PRIVY COUNCIL DECISION. ROYAL BANK OF CANADA V. PROVINCE OF ALBERTA. The Privy Council has allowed the appeal of the Royal Bank of Canada from the judgment against the bank in the Alberta Provincial Court to paying over to the provincial government a sum involving $6,000,000 held in connection with the Alberta and Great Waterways Railway project. The question argued before the Privy Council was the validity of an Act of the legislature. The Lord Chancellor, in delivering judgment, said that it was a question of great importance, and proceeded to review exhaustively the grounds for appeal, going on to speak of the public uneasiness shewn in 1910, about the action of the government in entering into arrangements concerning the railway. While a Royal Commission of Enquiry was sitting, there was a change of government. The new administration introduced and passed two statutes, and on the validity of the first of these, the question to be decided in appeal turned. This statute, after setting out in the preamble that the railway company had made a default in payment of interest. on bonds and in the construction of the line, and then ratifying and confirming the guarantee by the province of the bonds, enacted that the whole of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds, and all interest thereon, including such part of the proceeds of the sale as was then standing in the banks in the name of the treasurer of the province or otherwise, and comprising inter alia the six million dollars, and accrued interest in the appellant bank, should form part of the general revenue fund of the province, free from all claim of the railway company, and be paid over to the treasurer without deduction. It was also provided that, notwithstanding the form of the bonds and guarantee, the province should, as between itself and the railway, be primarily liable on the bonds, and should indemnify the company against claims. By another statute, passed at the same time, any person claiming to have suffered loss or damage in consequence of the passing of the act might submit his claim to the government. The Lord Chancellor went on to cite the steps subsequently taken in legal proceedings. Continuing he said: Their Lordships are not concerned with the merits of the political controversy which gave rise to the statute, the validity of which is impeached. What they have to decide is the question whether it was within the power of the legislature of the province to pass the Act of 1910. They agree with the contention of the respondents that in a case such as this it was in the power of that legislature subsequently to repeal the act which it had passed. If this were the only question which arose, the appeal could be disposed of without difficulty, but the Act under consideration does more than modify the existing legislation. It purports to appropriate to the province the balance standing at special discounts in banks, and so change its position as regards a scheme for the carrying out of which bondholders had subscribed their money. "Elaborately as the case was argued in the judgments of the learned Judges in the Courts below, their Lordships, are not satisfied that what appears to them to be the fundamental question at issue has been adequately considered. It is a well-established principle of English common law that when money has been received by one person, which in justice and equity belongs to another, under circumstances which render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff, the latter may recover. As for money had and received to his use, the principle stands, and as to cases where the money has been paid for a consideration that has failed, the present case appears to fall within the broad principle on which judgments in the case of Wilson v. Church proceeded. "Lenders in London remitted their money in New York, to be applied to carrying out a particular scheme established by statutes in 1909, and orders-in-council, and by contracts and mortgage of that year. The money claimed in action. was paid to the bank as one of those designated to act in carrying out the scheme. The bank received the money at its branch in New York, and the general manager then gave instructions from the head office in Montreal, to the manager of the local branches for the opening of credit for special account. The local manager was told he was to act on instructions from the head office, which retained control. "It appears to their Lordships that the special account. was opened solely for the purpose of the scheme, and that when the action of the government in 1910, altered its con ditions, the lenders in London, were entitled to claim from the bank at its office in Montreal, the money which they had advanced solely for the purpose which had ceased to exist. Their right was a civil right outside the province, and the legislature of the province could not legislate validly in derogation of that right. "These circumstances distinguish the case from that of King v. Lovett, where the point decided was in reality quite a different ore. "In the opinion of their Lordships the effect of the statute of 1910, if validly enacted, would have been to preclude the bank from fulfilling its legal obligations to return their money to the bondholders, whose right to this return was a civil right, which had arisen and remained enforceable outside the province. The statute was on this ground beyond the powers of the legislature of Alberta, inasmuch as what was sought to have been enacted was neither confined to property and civil rights within the province, nor directed solely to matters of merely a local, or private nature within it. "Other questions have, as already stated, been raised in this appeal as to whether the statute of 1910, infringed the provisions of sec. 91 of the British North America Act by attempting to deal with a question relating to banking, and by trenching on a field already occupied by the Dominion Banking Act. It was also contended that the appropriation of deposits to the general revenue fund of the province was outside the powers assigned to the provincial legislature for raising revenue for provincial purposes. "The conclusions already arrived at make it unnecessary for their Lordships to enter on a consideration of these mestions, and of other points made during the arguments of counsel. "Their Lordships will advise his Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, and the action dismissed. Respondents must pay costs here, and in the Courts below." N.S.] SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. DUNN v. EATON. [OCTOBER 29TH, 1912. Appeal-Final Judgment—Reference. In an action claiming rescission of a contract for the sale of timber lands and other equitable relief and, in the alternative, damages for deceit, the trial Judge held that it was a case for damages only and gave judgment accordingly and referred to a referee matters arising out of a counterclaim, ordering him also to take an account of moneys paid, an inquiry as to liens and incumbrances and as to the quantity of standing timber on the lands and other proper accounts. Further consideration of the cause was reserved. This judgment was affirmed by the full Court and the defendants sought to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Held, that the action tried and determined was the common law action for deceit only; that the judgment given therein was not a final judgment within the meaning of that term in the Supreme Court Act; and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Clarke v. Goodall (44 Can. S. C. R. 284), and Crown Life v. Skinner (44 Can. S. C. R. 616), followed. Appeal quashed with costs. Curry, K.C., for appellants. Rogers, K.C., for respondents. QUE.] TWO MOUNTAINS ELECTION CASE. [OCTOBER 29TH, 1912. Dominion Election-Nomination-Identification of Candidate-Powers of Returning Officer. The failure in the paper nominating a candidate for election to the House of Commons is substantially defective if it does not identify him by addition, residence or description, and should be rejected. DUFF and IDINGTON, JJ., dissenting. The Returning Officer may reject such nomination after the time for nominating candidates has expired, and may declare another whose papers are sufficient, elected by acclamation. DUFF, J., dissenting. Appeal dismissed with costs. Mignault, K.C., and Atwater, K.C., for appellant. HESSELTINE v. NELLES. ONT.] Appeal [DECEMBER 10TH, 1912. Final Judgment Further Directions Master's On the trial before the Chancellor of Ontario of an action claiming damages for breach of contract, judgment was given for the plaintiffs with a reference to the Master to ascertain the amount of damages, further directions being reserved. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The Master then made his report which, on appeal to the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, was varied by reduction of the amount awarded. The Chancellor then pronounced a formal judgment on further directions in favour of the plaintiffs for the damages as reduced. The defendants appealed from the judgments of the Chief Justice and the Chancellor and the two appeals were, by order, heard together but not formally consolidated. Both judgments were affirmed by the Court. of Appeal and the defendants sought to appeal from the judg ment affirming them and also from the original judgment sustaining the decision at the trial having applied without success to the Court below for an extension of time to appeal from the latter judgment. See Nelles v. Hesseltine (27 Ont. L. R. 97). Held, BRODEUR, J., dissenting, that the only judgment. from which an appeal would lie was that affirming the judg ment of the Chancellor on further directions; that the Chan |