to Point Isabel to arrange for the reinforcements which had begun to arrive. On the 18th, all being in readiness, he crossed the Rio Grande without opposition and closed the campaign by the occupation of Matamoras. The brilliant victories of the army of occupation in its three weeks' campaign should not make us lose sight of the perils it encountered. The advance to the Rio Grande, it is true, was suggested by the commander, but in adopting the suggestion the only modification of his instructions seemed to make them more ambiguous by changing the emergency for calling out raw troops from "invasion or to secure the country against apprehended invasion," to the still more vague "approach of a considerable Mexican force." As the nearest governor was at least 300 miles away, there was no possibility of receiving reenforcements, even if called for in view of the suggested emergency, inasmuch as the enemy could cross the Rio Grande and fight a battle on the same day. And such, in theory, was the plan of General Arista, the Mexican commander. The passage of the river by General Torrejon on April 24, which led to the skirmish on the 25th and to General Taylor's requisition for militia on the 26th, was to have been followed by the main body of the army with the expectation of cutting our line of communication and forcing our army to immediate battle. Delays, however, in crossing the river retarded the movement till the 1st of May, when the army returned to Point Isabel. The conflict was thus deferred till May 8, when, as we have seen, the battle of Palo Alto was fought three days before the first reenforcements made their appearance at Point Isabel. This act sufficiently proves the want of reflection which dictated the President's instructions. Had they been transmitted through the general in chief, as is now wisely required by law," he could in a measure have been held responsible had he failed to offer his professional advice. But whether or not he was taken into the confidence of the President, the fact still remains that in trying to economize by depending upon raw troops, the orders to our commanders invited a series of disasters from which we were alone rescued by the skill and fortitude of a disciplined army. Such was the excitement and alarm lest General Taylor's troops should be overwhelmed, that volunteers came forward far beyond the numbers specified in his requisitions. In New Orleans the veteran commander, General Gaines, who in nearly every disturbance since the war of 1812 had called out troops without waiting for instructions from the Government, set to work to organize and equip an army on his own responsibility, the term of enlistment being fixed at six months. So rapidly did he proceed, calling on the governors of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri, that, before he could be stopped by being relieved from command, the number of troops sent to General Taylor exceeded 8,000. The total number of troops who responded to the calls of the two commanders was: Three months' men.. Six months' men illegally enlisted and held for three months, the legal term of the militia... Total 1,390 11, 211 12, 601 a The act of Congress directing that orders to the Army be promulgated through the commanding general was passed March 2, 1867, and was repealed July 15, 1870.-EDITORS. The number of men received from Louisiana was 5,389. The arrival of these troops after the emergency had passed was attended by other evidences of mismanagement. They had been called to arms and embarked by a stroke of the pen, but when they landed, so destitute were they of equipment and transportation that they were compelled to remain in idleness near their depots of subsistence until discharged from the service. Called out for three months, they returned to their homes without the satisfaction of having fired a shot, their losses by death being 145-but 25 short of those killed and wounded (170) at the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. MILITARY LEGISLATION DURING THE WAR. The report of the first skirmish reached the War Department on Saturday, May 9, 1846. On Monday, the 11th, the President sent a message to Congress, then in session, stating that war existed by the act of Mexico, and adding that In further vindication of our rights, and defence of the Territory, I invoke the prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. To this end I recommend that authority should be given to call into the public service a large body of volunteers, to serve for not less than six or twelve months, unless sooner discharged. A volunteer force is beyond question more efficient than any other description of citizen soldiers; and it is not to be doubted that a number far beyond that required would readily rush to the field upon the call of their country. I further recommend that a liberal provision be made for sustaining our entire military force and furnishing it with supplies and munitions of war. The most energetic and prompt measures and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and successful termination." In these few brief lines is to be found the primary cause of all the subsequent delay and extravagance attending the prosecution of the war. Ignoring the experience of the Revolution, of the war of 1812, and later still of the Florida war, whose aggregate duration exceeded sixteen years, without pausing to compute, in the absence of railroads, the time required to transport troops from one to two thousand miles to the scene of hostilities, the President not only expressed his confidence in raw troops, but signified his belief in a formal recommendation to Congress that we could bring a foreign war to a successful conclusion in the brief space of from six to twelve months. The responsibility for this recommendation cannot wholly be laid upon the President. General Taylor, a witness of the