practice. We have examined them carefully, and are clearly of the opinion that they are devoid of merit. The principal question in the case is whether the machinery. was of such a character as under the Iowa statute would support a mechanic's lien. It was affixed to the floor of the factory by means of bolts, but could be removed without serious injury to the building. The evidence, however, is clear that the machinery was furnished as part of the factory, and under the express language of the Iowa statute, machinery so furnished entitles the party furnishing it to a lien. The statute is as follows: "Every person who shall do any labor upon or furnish any materials, machinery or fixtures for any building The statute thus provides for a lien for machinery, and sets that off in distinction to fixtures. So whether the machinery would come technically under the definition of a fixture in its. connection with the real property is not material. If it was furnished as a part of a factory, and was installed in a building constructed for that purpose, the lien arises for the machinery as well as for fixtures strictly within that term. Nordyke v. Hawkeye Woolen Mills, 53 Ia. 521, 5 N. W. 593. The proper rule in such a case is stated with remarkable accuracy and wisdom by Judge Sanborn, speaking for this court, in Hooven, Owens & Rentschler Co. v. John Featherstone's Sons, 111 Fed. 81, 94, as follows: * * "The true test is the intent to permanently incorporate the article with the plant or property, and the permanent and habitual use of it as a part of the real estate. And the true rule is that in a controversy between the claimant of a mechanic's lien and the owner of real estate upon which the property of the lienor has been placed, engines, machinery, houses, buildings, and every other thing which is essential to the particular use to which the realty is applied, or between which and the balance of the realty there is a manifest and necessary dependence, or which is intended to be and is permanently and habitually used as a part of the property constituting the real estate of the owner upon which it was placed, becomes a part of that realty, whether it can be removed without physical injury to the realty or not, however slight its physical connection with the real estate, and even when there is no actual fastening of the one to the other." (Citing many authorities.) The decision of the trial court was correct and is affirmed. JOSEPH M. JONES, ANCILLARY RECEIVER OF R. GOTTLIEB PANY ET AL. U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, June, 1924. No. 246. JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE AND RULES IN GENERAL-CREATION AND Courts of bankruptcy are of statutory origin and possess only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by the Bankruptcy Act. (See Collier, 13th Ed., p. 42; Am. B. R. Digest, § 13.) PETITION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREOF TRIAL HEARING OR REFERENCE-REF A court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction to make a general reference before adjudication. (See Collier, 13th Ed., p. 732; Am. B. R. Digest, § 269.) Petition to revise order of the District Court of the United State for the Eastern District of Missouri. Petition dismissed and order affirmed. Before STONE and KENYON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, District Judge. Arthur Miller, Frank P. Barker and Miller, Camack, Winger & Reeder, for petitioner. Ed. E. Aleshire, and Samuel Feller for respondents. PHILLIPS, District Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This is a petition to revise under section 24(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. The petition and response show the following facts: On July 14, 1922, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against R. Gottlieb Company in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. That court appointed Edwin D. Buell receiver of the property of the R. Gottlieb Company. It was adjudicated a bankrupt on October 2, 1922. On October 20, 1922, Buell was elected trustee. On July 20, 1922, Buell, as receiver, filed his petition in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division, for the appointment of an ancillary receiver, and on the same day Joseph M. Jones, the petitioner here, was appointed receiver. Supplemental to said order of appointment, the court made a general order of reference to George A. Neal, as referee in bankruptcy. Jones qualified as such ancillary receiver on August 1922. Thereafter he filed an application with George A. Neal, as referee in bankruptcy for an order on the Kansas City Custom Garment Making Company, a corporation, Max Goldberger and Joseph Goldberger, respondents here, to show cause why an order should not be made requiring them to turn over certain property claimed by the receiver to belong to the bankrupt estate. Respondents filed an answer to the show cause order wherein they challenged the jurisdiction of the referee to act in the premises, and also set up an adverse claim to the property. The referee overruled the challenge to the jurisdiction, and after a hearing, on November 11, 1922, made orders requiring the respondents to turn over to Jones, as such receiver, certain property or its value in money. Respondents filed their petition with the referee to certify his order to the District Court for review. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application in the bankruptcy court based on the findings of fact made by the referee wherein he asked for a provisional order that the respondents be required to give bond to comply with any order which the court might make in the premises or any judgment that might thereafter be entered against them. On May 11, 1923, the court made such provisional order based on the findings of the referee. On July 17, 1923, the bankruptcy court set aside and vacated the orders made by the referee and its order of May 11, 1923, requiring the respondents to give bond, on the ground that the referee had no jurisdiction in the premises. It is this order which petitioner here secks to revise. 41-N. S. VOL. IV. The order of general reference was made by the court of ancillary jurisdiction before an adjudication in bankruptcy by the court of primary jurisdiction. Sec. 22(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 552, provides that: "'a' After a person has been adjudged a bankrupt the judge may cause the trustee to proceed with the administration of the estate, or refer it (1) generally to the referee or specially with only limited authority to act in the premises or to consider and report upon specified issues; or (2) to any referee within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, if the convenience of parties in interest will be served thereby, or for cause, or if the bankrupt does not do business, reside, or have his domicile in the district."' Courts of bankruptcy are of statutory origin and possess only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by the Bankruptcy Act. Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 42; In re Hollins et al. (C. C. A., 2d Cir.), 36 Am. B. R. 168, 229 Fed. 349. Under the Bankruptcy Act a court of bankruptcy has no jurisdiction to make a general reference before adjudication. Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 732; In re Back Bay Automobile Co. (D. C. Mass.), 19 Am. B. R. 835, 158 Fed. 679. The general reference to George A. Neal, as referee in bankruptcy, was therefore void, and all proceedings taken and orders entered by him, as such referee, were without jurisdiction. The order of the bankruptcy court of May 11th being predicated upon. the findings made by the referee without jurisdiction to act was properly set aside by the bankruptcy court. It therefore follows that the petition to revise should be dismissed and the order of the bankrupty court affirmed. It is so ordered. FIRST TRUST COMPANY, A CORPORATION, V. F. B. BAYLOR, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY. U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, June, 1924. No. 247. RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF BANKRUPT SUITS BY AND AGAINST BANKRUPT STAY OF PENDING SUITS-BANKRUPTCY COURT MAY STAY FORECLOSURE ACTION. If a mortgage creditor, with the consent of the bankruptcy court, commences a proceeding in a state court for the foreclosure of his mortgage and such proceeding interferes with the ordinary administration of the assets of the bankrupt estate, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to restrain such foreclosure proceeding. (See Collier, 13th Ed., p. 406; Am. B. R. Digest, § 926.) SAME SUITS BY AND AGAINST BANKRUPT STAY OF PENDING SUITS--TERMINATION AND VACATION OF STAY-STAY SHOULD NOT BE PERPETUAL. An injunction issued by a bankruptcy court restraining the holder of a valid mortgage from proceeding with the foreclosure thereof in a state court should not be perpetual, but for a reasonable time only, and should be so framed that the mortgagee may, at any time, present a petition respecting any necessity for immediate foreclosure or unreasonable delay on the part of the trustee. (See Collier, 13th Ed., p. 406; Am. B. R. Digest, § 939.) Petition to revise order of the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, granting permanent injunction against foreclosure proceedings in the state court. Modified and affirmed. Before STONE and KENYON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, District Judge. Maxwell B. Veghtol (C. Frank Reavis on the brief), for petitioner. John A. Rine (Alvin F. Johnson and Harley G. Moorhead on the brief), for respondent. PHILLIPS, District Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: |