Incentives for Environmental Protection

This book explores the extent to which pricing incentives such as charges on emissions; in contrast to regulatory standards, can be shaped into a practical policy that is technically effective, politically enactable, administratively enforceable, and equitable. It also compares he advantages and disadvantages of this approach to those that characterize the policy of compliance to regulatory standards. And it identifies the criteria on which either pricing mechanisms or regulatory standards should be based. Three case studies comprise the heart of the book. One investigates carcinogenic chemical emissions, another audits the tradeoffs in controlling aircraft noise near major airports, and the third treats the protection of air quality from pollution by primarily stationary sources. The case studies are introduced by a chapter that gives numerous examples of possible pricing approaches and identifies common lessons that the three diverse studies reinforce.: The studies are followed by a chapter which is based on interviews with Congressional staff, environmentalists, and industrial lobbyists and other interest groups in Washington, revealing their assessments of pricing mechanisms in environmental protection. Thomas C. Schelling and his co-authors - David Harrison, Jr., Albert L. Nichols, Robert Repetto, and Steven J. Kelman - are all affiliated with the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The book is fifth in the series, Regulation of Economic Activity.