I realize only too well that neighbors can be estranged even when race and language should make them brothers, and of this the present war in the Chaco is a ghastly reminder. Undoubtedly some of the states to the south in the past viewed the growing proximity of the United States with misgiving, and I cannot but admit that there have been occasions when our words and actions gave some justification to their fears. Today these suspicions are happily vanishing, and I believe the time is at hand when the American republics will be convinced not only that the good-neighbor policy is being carried out in practice, but also that in strictly observing it the President, with magnificent foresight, has adopted a course which the future progress of our two continents makes imperative. The truth is that cooperation is proving itself profitable in every way. The most recent instance is our reciprocity treaty with Cuba, which, in the few months of its operation, has worked wonders both in the economic and in the political spheres. If the Platt Amendment was symbolical of an early epoch in our inter-American relations, its recent abandonment is an emphatic symbol of a new era in which it becomes our manifest destiny to enter into ever closer relations of free and voluntary collaboration for the furtherance of the prosperity of each and the peace of all.

Thus far I have not dealt with our relations east and west, or what might be called our transoceanic policies. Here again, there is no break in unity but merely an adaptation to the very different geographical and historical situation. The fundamental element is the ocean, the Atlantic on the east, the Pacific on the west. There was a time when the ocean meant, or could mean, a certain degree of isolation. Modern communication has ended this forever; but necessarily a gap remains, and with it the difference in perspective. Seen from the distance of this hemisphere, the manifold boundary lines on the map of Europe become blurred and Europe emerges as an entity. We have no direct concern with the political and economic controversies of the European states. We have time and again expressly disassociated ourselves from these disputes. Nevertheless, we are deeply interested in the peace and stability of Europe as a whole, and have therefore taken part in a number of multilateral efforts to achieve this purpose.

The most outstanding instance is the Disarmament Conference, which, by concentrating on land and air armaments, deals with an issue of primary importance to Europe. Although believing that the limitation and reduction of armaments in itself tends to increase confidence and security-a view which has been amply confirmed by our experience on our northern borders-we are compelled to recognize

that rampant suspicion and hostility between nations, based on longstanding political and economic differences, constitute a barrier to effective action. This is particularly true on the European Continent, still smarting under the ravages of the World War. Hence, our basic policy of not intervening in individual European disputes has not prevented us from encouraging, proposing, and offering to participate in measures of a universal nature designed on the one hand to forward general political appeasement and on the other to facilitate general disarmament. Thus, in his well-known message of May 16, 1933, to the heads of states, President Roosevelt, after reaffirming and amplifying the disarmament proposals designed to strengthen security through abolishing aggressive land weapons, suggested the conclusion of a general nonaggression pact in which each country would agree not to send any armed forces of whatsoever nature across its frontiers. Six days later Mr. Norman Davis, representing us at Geneva, made a further contribution in the form of an offer that the United States, subject to an effective disarmament agreement, would be willing to consult with other states in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict; and that, moreover, the United States would not take steps to hinder any collective action which the other states might decide to take against an aggressor, provided the United States should independently concur in their decision as to the identity of the aggressor.

These proposals, taken together with the provisions of the Kellogg Pact, provide, I submit, the four pillars of a sound peace structure: First, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy; second, a promise of nonaggression; third, consultation in the event of a threat to peace; and fourth, non-interference on our part with such measures of constraint as may be brought against a deliberate violator of peace.

All four are political measures, if you like, as distinguished from technical disarmament measures. However, they are political only in the wider sense of being designed to assist in general pacification and stabilization, of equal benefit to all countries and with no implication of any intervention on our part in controversies between individual states. I should emphasize, moreover, that these four pillars might readily crumble were they to be built on the shifting foundations of unrestricted and competitive armaments. We have therefore insisted that a real limitation and reduction of the instruments of warfare must be an essential concomitant of any such peace program as I have outlined.

