me from accompanying Balbo on an air flight to the oasis of Cufra. But from what I saw and heard even though I was unable to visit Cufra or the other air bases of Italy, I became convinced that extensive preparations had been made in Libya to establish air communications and air bases both along the French border to the west of Libya and along the Egypto-Sudanese eastern border. ... The Italian air fleet is only two and a half or three hours from its Sicilian base to Libya; from eastern Libya it is only a short distance by air to Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. There is a large Italian colony in Egypt . . . The Italian colony there is subject to a press propaganda similar to that carried on in Italy through the agency of an Italian newspaper there and other organized Fascist groups. It would be very easy for Italy to strike from two directions at the nerve centers at the control of Egypt, i. e., the three cities in the northern part of the country. So that if you place Italy in control of Ethiopia you have a continuing threat to British control of Egypt and the Suez Canal and a continuing threat to the British Empire as regards its communications to the east. It is also equally true that Italian presence in Ethiopia would threaten British communications with the south by the Italian effort to join up Libya with Ethiopia across the Sudan. Conclusion. The inference I draw from it as to the future is that Italy must either be defeated now and prevented in the realization of her ambitions in East Africa, or the trouble will continue on through for a generation as an additional irritation to European politics and an additional menace to world peace. And if she is not defeated now it follows that we will have the menace of a highly organized and militarized state threatening the eastern Mediterranean and from its synchronized bases in Africa challenging the British Empire, with the turmoil it will bring from time to time into international politics through a period of years. While I realize that this is all speculative, I think the possibilities have a bearing upon the present situation and that they may indicate what we may expect in the way of international relations for some time in the future. Respectfully yours, BRECKINRIDGE LONG Press Releases, vol. XIII, p. 255 54 Statement by President Roosevelt, October 5, 1935 In view of the situation which has unhappily developed between Ethiopia and Italy, it has become my duty under the provisions of the joint resolution of Congress approved August 31, 1935, to issue, and I am today issuing, my proclamation making effective an embargo on the exportation from this country to Ethiopia and Italy of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. Notwithstanding the hope we entertained that war would be avoided, and the exertion of our influence in that direction, we are now compelled to recognize the simple and indisputable fact that Ethiopian and Italian armed forces are engaged in combat, thus creating a state of war within the intent and meaning of the joint resolution. In these specific circumstances I desire it to be understood that any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk. 55 765.84/1686 The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Geneva [Telegram: Paraphrase] [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1935-9 p.m. 188. For the Minister. Your 325, October 9, 11 a.m. and Gilbert's 448, October 8, 4 p.m. Reports from you and other sources evidence an intention of the League to ask non-League countries to participate in the consideration of the problem of sanctions. We, of course, are not as qualified as others to know whether other non-member states are willing or unwilling to so participate. For ourselves it should be more and more clear that we have used all our influence and support for the preservation of peace; that now we take the position that we are determined that war shall not involve us; that in pursuance of this policy we will not overlook any possible step that would be consistent with our position. Considering our policy as evidenced by what we have already done and said, with the complete support of American public opinion, we regard it advisable in every respect for the League to understand that definite measures have already been taken by the United States in accordance with our own limitations and policies; that these measures include long steps in restricting commercial and financial transactions with the belligerents; and that we desire to follow our course independently according as circumstances develop. Our course and attitude should be indicated by these measures. With this in mind. it would appear not only unnecessary but at this time inadvisable from the viewpoint of this government to invite us to join in any committee organized to consider sanctions. It would be useful if you would inform orally and with great discretion the Secretary General and any other appropriate delegation of the sense of the above. HULL 56 765.84/1847 The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Geneva [Telegram] [WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1935-6 p.m. 129. Your 508, October 15, 8 p.m. It is important that, if possible, daily newspaper rumors and reports from Europe about the attitude or policy of this Government toward some phase of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy, and especially reports that foreign governments or agencies are just about to inquire of this Government whether it can or will cooperate with foreign Governments or peace agencies in one way or another, shall be minimized to the greatest possible extent. My opinion is that you can anticipate most of these and head them off by casually and unofficially imparting all permissible information relative to our present and prospective course and