feeble and protracted prosecution of the two preceding wars, in his letter reporting the skirmish of Thornton's dragoons, stated: If a law could be passed authorizing the President to raise volunteers for twelve months, it would be of the greatest importance for a service so remote from support as this, b The promptitude with which Congress entertained and complied with the President's unfortunate recommendation finds no parallel in a House Ex. Doc. No. 196, Twenty-ninth Congress, first session, p. 6 our history." The very day his message was received a bill to raise 50,000 volunteers was introduced, and under the operation of the previous question passed the House of Representatives. The next day it passed the Senate, and on the 13th received the President's signature. The first section of the act read as follows: Whereas, by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States, that, for the purpose of enabling the Government of the United States to prosecute said war to a speedy and successful termination, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to employ the militia, naval, and military forces of the United States, and to call for and accept the services of any number of volunteers, not exceeding 50,000, who may offer their services, either as cavalry, artillery, infantry, or riflemen, to serve twelve months after they shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged, according to the time for which they shall have been mustered into service; and that the sum of $10,000,000, out of any moneys in the Treasury, or to come into the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this act into effect. The second section extended the term of the militia, when called into the service of the United States, to six months; the third section required the volunteers to furnish their own clothes, horses, and equipments, the arms to be furnished by the United States; the fourth section gave to each volunteer, as compensation for his clothing, the cost of clothing allowed to a regular soldier; the fifth section, ignoring the fact that the new force was not militia, authorized the officers to be appointed according to the laws of their several States; the ninth section gave the volunteers the same pay and allowances as regular soldiers, and allowed to those who were mounted a compensation for their horses of 40 cents per day. It ought not to surprise us if a law passed without debate should have contained many costly, if not dangerous, mistakes. The principal one of these was contained in the brief words "to serve twelve months" or "to the end of the war." Whether this unfortunate alternative may be regarded as evidence of the conviction on the part of Congress that a foreign war could be brought to a speedy and successful end in twelve months-a thing that has never occurred, and probably never will occur under our present system-or as an expression of its confidence in the wisdom and judgment of the President, it is not necessary to discuss. 66 As might have been foreseen, the sequel proved that our best and only safeguard lies in wise legislation. The provisions of the law, more liberal than those recommended by the President, authorized him, at his option, to accept the services of volunteers for twelve months" or "for the war." Instead of deciding upon the volunteers for the war, the President permitted the circular calling for the new troops to be couched in the exact wording of the law, thereby enabling each volunteer, at the expiration of twelve months, to elect whether he would receive his discharge or remain in service till the end of the war. a Under the joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, and the Act of Congress, dated April 22, 1898, President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers for the Spanish war on April 23. On May 31, a little more than a month after the President's proclamation, nearly all of this immense force of volunteers had been mustered into the United States service. Under the call of the President of May 25, 75,000 additional volunteers were called for. The last volunteers under these two calls, were mustered in, August 24, 1898.—EDITORS. b Callan's Military Laws of the United States, first section, p. 367, The dilemma in which the Government thus placed itself by mere want of foresight was foreshadowed in the annual report of the Secretary of War of December 5, 1846. After stating that the volunteers in their encounters with the enemy had "more than justified the expectations formed of that description of troops," but "that it was no disparagement to them to say that a regular force was to be preferred in a war to be prosecuted in a foreign country," he added: Those who are now in the field, with the exception of one regiment sent out to California, entered the service under the alternative of continuing in it for twelve months or to the end of the war; and it is presumed they will have the right-at all events they will have the permission if they claim the right-to retire from the service at the end of that period, which will expire about the (end) 1st of June next.a The needless expense caused by this great mistake may be inferred from the fact that on the 13th of May, the day the law received the President's signature, requisitions were made upon the governors of the States of Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio for a volunteer force equal to 26 regiments, amounting in all, with a battalion from the District and Maryland, to about 23,000 effective men, to serve for the period of twelve months or to the end of the war. Nine regiments and one battalion of volunteers have been recently called for from various States to serve to the end of the war, and the information received at the Department gives the assurance that these requisitions will be promptly and cheerfully complied with. c The above showed