quently received from our representatives in China, it has been established that the Japanese naval air force, acting upon information that the Chinese troops fleeing from Nanking were going up the river in steamers, took off to pursue them, and discovered such vessels at the above-mentioned point. Owing to poor visibility, however, the aircraft, although they descended to fairly low altitudes, were unable to discern any mark to show that any one of them was an American ship or man-of-war. Consequently, the United States gunboat Panay and the vessels of the Standard Oil Company, being taken for Chinese vessels carrying the fleeing Chinese troops, were bombed and sunk. While it is clear, in the light of the above circumstances, that the present incident was entirely due to a mistake, the Japanese Government regret most profoundly that it has caused damages to the United States man-of-war and ships and casualties among those on board, and desire to present hereby sincere apologies. The Japanese Government will make indemnifications for all the losses and will deal appropriately with those responsible for the incident. Furthermore, they have already issued strict orders to the authorities on the spot with a view to preventing the recurrence of a similar incident. The Japanese Government, in the fervent hope that the friendly relations between Japan and the United States will not be affected by this unfortunate affair, have frankly stated as above their sincere attitude which I beg Your Excellency to make known to your Government. I avail myself, etc., signed Koki Hirota." 2. Yoshizawa then read to me portions of the official Japanese naval report on the disaster the purport of which is that the disaster was not caused by deliberate intention to bomb American vessels but was due to the inability of the aviators to distinguish the nationality of the vessels bombed. I informed Yoshizawa that his explanation does not cover the fact that, notwithstanding information in Japanese hands that foreign vessels were in the neighborhood of Nanking, bombarding and shelling operations by both naval and military forces were carried out without any precautions taken against attack upon foreign vessels. I also pointed out that the bombing and shelling was carried out in the face of repeated assurances that measures had been taken to safeguard against attacks upon American nationals and property. 3. I also stated to Yoshizawa that I had just received instructions to present to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note from the American Government. I added that, although I appreciated the action of the Japanese Government in delivering to me its note, I would proceed with the instructions which had been given to me. 4. I am still waiting for an appointment to call on Hirota which I asked for at 4 o'clock. Repeated to Peiping for Hankow. 793.94Conference/351 100 GREW Report of the United States Delegate to the Conference at Brussels (Davis) [Extracts] DECEMBER 16, 1937. The Belgian Government "in response to the request of the British Government and with the approval of the American Government" issued to the parties to the Nine Power Treaty an invitation to attend a conference at Brussels for the purpose "of examining in accordance with Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty, the situation in the Far East and to study peaceable methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there." Also, after consulting other powers to the Treaty, it issued similar invitations to the Soviet Union and Germany. All parties to the Nine Power Treaty, except Japan, accepted the invitation. Also, the Soviet Union accepted. Japan declined and Germany declined. By this time it was realized that the task given to the Brussels Conference had been made additionally difficult by the fact that the League and the American Government had already delivered judgment upon Japan's course. The American Delegate to the Conference received instructions in the form of a written instruction from the Secretary of State; an informal memorandum; oral instructions given by the President and the Secretary of State at the White House; and oral instructions given by the President at Hyde Park. The general purport of all of these instructions was to the effect that the policy to be followed must be consistent with the principles and provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the general principles of American foreign policy as laid down especially in public statements of the Secretary of State and the President. There was no provision that any positive methods of pressure should or might be discussed at the Conference; but there was also no express provision that such method should not be discussed, provided, however, that previously every effort to bring about mediation had been exhausted. In the written instruction, attention was called not only to the terms of the Belgian Government's invitation but also to statements of the Secretary of State and to the President's address at Chicago of October 5. In the conversations at the White House and at Hyde Park, especially the latter, the President emphasized to the American Delegate the view that if we are to avoid an ultimate serious clash with Japan some practical means must be found to check Japan's career of conquest and to make effective the collective will of those powers which desire that principles of law and order shall prevail and controversies between nations be