attitude. Every leading official abroad knows that prior to the outbreak of the war our chief purpose was to aid in preserving peace, whereas after hostilities began our chief object is and will be to avoid being drawn into the war. The lengthy succession of acts and utterances by this Government in an attempt to preserve peace should be well known in every foreign office and at Geneva. Our numerous steps taken after the outbreak of hostilities primarily and paramountly to keep out of the war, although incidentally and consciously calculated to be very helpful in discouraging a protracted war or a spread of the war, should likewise be well known abroad. This Government preceded others in declaring that a state of war exists, in enforcing embargo on arms, ammunition and implements of war, in refusing Government credit in support of trade transactions, in warning all Americans that any transactions of whatever nature with the belligerent countries would be at their own risk, and that Americans traveling on ships of the belligerent countries would do so at their own risk, and finally in my public statement of October 11 it was made certain that the influence and attitude of this Government under the foregoing policies was definitely to discourage any and all economic transactions between our nationals and those of the belligerent countries. The American public is making a satisfactory response to the policy thus indicated. Subordinate to this major policy of not being involved in war, this Government is keeping thoroughly alive its definite conviction that it and all nations have a real interest in peace in every part of the world, and hence a special corresponding interest and obligation to contribute to the cause of peace in every practical way consistent with our well known foreign policy of non-involvement or entanglement. The numerous acts and utterances of this Government, both before and after the outbreak of hostilities, offer definite and clear index of the course and attitude of this Government relative to the Italo-Ethiopian controversy in the future. Foreign Governments and peace agencies are familiar with the extent and limitation of statutory authority of this Government to deal with the various phases of the existing war situation. It must be clear to them by this time that this Government is acting upon its own initiative and proceeding separately and independently of all other Governments or peace organizations. It is also important to keep in mind that in some vital respects the policy of this Government to the extent based upon the discretion of the President is intended primarily to apply to the present specific Italo-Ethiopian situation rather than as an inflexible and permanent policy. The purpose is to meet and deal effectively with conditions and circumstances as they may arise. HULL 57 Press Releases, vol. XIII, p. 367 Radio Address 23 of the Secretary of State, November 6, 1935 Because of the generally unsettled world conditions, and the existence of hostilities between two powers with which we are on terms "Delivered by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips). of friendship, the one phase of our foreign policy uppermost in the minds of our people today is that of neutrality. It is being discussed from the platforms, in the press, and in the streets. It is of concern to our people in every walk of life. They have not forgotten the bitter experiences of the World War, the calamitous effects of which will not be erased from their memories during our present generation. Is it therefore any wonder that they should be concerned regarding our policy of neutrality and the steps that their Government is taking to avoid a repetition of those experiences? Modern neutrality dates from the latter part of the Middle Ages. Prior to that time neutrality was unknown for the reason that belligerents did not recognize an attitude of impartiality on the part of other powers; under the laws of war observed by the most civilized nations of antiquity, the right of one nation to remain at peace while neighboring nations were at war was not admitted to exist. Efforts made by nations from time to time to adopt an attitude of impartiality were successfully resisted by the belligerents, who proceeded on the theory that any country not an ally was an enemy. No intermediate relation was known to the pagan nations of those earlier times, and hence the term "neutrality" did not exist. During the sixteenth century, however, neutrality as a concept in international law began to be recognized. In 1625 Hugo Grotius, sometimes referred to as "the father of international law", published his celebrated treatise on the laws of peace and war. While his treatment of the subject of neutrality is brief and necessarily so because of the undeveloped status of the law of his time, he nevertheless recognized the possibility of third parties remaining neutral. He did not, however, have that conception of neutrality to which we have been accustomed in more recent times. He stated that it was the duty of those not engaged in a war "to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who wages a just war may be hampered." Since the days of Grotius, neutrality has passed through several stages of evolution. No nation has done more toward its development than has the United States. In 1794 Congress passed our first neutrality act, temporary in character, covering a variety of subjects. In 1818 permanent legislation on these subjects was passed. This legislation formed the basis of the British act of a similar character of 1819, known as the British Foreign Enlistment Act. Other legislation has been passed by Congress from time to time, including that enacted during the World War-I refer particularly to the act of June 15, 1917-and that enacted as recently as the last session of |