the effort made to retrieve the error already committed and proved that the requirement of service "for the war" would in no wise have lessened the spirit of volunteering. Although not so dangerous to the success of our arms as the error just referred to, there was another defect in the law which diminished our strength and at the same time exposed the new levies to needless suffering and privation. Under the construction of the fourth section of the act, it was decided that the volunteers first called out should receive, on being mustered into service, the cost of a year's clothing, amounting to $42. The effect was thus explained by the Secretary in his report: This sum was not always appropriated for clothing, and many of them soon became so destitute as to suffer in their health, and in other respects to be scarcely fit for service. To this cause, in no inconsiderable degree, is to be ascribed the great disparity of sickness between volunteers and regular troops, the latter being well clothed by the Government and comparatively much more healthy.d The military legislation on the 13th of May was not limited to raising a force of volunteers. Another act of the same date authorized the President, by voluntary enlistment, to increase the number of privates in each or any of the companies of the dragoons, artillery, and infantry to not exceeding 100, the number to be reduced to 64 when the exigency requiring the increase should cease. It will thus be seen that while during peace all discretion to increase the Army was withheld from the President through motives of economy, or of jealousy of the Army, the moment war was declared the power of expanding it was freely committed to his trust, a power that enabled him, without adding an officer to the line, to raise the enlisted strength from 7,580 to 15,540. House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 54. Report of Secretary of War. House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 47. c Same, p. 54. d House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 56. Had this discretion been granted to the President by the law of 1842, the army of occupation need not have been exposed to an attack by an army of three times its numbers; neither would there have been any occasion to expose to the ravages of disease the thousands of three months' men who rushed to its rescue. On the 19th of May a regiment of mounted riflemen intended for service in Oregon was added to the Army. The remaining laws, from May 13 to the month of August, the end of the first session of the Twenty-ninth Congress, mainly related to the temporary increase during the war, of the various staff departments. b The Army, as organized by the foregoing laws, numbered 775 officers and 17,020 men; total, 17,812; but so slow was the recruitment that, by the return of December 5, 1846, the aggregate present and absent numbered 10,690, leaving a deficiency of recruits amounting to 6,958. The reasons for this deficiency, the same as existed during the Revolution and the War of 1812, were plainly set forth in the Secretary's report. The want of better success in recruiting is, I apprehend, mainly to be ascribed to the large number of volunteers which has, in the meantime, been called out. The volunteer service is regarded generally by our citizens as preferable to that in the Regular Army, and as long as volunteers are expected to be called for it will be difficult to fill the ranks of the regular regiments unless additional inducements are offered or the terms of service modified. A small pecuniary bounty given at the time of enlistment, or land at the end of the term of service, would, it is believed, have a most beneficial effect. Probably an equally favorable result would flow from annexing a condition to the present period of service, allowing the recruit to be discharged at the end of the present war. It is presumed there are many thousand patriotic citizens who would cheerfully enter the service for the war if they could return to the pursuits of civil life at its close.c The second section of the law for the increase of the staff departments merits attention. It authorized the President to call into the service, under the act approved May 13, 1846, such of the general officers of the militia as the service, in his opinion, may require, and to organize into brigades and divisions the forces authorized by said act, according to his direction.d This section would apparently denote that Congress regarded the volunteers under the Constitution as substantially the same as the militia, and that conformably with the law of 1792 the Governors of States had an equitable right to the appointment of all the officers, from the highest to the lowest grades. This partial adhesion to the State system was the means, in many instances, of placing the fortunes of the country, as well as the lives of our soldiers, in the hands of generals utterly ignorant of the military art at a time when the Government had at its disposal numbers of competent officers who had devoted their lives to the theory and practice of their profession. The first law of the next session was passed on the 12th of January, 1847, and, pursuant to the recommendation of the Secretary of War, permitted recruits to enlist in the Regular Army for the period of "five years" or "during the war." The recruits were also to receive a bounty of $12, $6 paid in hand, the remainder to be retained till the recruit joined the regiment. Had patriotic citizens been permitted to enlist in the Regular Army for the war at the outset, it is probable that the difficulties of recruitment might have been largely diminished. a Army Register, 1847. House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 68. House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 53. d Callan's Military Laws of the United States, first section, p. 373. |