2 Mills v. Sargent, 36 Cal. 379; Kennedy v. Milwaukee &c. R. R. Co. 22 Wis. 581; Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Santo v. State, 2 Clarke, (Iowa) 165. 3 Mobile &c. R. R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 573; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 545; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Nelson v. People, 33 Il. 390. 4 Wakely v. Mohr, 15 Wis. 609. 5 Comm. v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 97; Comm. v. Hitchings, Ibid. 482; Comm. v. Pomeroy, Ibid. 486, note. 6 Knox Co. v. Davis, 63 Ill. 405; Myers v. People, 67 Ill. 503. 7 State v. Perry Co. 5 Ohio St. 497; Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Davis v. Minge, 56 Ala. 121; Mobile &c. R. R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 584; Warren v. Mayor &c. 2 Gray, 99; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 338. 8 People v. Hill, 7 Cal 97. 9 Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398. 10 Davis v. Minge, 56 Ala. 121; Mobile &c. R. R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 584; State v. Perry Co. 5 Ohio St. 506; Warren v. Mayor &c. 2 Gray, 99; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 338; Campan v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276. 11 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481. 12 Read v. Omnibus R. R. Co. 33 Cal. 212. 13 S. F. v. S. V. W. W. 48 Cal. 493. Statutory construction.-Statutes should be construed with reference to the habits of business prevalent among the people to whom they apply 1-such a construction as will tend most to make them accomplish their different objects.2 They should be construed so as to give them operation, if the language will permit, instead of treating them as meaningless. Useful and honest legislation should not be defeated by a too rigid adherence to the letter of the constitution; and when the intent is discovered it ought to be followed with reason and discretion, although such may seem contrary to the letter.5 It is the duty of the court to reconcile different parts of the law. When an act can be so construed and applied as to avoid a conflict with the constitution and give it the force of law, such a construction will be adopted, as by a change of a disjunctive for a conjunctive conjunction; and when the language is susceptible of two constructions, the one in accord with and the other in violation of the constitution, it will be presumed that the legislature intended to use the language in a sense consistent with the constitution.9 General words are to be restricted DESTY CAL. CON.-20. 8 where it is clear that they were not intended to extend to a particular act or thing.10 Special or specific provisions control general provisions. 11 Where a provision contains negative terms, express or implied, such negative shows an intent to impose a limitation, and the statute becomes imperative.12 Provisions are mandatory where compliance is essential to the validity of the act, or when some antecedent and prerequisite conditions exist, or where performance is required before certain other powers can be exercised.13 Though language is simply enabling, yet if it conveys a power which concerns the public as well as individuals, it is mandatory.14 Provisions are directory where they relate to immaterial matter, or where they are given with a view to a proper, orderly, or prompt conduct of business merely.15 Statutes in contravention of the common law are not to be extended by construction, 16 as it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make an innovation on the common law further than the case absolutely requires. 17 1 Higgins v. Rinker, 47 Tex. 393. 2 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Higgins v. Rinker, 47 Tex. 393. 3 Howard Asso. Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 344. 4 Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433. 5 Smiley v. Sampson, 1 Neb. 87. 6 Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433, 7 State v. Pool, 74 N. C. 402; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 384. 8 State v. Pool, 74 N. C. 402; Parker v. Carrow, 64 N. C. 563. 9 Galveston &c. Co. v. Gross, 47 Tex. 428. And see Burt v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 116. 10 Smiley v. Sampson, 1 Neb. 87. 11 People v. Gosper, 3 Neb. 310; Felt v. Felt. 19 Wis. 193; McCann v. McLennan, 2 Neb. 233; City of Covington v. McNickle, 18 B. Mon. 280; Peyton v. Mosely, 3 Mon. 77; M. & E. R. R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Taxa tion, 8 Vroom, 415. 12 People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 358; Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 350. 13 Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 350. 14 Inhab, of V. v. Inhab. of C. 50 Mc. 526; People v. Supervisors, 11 Abb. Pr. 114. 15 Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 350. 16 Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. 17 Johnson v. Hahn, 4 Neb. 144. Effect of repeal. -A general statute without negative words will not repeal a previous statute which is special, although its provisions be different.1 A repealing clause in an unconstitutional statute is inoperative. The effect of a repealing clause is to end all proceedings, unless under an exception.3 The law does not favor a repeal by implication,4 yet, though a repeal by implication is not favored, when the inconsistency is clear the first statute is held repealed.5 In the construction of statutes the earliest remains in force unless the two are clearly inconsistent and repugnant,6 in so far as it is repugnant. The rights of a citizen on a pending suit founded solely on statute is terminated by repeal unless there be a saving clause in the repealing act.8 1 Rounds v. Waymart Borough, 81 Pa. St. 395. 2 Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482; State v. La Crosse, 11 Wis. 51. 3 Copeland v. Village of Passaic, 7 Vroom, 382. 4 People v. Webster, 3 Neb. 323. 5 Golding v. College of Chambersburg, 8 Vroom, 258. 6 White v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 505; People v. Weston, 3 Neb. 323. 7 Case of Barber, 86 Pa. St. 392. 8 Bennet v. Hargus, 1 Neb. 421. Judicial interpretation.