Incentives for Environmental Protection

Přední strana obálky
Thomas C. Schelling
MIT Press, 1983 - Počet stran: 355
This book explores the extent to which pricing incentives such as charges on emissions; in contrast to regulatory standards, can be shaped into a practical policy that is technically effective, politically enactable, administratively enforceable, and equitable. It also compares he advantages and disadvantages of this approach to those that characterize the policy of compliance to regulatory standards. And it identifies the criteria on which either pricing mechanisms or regulatory standards should be based. Three case studies comprise the heart of the book. One investigates carcinogenic chemical emissions, another audits the tradeoffs in controlling aircraft noise near major airports, and the third treats the protection of air quality from pollution by primarily stationary sources. The case studies are introduced by a chapter that gives numerous examples of possible pricing approaches and identifies common lessons that the three diverse studies reinforce.: The studies are followed by a chapter which is based on interviews with Congressional staff, environmentalists, and industrial lobbyists and other interest groups in Washington, revealing their assessments of pricing mechanisms in environmental protection. Thomas C. Schelling and his co-authors - David Harrison, Jr., Albert L. Nichols, Robert Repetto, and Steven J. Kelman - are all affiliated with the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The book is fifth in the series, Regulation of Economic Activity.

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Obsah

Chapter
1
The Problem of Aircraft Noise
43
Federal NoiseControl Strategies
71
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O autorovi (1983)

Thomas Crombie Schelling was born in Oakland, California on April 14, 1921. He received a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. After working as an analyst for the federal Bureau of the Budget, he attended Harvard University. He spent two years in Denmark and France as an economist for the Economic Cooperation Administration. In 1950, he joined the White House staff of the foreign policy adviser to President Harry S. Truman. In 1951, he received his doctorate from Harvard and published his first book, National Income Behavior: An Introduction to Algebraic Analysis. He taught economics at Yale University, Harvard University, and the University of Maryland's Department of Economics and School of Public Policy before retiring in 2003. He wrote several books during his lifetime including International Economics, The Strategy of Conflict, Strategy and Arms Control written with Morton H. Halperin, Arms and Influence, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Choice and Consequence, and Strategies of Commitment. In 2005, he and Robert J. Aumann received the Nobel Prize in economic science for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis." He died on December 13, 2016 at the age of 95.

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