regulated and settled by peaceful means rather than by use of armed force. The President emphasized the importance of mobilising moral force in all peace-loving nations and suggested a strategy of calling upon Japan repeatedly to come into conference and seek means for desisting from hostilities and submitting the issues between herself and China to peaceful processes of settlement. He suggested that the Conference might be given a prolonged life and that it might be made an agency for informing and educating public opinion by way of bringing to bear upon Japan every moral pressure directed toward bringing about a change in Japan's attitude and policy. Also, he suggested that the Delegation observe closely the trend of public opinion in the United States and take full account thereof. He realized the difficulties before us but hoped that the Conference might nonetheless produce constructive results either in its influence on Japan or in mobilising public opinion. The outstanding achievements of the Conference were as follows: 1. Exchanging of views, among nineteen governments, enabling the delegates of each-and through them their governments-to obtain knowledge of the attitude and position of the others; 2. Demonstration of the unwillingness of Japan to resort to methods of conciliation; 3. Clarification of the fact that the Japanese continue to insist that the issues between Japan and China are exclusive to those two countries whereas the Conference Powers with the exception of Italy deny this and affirm that the situation is of concern to all of them and in fact to all members of the Family of Nations; 4. Express reaffirmation by the Conference Powers with the exception of Italy of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty. 5. Express serving of notice that the settlement ultimately arrived at must be consistent with the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and satisfactory to the Conference Powers; 6. Express serving of notice that the Conference Powers will continue to concern themselves with the situation and that the Conference is not ended but is in recess and is subject to re-convocation. 101 Press Releases, vol. XVIII, p. 99 President Roosevelt to the Speaker of the House MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: WASHINGTON, January 6, 1938. In response to your request for an expression of my views respecting the proposed resolution calling for a referendum vote as a prerequisite for a declaration of war,38 I must frankly state that I consider that the proposed amendment would be impracticable in its application and incompatible with our representative form of government. Our Government is conducted by the people through representatives of their own choosing. It was with singular unanimity that the founders of the Republic agreed upon such free and representative form of government as the only practical means of government by the people. Such an amendment to the Constitution as that proposed would 3 "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of cach House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States. "SECTION 1. Except in the event of an invasion of the United States or its Territorial possessions and attack upon its citizens residing therein, the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast thereon in a Nation-wide referendum. Congress, when it deems a national crisis to exist, may by concurrent resolution refer the question of war or peace to the citizens of the States, the question to cripple any President in his conduct of our foreign relations, and it would encourage other nations to believe that they could violate American rights with impunity. I fully realize that the sponsors of this proposal sincerely believe that it would be helpful in keeping the United States out of war. I am convinced it would have the opposite effect. Yours very sincerely, 102 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Press Releases, vol. XVIII, p. 100 The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (McReynolds), House of Representatives DEAR CONGRESSMAN MCREYNOLDS: WASHINGTON, January 8, 1938. In reply to your inquiry I would say that on December 15, 1937, in referring to the Ludlow Resolution, I stated to the press that "from the standpoint of promoting peace and keeping this country out of war, I am unable to see either the wisdom or practicability of this proposal". The primary objective in the conduct of our foreign affairs is to safeguard the peace of the United States. All American citizens agree alike that this country should be safeguarded against war to the fullest possible extent. It is my judgment that under our present form of government "of the people, by the people, and for the people", our foreign affairs can be conducted far more efficiently from the standpoint of keeping this country out of war than would be at all possible under the operation of any such plan as the Ludlow Resolution proposes. After the fullest consideration I am satisfied that this plan would most seriously handicap the Government in the conduct of our foreign affairs generally, and would thus impair disastrously its ability to safeguard the peace of the American people. Sincerely yours, Footnote 38-Continued. CORDELL HULL ? Con be voted on being, Shall the United States declare war on gress may otherwise by law provide for the enforcement of this section.'" This was the so-called "Ludlow Resolution", H.J. Res. 199, 75th Cong., 1st sess. |