The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the West Indies situation, and I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government that, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal access to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to impose in the Pacific Ocean area, the United States and other countries are to be denied equality of trade and industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation. I again brought to his attention the information contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese newspapers, as stated, were undertaking to keep alive and emphasize some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there was an intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in every other part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. The Ambassador again stated that his Government was satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of each of the three other governments interested, and that they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to attack the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his statement, but again reminded him of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japanese Government or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lines of discussion indicating a claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the status quo should be respected and preserved by each of the four governments; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said. I still interpret the Ambassador's visit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Japan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the Netherlands East Indies. 740.0011 European War/3124 158 C[ORDELL] H[ULL] The Premier of Italy (Mussolini) to President Roosevelt 48 [Telegram] ROME, May 18, 1940. [Received May 18-10: 04 a.m.] 379. I reply to the message which you sent me at noon on the fourteenth instant. I understand perfectly the motives by which it was inspired and I consider it worthy of much respect and of the greatest consideration but there are two fundamental motives which cannot escape your spirit of political realism and those are that Italy is and intends to remain allied with Germany and that Italy cannot remain absent at a moment in which the fate of Europe is at stake. I cannot therefore but reconfirm the substance of my first message. [MUSSOLINI] 159 740.0011 European War 1939/2691-24A President Roosevelt to the Premier of Italy (Mussolini) [Telegram] 49 WASHINGTON, May 26, 1940-3 p.m. 140. I want to thank you for your courteous reply to my last verbal message to Your Excellency. Events have been marching swiftly but I still believe that political long range vision favors the limitation of the war to its present areas. I hope it will be helpful to Your Excellency in keeping war out of the Mediterranean and out of even much wider areas and populations if I make the following suggestions to you: The people of the United States are greatly concerned by the indications of the past few days which would seem to show that there was an increasing possibility of the extension of the European War to the Mediterranean area. 48 Transmitted in a telegram from the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State. "Transmitted in a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) for immediate, oral communication. I realize fully from your recent messages and from public statements which you have made that the Italian Government desires to obtain readjustments with regard to Italy's position. If you are willing to inform me of the specific desires of Italy in this regard in order to insure the satisfaction of Italy's legitimate aspirations in that area, I will communicate them to the Governments of Great Britain and of France. I would take this action in the belief that I am thereby rendering a constructive service at this critical moment with the hope that the cause of peace might thereby be furthered. Likewise, I would communicate such a message from you with the understanding that if an agreement were arrived at, it would involve an assurance to me by the French and British Governments that such agreement would be faithfully executed by them at the end of the war and that those Governments would welcome Italian participation at any eventual peace conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents; and, finally, that you would in similar fashion assure me that the claims of Italy would be satisfied by the execution of this agreement and that the agreement so reached would avoid the possibility of Italy entering the war. With the terms which you might be willing to propose or with the counter terms which the French and British Governments might desire to propose I am of course not concerned; nor can I undertake any responsibility other than that indicated. My sole desire in making this suggestion is to make a practical effort towards avoiding the extension of the war. 160 ROOSEVELT 740.0011 European War 1939/2691-34 The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State [Telegram: Paraphrase] ROME, May 27, 1940-1 p.m. 420. This morning I was received by Ciano at eleven-thirty. I said to him that I had a message of great importance from President Roosevelt, that I had been ordered to deliver it orally to the Duce, but that I would be glad for Ciano to read it for his own information. He answered that the Duce could not receive me but that he, Ciano, would take the message and would make, with my permission, a few notes of its text. He thereupon did so with care and attention and I did not feel able to press any further the request that I have an interview with Mussolini. After he had finished I asked him if he could let me have some idea of the general nature of the reply. He answered definitely "It would be a no" and proceeded to explain that the position of the Duce was more than the question of realizing the legitimate aspirations of Italy, that Mussolini was resolved to fulfill his obligations under the alliance with Germany. He said that the Duce was not in at that particular moment but would come back later in the day and Ciano promised that as soon as he was in a position to give me the reply he would send for me. I asked the Foreign Minister if he had full realization of the seriousness and importance of the message of President Roosevelt. He said that he did but that there was nothing that could now change the situation. In addition he said that he could not give me the exact time of Italy's entrance into the war; it would be impossible for a few days and it might not take place for a few weeks but he did say "it will happen soon". Finally he asked me about the position of the United States. I called his attention to the program of President Roosevelt for a great defensive armament. Ciano only answered that it was his assumption that the United States sympathized with the Allies in the same manner that Italy sympathized with Germany. The Foreign Minister called for me at one o'clock and informed ine that the statements which he had made to me earlier in the day had been confirmed by Mussolini. Ciano declared that it was the desire of Mussolini to keep his "freedom of action" and that the Duce was not disposed to engage in any negotiations which indeed would not be in accordance with the spirit of Fascism. He laid emphasis on the idea that the Duce was responsible for the "fulfillment of an engagement—of words given" and he said in addition "any attempt to prevent Italy from fulfilling her engagements is not well regarded". PHILLIPS 740.0011 European War 1939/2691-34 161 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) [Telegram] WASHINGTON, May 30, 1940-6 p.m. 154. By direction of the President you are requested to call on Count Ciano and deliver to him orally the following message for the Chief of Government: The President has received and has of course given the most thoughtful consideration to the reply conveyed by the Chief of Government to the President's last message. The President feels compelled in the most friendly manner, but at the same time with the utmost frankness, to lay certain very important considerations before Signor Mussolini. If the war in Europe is now extended through the entrance of Italy into the war, direct interests of the Government of the United States will be immediately and prejudicially affected. The President has already reminded the Chief of Government of the historic and traditional interests of the United States in the Mediterranean. These interests have been upheld over a period of almost one hundred and fifty years. This Government has never asserted any political interests in Europe, but it has asserted its clearly defined interests of an economic and property character. Through the extension of the war to the Mediterranean region and the inevitable destruction of life and property resulting therefrom, the legitimate interests of the American people will be gravely curtailed and such a possibility cannot be viewed with equanimity by their Government. An extension of the war into the Mediterranean region will almost unquestionably likewise involve a further extension of the war area in the Near East and in other regions of the world. The President has already stated his belief that such further extension of the war might well bring with it the involvement of countries at present remote from the scene of the hostilities. The President feels it necessary to emphasize that possibility. The social and economic relations between the Americas and the whole of Europe are greater than with any other part of the world. These relations are already gravely disturbed as a result of the present hostilities. In the event that there were any further extension of the war, they would obviously be even more seriously disturbed. In conclusion, the further extension of the war as a result of Italian participation would at once result in an increase in the rearmament program of the United States itself and in a redoubling of the efforts of the Government of the United States to facilitate in every practical way the securing within the United States by the Allied Powers of all the supplies and matériel which they may require. Signor Mussolini will recognize that arming on an unprecedented scale in the Americas will make difficult the reduction of armaments in Italy, Europe, and the rest of the world at the conclusion of the present wars. The establishment of normal internal economic and social programs will, therefore, be made infinitely more difficult. |