cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East; that, if the Ambassador did not mind, I would be glad to reemphasize the chief points I had referred to in our previous conversations on this general subject and situation; that these included a most earnest appeal to each government, from every possible standpoint, for peace, as well as an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and would prove utterly disastrous, in the present chaotic state of world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress. After elaborating the foregoing views as fully as possible, I then said that I had also brought to the Ambassador's attention the great objective and beneficent purposes of the program adopted at Buenos Aires, including the 8-point pillar of peace proposals in my address at Buenos Aires, and I emphasized the view that such general hostilities now would utterly shatter the future prospects of this broad basic program for improving international relationships and to restore international order and thereby avoiding the opposite trend at present towards international anarchy; that I have been seeking to emphasize to all governments and all nations alike the basic points of this broad Buenos Aires program, and to this end I gave out a statement on last Friday 34 containing these various proposals based originally on the 8-point pillars of peace statement; that I am getting a few of these out each day to various governments for their comment and, I hope, their approval and active cooperation; that I was glad herewith to hand to the Ambassador for his government a copy of this statement of last Friday, in the hope that his government can see its way clear to join with us and other nations in proclaiming the soundness and need of this program, and I added that it would be most pleasing to us if the Government of Japan could and would step up by our side and join in carrying forward this great program, a revival of the principles of which is so much needed by the world today. From the outset of our conversation, the Ambassador from time to time in brief words indicated his approval of what I was saying. I then said to the Ambassador that I might repeat what I had also said to him at the beginning-that this government is ready and will be most glad at any time to say or do anything, short of mediation which of course requires the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute towards composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China; that this was, of course, said to the Ambassador for his Government; 4 Doc. 86. and I added that I desired to repeat with emphasis the present, continued attitude of this government of thus being ready and desirous of saying or doing anything that the government or governments concerned might suggest which would be fair and impartial towards all concerned and at the same time calculated to be helpful in restoring thoroughly peaceful relations in the Far East. I said to the Ambassador that there was another phase of the matter I would like to put before him. I explained that I was anxious that my point of view be completely understood and for this reason I would like to inform the American Ambassadors in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have those Ambassadors report what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I spoke here would report, to the Japanese and Chinese Governments. At one stage I asked the Ambassador what the latest developments were. He replied that he knew very little in addition to what had been reported to me by the Japanese Counselor during the past three or four days, except a report about a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only and declined to use their infantry. He said their purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still has hopes that this result may be accomplished; that they are not bringing down troops from Japan proper. The Ambassador said little throughout the conversation, but sought to make himself agreeable. I emphasized to him that if we did not feel genuinely friendly and impartial towards his country and all concerned I would not be saying some of the things I was saying. During the course of the conversation, I remarked that I desired to refer specially to an incident of the past two days in which two American women, near their embassy in Peking, were assaulted by Japanese guards. I said that I had remarked to the press, off the record, on yesterday that I had only received newspaper information about this attack upon the American women and I could not comment upon it with accuracy until official information came to me; that in the meantime I assumed and hoped that our Embassy in Peking would take the matter up with the Japanese Government and a settlement, or adjustment, or action satisfactory to all concerned would be brought about. The Ambassador expressed his favorable interest in such action and also his belief that such would be the case. Dr. Hornbeck, who was present, remarked to the Ambassador that similar incidents relating to our nationals or the nationals of other governments have occurred during the past five years and that it would be very helpful to the reputation of the Japanese Government to see to it that their guards would deport and demean themselves in a way to avoid such occurrences. The Ambassador expressed his approval. C[ORDELL] H[ULL] 793.94/9278 88 The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State · [Telegram: Paraphrase] TOKYO, August 10, 1937-7 p.m. 254. Department's 140, August 7, 3 p.m.34a Today affirmative instructions were received by the British Chargé. This afternoon I called upon the Foreign Minister at his home and presented confidentially and informally the United States Government's offer of good offices along the lines of the two points set out in the Department's telegram No. 138 of August 8.35 The offer was received by the Foreign Minister in entire friendliness. However, he said that there had already been made an opening for negotiations in the conversation at Shanghai yesterday between Ambassador Kawagoe and Kao, Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the Chinese Foreign Office. The plan of the Japanese for an understanding between China and Japan was presented to Kao and immediately the latter left for Nanking in order to communicate the plan to Chiang Kai-shek. The Foreign Minister said that the complete details of the conversation at Shanghai had not reached him but that war might be avoided if Chiang Kai-shek would reply with some plan (obviously a counter-proposal) which could serve as a basis for negotiations. However, the situation was characterized by the Foreign Minister as critical and he indicated that general hostilities could be prevented only by a favorable and early reply from Chiang Kai-shek. Foreign Minister Hirota then remarked that if the United States wanted to be helpful the most effective thing it could do would be to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to take prompt action as contemplated in the preceding sentence. 34 Not printed. 35 The two points set out in telegram 138 were the providing of a neutral place for Japanese and Chinese negotiators and assistance in smoothing out difficulties which might arise in negotiations. Apparently Hirota was reluctant to reveal the plan proposed by Kawagoe even in its general nature except that it included conditions for "good relations" with Manchuria and for the elimination of all anti-Japanese activities in China. I was requested by the Foreign Minister to consider the fact that an opening for negotiations had been made as strictly confidential. He declared that the press has no information about the nature of the conversation between Kawagoe and Kao. The British Chargé expects to see the Foreign Minister tomorrow and to take similar action. The Foreign Minister said that matters had been worsened by the murder recently of a Japanese naval officer in Shanghai. The Japanese navy is observing self-restraint, although it is very angry, in order that the situation in Shanghai be not inflamed. GREW 89 Press Releases, vol. XVII, p. 166 Press Release Issued by the Department of State on August 23, 1937 At his press conference on August 17, the Secretary of State announced that (1) legislative action to make available funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2) this Government had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary then discussed at some length the principles of policy on which this Government was proceeding. The situation in Shanghai is in many respects unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States. In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection, primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation. The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principle summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships. When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most peoples of the world, should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, to |