-The constitution is a law, and the judiciary, from the very nature of the powers given it, must interpret it.1 Courts may declare the action of the legislature unconstitutional when such action violates the supreme law, but they cannot avoid the effects of non-action.2 The construction of the constitution and statutes of one State, given them by the highest judicial tribunal thereof, is to be followed by the courts of other States.3 Courts have a right to decide on the validity of statutes of other States. If an act be manifestly a breach of the constitution, it is the duty of the court to declare it void.5 City ordinances in conflict with the constitution or statutes are invalid.6 1 Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65. 2 Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341. 3 Franklin v. Twogood, 25 Iowa, 520. 4 Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355. 5 Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & R. 330. 6 Mayor &c. v. Hussey, 21 Ga. 80. Police powers of States.-Private interests must be made subservient to the general interest of the community, so the power of Sates over police regulations is supreme.2 A State law intended as a regulation of police is not a regulation of commerce,3 but the police power cannot be extended over interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce.1 A State may regulate the position of vessels in her harbors or rivers,5 or may regulate the speed of steamers or railroad trains.6 States may prohibit the intro luction of slaves,7 or exclude paupers, criminals, diseased or infirm persons, and persons afflicted with contagious diseases,8 and may exact a bond to indemnify from expense of maintaining passengers after arrival but to exclude passengers who are in possession of their faculties, and neither paupers nor criminals, is a regulation of commerce which the State cannot exercise.10 So, a State cannot legislate to prevent the importation of cattle during certain seasons of the year, this being more than an exercise of its police powers; but it may regulate the introduction of game during certain months;12 but forbidding the exportation of game, lawfully killed within the State, is unconstitutional. 18 A State may forbid the sale of an illuminating liquid below a certain standard, 14 or regulate the use of explosives and dangerous oils and substances, 15 or may remove the same.16 The police power extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, morals, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property in the State. This clause does not interfere with the rights of States to enact inspection, quarantine, and health laws, as well as laws regulating internal commerce, 18 or commerce local in its character, 19 as requiring the master of a vessel to report the names, ages, and origin of passengers.20 Inspection laws are not burdens on trade, nor unjust discriminations, so long as they are reasonable; 2 but a statute requiring vessels to furnish statements of the name and owner is void as to United States vessels. 22 So, a statute relating to the survey of sea-going vessels is a regulation of commerce, and void.23 1 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 62; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84; Taunton v. Taylor, 116 Mass. 254; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315. 2 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 62; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 138. 3 Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102. 4 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. Contra, Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill.254. 5 Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cowen, 348. 6 People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; Toledo &c. Co. v. Deacon, 63 Ill. 91. 7 Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Peters, 449; Osborn v. Nicholson, 1 Dill. 235. 8 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 607; 26 Barb. 270. 9 Candler v. Mayor of New York, 1 Wend. 493; State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578; Henderson v. The Mayor, 92 U. S. 265; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 572. But see New York v. Staples, 6 Cowen, 170. 10 State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. 11 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; S. C. 6 Am. L. R. 265, denying Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill. 254; Stevens v. Brown, Ibid. 289; Wilson v. Kansas C. St. J. & C.R. R. 60 Mo. 184; Husen v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co. 60 Mo. 226; Mercer v. Kansas C. St. J. & C. R. R. Co. 60 Mo. 397; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Gassaway, 71 Ill. 570; Somerville v. Marks, 58 Ill. 371. 12 State v. Randolph, 1 Mo. App. 15. 13 State v. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127. 14 Patterson v. Kentucky, 11 Ch. L. N. 183; 7 Am. L. R. 83. 15 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41. 16 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 617. 17 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 147; Toledo &c. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37; Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Davis v. Central R. R. Co. 17 Ga. 323. 18 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 102; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 633; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. An. 256. 19 State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. 20 New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 131. 21 People v. Harper, 11 Ch. L. N. 191. 22 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244. Contra, Commrs. of Pilotage v. The Cuba, 28 Ala. 185. 23 Foster v. Master &c. of N. O. 94 U. S. 246. Police powers.-It is the province of the legislature to determine the exigency calling for the exercise of police powers, and of the courts to decide the proper subjects of its exercise,1 and it cannot by any contract divest itself of this power, 2 nor of its discretion in its exercise.3 The police powers comprehend all those general laws of internal regulation necessary to secure peace, good order, health, and the comfort of society, private interests being subservient to the general interests of the community.5 The legislature may forbid an individual from undertaking a dangerous employment except at his own risk, or it may prohibit a hazardous or pernicious business, although it affects prior contracts.7 So, it may regulate the sale of naphtha or inflammable oils.8 A subsequent statute may prohibit the transportation of dead animals under a charter allowing their use as fertilizers.9 So, a statute prohibiting a lottery is valid, though the charter gave a right to establish one. 10 A State legislature may pass laws regulating the observance of the Sabbath,11 or may |