Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. Concur: HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN and CRANE, JJ. Not sitting: MCLAUGHLIN, J. PRESTON B. SEAMAN, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent. Seaman v. City of New York, 172 App. Div. 740, affirmed. (Argued December 5, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered June 27, 1916, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a verdict. This action was brought to recover under two separate causes of action. The first cause of action alleged the employment in March, 1905, of the plaintiff by the defendant, acting by and through the president of the borough of Queens, to prepare and furnish to the defendant all of the plans and specifications, etc., for the erection and full completion, together with the supervision of a combination borough hall and county court house building for the borough of Queens, said services to be paid for by the defendant at the usual and customary rates of commissions allowed architects; that plaintiff entered upon the performance of this contract and duly prepared and completed all the preliminary studies and specifications and furnished the same to the defendant, who duly approved and accepted the same, and thereafter the plaintiff continuing his performance prepared and completed the necessary plans and specifications sufficiently complete to enable prospective bidders and contractors to make reliable estimates upon which to make their bids, and that said plans were duly approved, accepted and retained by the defendant. For a second cause of action plaintiff alleged damages for the refusal of the defendant to permit him to complete the detailed drawings for said building and supervise its construction. The defendant in its answer pleaded a general denial to both causes of action and in addition set up the following separate defenses to each cause of action: First, that the plaintiff had been fully paid by the defendant each and every sum due; second, that at the time plaintiff claimed to have been employed pursuant to the contract specified in the complaint he was in the employ of the defendant as a draftsman and that he actually received his salary as such draftsman during all the period, which said salary was in full compensation for all services performed for the defendant, also that plaintiff could not hold two positions; third, that there was no appropriation and the contract as alleged was ultra vires; fourth, that the art commission had rejected the plans. Nicholas W. Hacker for appellant. William P. Burr, Corporation Counsel (Terence Farley and William E. C. Mayer of counsel), for respondent. Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. Concur: HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ. GEORGE C. ANDREWS, Respondent, v. FRANK R. PIERSON, as President of the VILLAGE OF TARRYTOWN, et al., Appellants. Andrews v. Pierson, 174 App. Div. 478, affirmed. (Argued December 5, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered August 4, 1916, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term in a taxpayer's action under section 1925 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment in substance determined that the resolution of the board of trustees of the village of Tarrytown adopted on the 4th day of January, 1916, fixing the salary of the defendant William B. Moorhouse as police justice for the term commencing January 1, 1916, at $1,000 per year, payable monthly, was absolutely void and constituted a waste of and injury to the estate, funds and other property of the said village, and enjoined and restrained the said board of trustees from performing any of the conditions of said resolution, and from paying to said William B. Moorhouse as police justice any salary in excess of fifty-five dollars per month during his term of office of four years, and restrained and enjoined said William B. Moorhouse from collecting for his salary as police justice during his term of office any sum in excess of fifty-five dollars per month as provided by resolution of the board of trustees of said village of Tarrytown adopted December 12, 1911. Hugh A. Thornton and Clarence S. Davison for appellants. George C. Andrews for respondent. Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. Concur: HIS COCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ. CITY OF SYRACUSE, Respondent, v. ONONDAGA COUNTY SAVINGS BANK, Appellant, Impleaded with Others. City of Syracuse v. Onondaga Co. Sav. Bank, 174 App. Div. 902, affirmed. (Submitted December 6, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered September 26, 1916, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term. The action was brought by the plaintiff for the foreclosure of the general city tax of the city of Syracuse for the year 1908, assessed against the defendant, the Onondaga County Savings Bank, as the owner of two vacant lots in said city. The relief sought was the sale of the lots and a judgment against the Onondaga County Savings Bank for any deficiency on account of the general city tax of 1908, and all other taxes and local improvement assessments which had been levied or assessed subsequent to the tax upon which this action is brought. The question was whether under chapter 385 of the Laws of 1911 the defendant Onondaga County Savings Bank was personally liable for a local improvement assessment so as to warrant a deficiency judgment for the amount thereof. Harold Stone for appellant. Stewart F. Hancock, Corporation Counsel, for respondent. Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. Concur: HIS COCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ. MORRIS SYRKIN, Appellant, v. IRVING KESNER et al., Respondents. Syrkin v. Kesner, 175 App. Div. 321, affirmed. (Submitted December 6, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL from a judgment, entered December 7, 1916, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and directing a dismissal of the complaint. The action was brought upon a jail limit undertaking executed by defendants whereby it was provided that defendant Kesner should not go without the liberties of the county of New York until discharged. Thereafter on June 15, 1914, it was alleged Kesner was seen in the county of Bronx. The trial court denied defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint, made upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, defendants' contention being that on said June 15, 1914, the jail liberties of New York county included Bronx county, and that, therefore, Kesner's presence in Bronx county on that date did not constitute an escape, but the Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint. Harry N. Wessel for appellant. Harry H. Bernstein and Morris M. Becher for respondents. Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion. Concur: HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ. Cora MAUDE CLARKE, Respondent, v. JOHN L. MARTIN, Appellant. Clarke v. Martin, 175 App. Div. 919, affirmed. (Argued December 9, 1918; decided January 7, 1919.) APPEAL from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 10, 1916, modifying and affirming as modified a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in an action to recover for an alleged breach of promise to marry. The complaint alleged a promise of marriage in August or September, 1907, and a breach by the defendant by his marriage to another in the month of March, 1912, and that in reliance upon defendant's promise the plaintiff lived and cohabited with the defendant in and after 1907 and up to the time of the defendant's marriage. The answer admitted the defendant's marriage, denied all of the other allegations of the complaint and set up, as an affirmative defense, that in or about October, 1908, the plaintiff and defendant mutually agreed to rescind the contract to marry and as a partial defense and in mitigation of damages that prior to and about the time of the agreement alleged in the complaint and subsequent thereto, the plaintiff accepted money for her maintenance and support from other men, lived in different apartments in the city of New York, in the borough of Manhattan and borough of Brooklyn, under the protection of these men, falsely represented to the |