hopkins, J., dissent. ANNOTATION. Validity of minimum wage statutes relating to private employment. [Master and Servant, § 42.] The earlier cases on this question are discussed in the annotation in 24 A.L.R. 1259. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 67 L. ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394, has been generally construed as rendering invalid statutes attempting to fix a minimum wage for adult women in private employment. ToPEKA LAUNDRY Co. v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (reported herewith) ante, 208; Stevenson v. St. Clair (1925) 161 Minn. 444, 201 N. W. 629 (invalidity assumed); Folding Furniture Works v. Industrial Commission (1924; D. C.) 300 Fed. 991 (Wisconsin statute involved). But it is held that the Adkins Case does not render invalid minimum wage statutes so far as the same are applicable to minors. Stevenson v. St. Clair (1925) 161 Minn. 444, 201 N. W. 629. The supreme court of Minnesota, which had previously sustained the constitutionality of a minimum wage statute as applied to women (William v. Evans (1917) 139 Minn. 32, L.R.A. 1918F, 542, 165 N. W. 495, 166 N. W. 504), assumed that its validity in this regard could no longer be sustained, since the decision in the Adkins Case. But it is held by this court that the Supreme Court of the United States excluded from its decision in the Adkins Case the question of the validity of a minimum wage law as applied to minors. It was accordingly held that, as applied to minors, the statute was valid. Stevenson v. St. Clair (Minn.) supra. The decisions of the supreme court of Kansas upholding the industrial relations statute of that state, referred to at p. 1261 of the earlier annotation, were reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923) 262 U. S. 522, 67 L. ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 630, and the Kansas statute held invalid. The supreme court of Kansas construed the opinion of the United States Supreme Court as declaring invalid all that part of the statute which attempted to give the court of industrial relations power to fix wages, but it was held that an order fixing wages for overtime at time and one half concerned working conditions, and was legal. Court of Industrial Relations v. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. (1924) 114 Kan. 487, 227 Pac. 249. Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, this judgment was reversed, that court saying: "The authority which the act gives respecting the fixing of hours of labor is merely a feature of the system of compulsory arbitration, and has no separate purpose. It was exerted by the state agency as a part of that system, and the state court sustained its exertion as such. As a part of the system it shares the invalidity of the whole. Whether it would be valid had it been conferred independently of the system, and made either general or applicable to all businesses of a particular class, we need not consider, for that was not done." (1925) 267 U. S. 552, 69 L. ed. 785, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441. The regulation which was sustained by the supreme court of Kansas in Court of Industrial Relations v. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. (1924) 114 Kan. 487, 227 Pac. 249, and which was held invalid by the United States Supreme Court, fixed the hours of labor in the packing industry at a basic working day of eight hours, but provided that a nine-hour day might be observed not to exceed two days in any one week, without a penalty, but provided that all working hours over forty-eight should be paid for at the rate of time and one half, and made other provisions respecting payment. The Federal Transportation Act, Comp. Stat, § 10,0714, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1920, p. 72, under which the railroad labor board was entitled to fix wages, is held to be advisory merely and not compulsory. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States R. Labor Bd. (1923) 261 U. S. 72, 67 L. ed. 536, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278; Schuppan v. Peoria R. Terminal Co. (1924; D. C.) 9 F. (2d) 448. W. A. E. GEORGE I. HASELTON, County Solicitor, V. INTERSTATE STAGE LINES. (N. H., 133 Atl. 451.) New Hampshire Supreme Court - May 4, 1926. Commerce, § 52 — state regulation of intrastate business. 1. The Federal Constitution does not render a carrier by motor bus be tween points in different states immune from state regulation with respect to intrastate business. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 230.] construction Statutes, § 219 2. Where a statute is fairly susceptible of two interpretations, one rendering it unconstitutional, and one not, that construction will ordinarily be adopted which will uphold its constitutionality. [See 25 R. C. L. 1000; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1437; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1615; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1358; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1498.] Evidence, § 206 presumption as to intent of legislature. 3. The presumption is that the legislature intends to keep within the limits of both the state and Federal Constitutions, and to restrict the operation of its enactments to cases where they will have effect consistently therewith. the circumstances under which the language is used, the evil to be remedied, and the object sought to be accomplished are material evidence. [See 25 R. C. L. 1013; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1438; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1616.] Evidence, § 3-judicial notice - purpose of passage of statute. 5. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that the situation which called for and resulted in the enactment of the statute providing for the licensing and regulation of passenger-carrying motor vehicles was the advent of the jitney, the operations of which were principally confined to the transportation of passengers upon the streets of cities and large towns. [See 25 R. C. L. 1029; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1439; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1500.] Statutes, § 236 - amendment effect. 6. An amendment to a statute regulating the carriage of passengers for hire over the state highway by motor vehicles that receive or discharge passengers "along" their routes, which 4. In the interpretation of a statute, inserted, after the words "discharging [See 25 R. C. L. 959, 1000; 4 R. C. L. what considered. construction Statutes, § 290 prospective con [See 25 R. C. L. 778; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1601.] Motor busses, § 2 statute struction. con 9. A statute passed to regulate jitney busses operating in cities and large towns, the language of which is in general and comprehensive terms, and prospective in operation, applies also to the transportation of passengers over the state highways between the cities and towns, such a business being within its general purview and scope. Motor busses, § 2 10. A carrier by motor vehicles, which operates such vehicles between towns in two states, but also stops at towns along its route so that part of its business is between towns in the same state, has termini within that state within the meaning of a statute regulating the carriage of passengers in intrastate commerce over a regular route between fixed termini. Highways, § 87 right to use. interference with 11. A statute which forbids only the conduct of the business of transporting passengers for hire by motor vehicle and receiving and discharging passengers until certain regulations have been complied with does not invade a constitutional right to a physical use of the highway. Commerce, § 41 state regulation absence of Federal action. 12. The commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, even assuming that it applies to intrastate business carried on by interstate carriers by motor vehicle, is not self-executing, and, until Congress sees fit to act, the state may regulate such a business. [See 5 R. C. L. 715; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 1488; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 316.] Commerce, § 52 interference with incidental profits constitutionality. 13. Depriving an interstate carrier by motor bus of the incidental profits which might be derived from conducting an intrastate business as an incident to the interstate business is not an interference with interstate commerce within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution. TRANSFER by the Superior Court for Hillsborough County (Sawyer, J.) for the opinion of the Supreme Court of questions arising upon exceptions by defendant to an order enjoining it from receiving intrastate passengers until compliance with the statute regulating transportation of passengers for hire in motor vehicles, in an information to enjoin defendant from doing intrastate business. Exception overruled. Defendant operated a daily line of busses over a regular route between Boston, Massachusetts, and Manchester, New Hampshire, with intervening stops at Lowell, Massa chusetts, and Nashua, New Hamp shire. Laws 1919, chapter 86, which was amended by Laws 1921, chap. 59, by inserting in § 1, after the words |