I have already indicated that the factors molding our foreign

policy toward Europe have led to our support primarily of endeavors of a general and universal nature. While growing out of and adapted to the basic needs of Europe, they are in effect world-wide in scope and application. If we turn our eyes in the opposite direction, toward the Pacific, we find a situation occupying an intermediate stage between our more immediate preoccupation with the issues of the Western Hemisphere and our more generalized participation in transatlantic problems. The greater width of the Pacific is more than compensated for by our possessions in that area and by long-standing historical developments and relationships. I shall not go into the origin of the "open door" and other elements of our traditional Far Eastern policy, but merely point out that this policy is most clearly set forth in a series of connected treaties which set up an integrated system for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Far East and the Pacific. I refer, of course, to the accomplishments of the Washington Conference, which, in their essence, still embody the basic principles we believe in and stand by. The problems dealt with in 1922 were in some respects peculiar to the special situation in the Far East and our relation thereto, notably the emergence of certain territorial questions, the predominance of economic issues, and the emphasis on naval rather than land and air armaments. But the elements common both to our transpacific and transatlantic policies are even more striking: Political and economic stabilization through conference and mutual agreement; cooperation for the maintenance of peace through nonaggression, consultation, and through limitation and reduction of armaments. I endeavored to summarize the basis of our Far Eastern policy when, on March 3, 1934, I expressed the hope, in reply to a message from Foreign Minister Hirota, "that it may be possible for all of the countries which have interests in the Far East to approach every question existing or which may arise between or among them in such spirit and manner that these questions may be regulated or resolved with injury to none and with definite and lasting advantage to all.” In other words, a good-neighbor policy in the Orient.

In this brief survey I have endeavored to cover the four major divisions of American foreign policy-Canadian, Latin American, European, and Far Eastern-and have touched upon the varying phases of each. It would be generalizing too much to state that the fundamental object uniting them is the preservation of peace. No nation would ever admit its policy to be or to have been other than one of peace. It is more a question of the means. After all, the Roman Empire knew long periods of peace; but the essence of the

Pax Romana was predominance over wide areas, a peace of inequality based on force. The kind of peace we envisage, and I think it is the kind not only we in the United States but the peoples of all nations, great and small, desire at heart and pray for, is the peace of friends, who feel secure in their independence not through immense armaments, the balance of which must again and again be destroyed by uneven competition, but through the give and take of political and economic cooperation which benefits no one country to the detriment of others but is of equal advantage to all. For what I said in a speech shortly after I became Secretary of State is true fundamentally for all nations: "It is a great satisfaction", I then stated, "to one who is confronted with the tasks devolving upon the Department of State to realize how, in meeting the problems that are our daily portion, the interests of our Government and our people seem so clearly to coincide with the interests of humanity."

863.00/1178

4.4

Memorandum by the Minister to Austria (Messersmith) Regarding A Conversation With the Ambassador in Germany (Dodd)

[Extract]

BERLIN, March 22, 1935.

I had a talk with the Ambassador this morning and we found ourselves in major agreement on all the subjects discussed.

I mentioned a despatch about the Chinese Minister in Vienna having said that I had told him that there was a Japanese-German understanding, if not alliance. I told him that I had not made such a statement but that I had told the Chinese Minister that in May and June, 1933, I had heard talk in Berlin that the Nazis and Japanese were trying to get together. I told the Ambassador that I had good reason to believe at the time that this was so, but I did not know how far it had gone. He said that he thought this had continued and that he felt that it had gone pretty far and he was not at all sure that there was not a very thorough understanding and perhaps even a very farreaching one.

I told the Ambassador that I thought if these people stayed in much longer we would have something to reckon with, and that many good men had already been affected. He said this unfortunately was the We again went over the situation and agreed that no faith

whatever can be laid in the present regime and its promises, and that we are going to suffer unless we recognize what they are really after, and this means unlimited territorial expansion.

G[EORGE] S. M[ESSERSMITH]

862.20/800

45

Memorandum by the Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the German Ambassador (Luther)

[WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1935.

The German Ambassador during his call casually stated that he trusted there would be no misunderstanding about the true attitude of the German Government on political and peace questions. He showed no disposition to elaborate, and I then remarked that the German Government at this time had a greater opportunity than any within two generations to make a remarkable showing of leadership with a program that would gradually bring Western Europe to normal political, social and peace relations; that the nations could either take this course or they could continue more or less aloof from each other with more or less misunderstanding of each others true motives, purposes and objectives, with the result that each country would go forward and arm to the teeth and without limit and on an ever-increasing scale, so that at some stage some local incident perchance would ignite the spark that would start a conflagration which in its ultimate effects would not leave a vestige of Western civilization. The Ambassador hurriedly proceeded to disclaim any course on the part of his Government except that of peace. . I asked the Ambassador what about the news reports as to the alleged objective of the German Government with respect to the Polish Corridor. He instantly disclaimed and denied as to this. I then referred to the reported objectives, such as the economic union with Austria, the return of Memel, the restoration of certain portions of Czechoslovakia with 3-12 million inhabitants, and certain other reported objectives. The Ambassador promptly disclaimed and denied as to each of these and insisted that his Government favored peace. I said, "What about disarmament?" He replied that his Government was and would be willing to disarm on relative equality with other governments. I continued at each stage to repeat as to the almost unprecedented opportunity of his Government for leadership with a program back to normal and peace conditions, and at the same time to emphasize how easy it would be for this opportunity to be lost or