hostilities which having been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved; for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual goodwill. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen

in the development of her country and its government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations, in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

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894.00/434-1/2

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, August 13, 1932.
[Received August 27.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

8

The outburst in Japan against your speech before the Council on Foreign Relations savors distinctly of a tempest in a teapot if not of a guilty conscience on the part of the Japanese, for we now understand that the speech was merely an academic discussion of a hypothetical case, while the Japanese took it as a specific charge of guilt. Unfortunately I was unable to take any steps to mitigate the effect here, because neither the text of the speech nor a resumé of its substance and intentions have reached me, and by the time the text arrives from Shanghai the incident will presumably be closed. However that may be, the Foreign Office has used the speech deliberately to pour fuel on the temporarily quiescent flames of public animosity against the United States. I say deliberately, because the violent Japanese press reaction was based not on the press despatches from the United States but on the Foreign Office's inflammatory interpretation of Debuchi's cabled account, and this interpretation was given to the Japanese press a day before it was released to the foreign correspondents.

This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts of the German Government, by calumniating foreign nations, to build up a public war psychology in 1914, the effort being repeated whenever some new -venture, such as the indiscriminate submarine warfare, was about to be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate building up of public ani"Delivered August 8, 1932. For text, see Foreign Affairs, Special Supplement (October, 1932), vol. X, no. 1.

mosity against foreign nations in general and the United States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose-to strengthen the hand of the military in its Manchurian venture in the face of foreign, and especially American, opposition. I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness, not of strength. The internal economic and financial situation in Japan is serious and may become desperate. The plight of the farmers is very bad, many industries are at low ebb, unemployment is steadily increasing. The yen is falling and prices have not yet risen proportionately. Money cannot be obtained from abroad; I was recently told, although I cannot vouch for the reliability of the information, that the Government had tried without success to obtain loans from England, France and Holland in turn. It will become increasingly difficult to obtain domestic loans. This situation is not critical, but it may become so when the ability of the National Bank of Japan to absorb domestic bonds comes to an end. Meanwhile millions of yen are being squandered to support the Manchurian venture, of which the eventual economic advantage is highly problematical, and when the full purport of these expenses becomes known to the people, in their own serious deprivation, there is no telling what effect it will create. I believe that a steadily increasing anxiety exists among the Government and the thinking men of the country outside of the hot-headed military clique which refuses to face these facts. It seems to be primarily this military element— vocalized by such men as Shiratori —who believe that the best way to obscure these facts is to work the public into a patriotic and nationalistic fervor by representing foreign nations, particularly the United States, as trying to thwart Japan's efforts for alleged self-preservation.

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Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military machine, supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit in its teeth and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military machine is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war and would welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it criminal to close them.

In this connection the enclosed memorandum prepared by the Embassy,10 which will be incorporated in a despatch, may be found significant.

Respectfully yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

Toshio Shiratori, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, Japanese Foreign

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793.94/5709

11

Memorandum by the Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi)

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1933.

The Japanese Ambassador came in with the remark that he regretted that his presence seemed to coincide with a new outbreak of war. He said that he was without instructions from his Government but that from the information he received this affair at Shanhaikwan was a local incident, provoked by a minor outbreak of Chinese against the Japanese there, and that when the Japanese who had sought permission to bring troops in to stabilize the situation approached the Gate of the City they were shot at and a Lieutenant and several soldiers killed. He said that the news he got from Ambassador Muto," who is also General, indicated that some troops of the Japanese had now been withdrawn and there was reason to be hoped that unless there was further provocation in Jehol by Chang Hsueh-liang the matter would be controlled. He said that in any event Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall. I reminded the Ambassador that a year ago he had told me Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. He became flustered and said that that was so but the situation had changed greatly. At any rate, he could now assure me that they had no such ambitions in North China. He said further that in Japan he thought that matters were progressing; that Saito was getting better control, and he regarded this incident at Shanhaikwan as a test incident as to whether the military elements still remained in control or whether the civil government had regained its position.

I reminded the Ambassador that just before he went away he told me that the Japanese Government was in the control of a group of younger officers, none of them of a higher rank than a LieutenantColonel, and I said to him that he must recognize that as long as that situation lasted I could not regard Japan as a normal Government and must make my own conclusions as to information coming from her. He said he remembered that situation but he found that when he got back to Japan it had somewhat changed and that Saito was getting into better control and that, as he expressed it, this incident at Shanhaikwan he regarded as a test of whether that was so. But he said he must in all frankness tell me that no Japanese

11

"Nobuyuki Muto, Japanese Ambassador in "Manchukuo".

Cabinet which advocated a compromise of the "Manchukuo" question could survive in Japan; that must be regarded as a closed incident. I told the Ambassador that in that case I could see, on my part, no other course than for Japan to get out of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. I went over the situation of the basic policy of this Government and the rest of the world and Europe, arising out of the Great War which had brought us to the conclusion that another war might destroy our civilization and which had made us determined to support the peace machinery which would render such a recurrence impossible. We recognized that Japan had a right to live her own way, provided she did not break treaties which she had made, and that if she was determined to lead a life differently from what we were determined to do I saw no other way but for her to withdraw from the associations and treaties which we proposed to abide by.

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H[ENRY] L. S[TIMSON]

793.94Commission/837

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1933-6 p. m. 78. Your 125, February 24, 7 p. m. Communicate to Drummond as a letter from me under today's date the following:

"There has been communicated to me the text of your letter of February 24, 1933, transmitting to me a copy of the report of the Committee of Nineteen as adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on this day.

I note your request that I communicate to you as soon as possible the reply of the Government of the United States.

In response to that request I have the honor to state the views of the American Government as follows:

In the situation which has developed out of the controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of the United States has coincided in general with that of the League of Nations, the common objective being maintenance of peace and settlement of international disputes by pacific means. In pursuance of that objective, while the League of Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a controversy between two of its members, the Government of the United States