The Ambassador did not know so much about this, but felt it could and would be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides. I said this would, of course, be a vitally important point for determination. I asked the Ambassador whether his Government had in mind any method of giving absolute assurances that it would not use either force or threat of force for purposes of conquest in the southeastern area of the Pacific or other countries. The Ambassador had nothing special to offer on this point except to say that his Government had no purpose to use force or threat of force in this entire southeastern area. I spoke generally then and said that, if his Government really desires a settlement of the Pacific situation on a basis of peace and genuine friendliness, there should be no serious difficulty about the matter; that he and his Government know the relations existing between this country and South America, which offer equal opportunity, politically, economically and every other way, to all countries alike, including the United States and Japan; that my Government treats the smallest countries in this hemisphere, such as Haiti, on a basis of absolute equality in every sense with the largest countries, such as Brazil and the Argentine. I then inquired why it was that Japan, with ample capacity and standing to command influence and recognition, both at home and abroad, persists in an effort to use such high-sounding phrases as the "new order in greater east Asia" and variations of this slogan. I added that, unless Japan uses this slogan not as embodying the principles of law, justice, equality and nonintervention, but as a cloak under which Japan would continue her policy of conquest by force, there was absolutely no reason why this trouble-making slogan should be persistently flaunted before the peaceful and sovereign nations, and that Japan could get all of the benefits from contacts with other nations without this slogan that the United States gets from its association with South American countries without such slogan, and, therefore, I cannot understand why Japan persisted in using it. The Ambassador had little comment to make, but did not take issue with what I said. He emphasized from time to time that his country desired to keep war out of the Pacific, and that it did not intend to use force in the South Sea area. I again repeated that we were profoundly convinced that Hitler and Hitlerism will prove not only a scourge to other parts of the world, as it has in Europe, but that it will be applied to Japan herself just as quickly as it was applied to friendly countries in Europe who trusted Hitler and his previous guarantees of friendship, safety and freedom from attack and invasion. I took advantage of a remark of the Ambassador to the effect that it would be an incalculable loss to both Japan and the United States, as well as to civilization, if our two countries should become engaged in war, by saying that unless the civilization of the world is to run the great risk of being destroyed anyhow by the world movements of Hitler, it will require all of the united efforts of civilized nations like Japan, the United States and Great Britain to shape the course of the world in a different direction, and that steps looking towards the gradual development of basic programs both for the transition and the post-war periods cannot be taken too soon. The Ambassador, of course, agreed to this. In conclusion, I reemphasized that this Government is determined that Hitler shall not get control of the seas and that we would feel obliged without the slightest hesitation to resist to a successful conclusion such efforts on his part whether one year, five years or ten years should be involved. The Ambassador again bowed and smiled approvingly without saying anything. I said that, in these circumstances, with things moving so rapidly, no one could tell, as I remarked to him in our previous conversations, what any day might bring forth. I then repeated my former statement to him that, since Hitler avows his movement to be one of world control, and hence of conquest by force, this country does not propose to commit suicide, as so many countries in continental Europe did, by trusting Hitler and by waiting until it was too late to resist; that we propose to resist, when and where such resistance would be most effective, whether within our own boundaries or on the high seas or in aid of such countries as Great Britain, and that such resistance would be to the maximum extent within the minimum of time, and that this in its very nature would constitute necessary self-defense against an avowed world-wide aggressor, and in no sense could be construed as an act of offense, much less aggression, in the light of the world nature of the movement of aggression on Hitler's part. 711.94/2086 209 C[ORDELL] H[ULL] Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) To the Secretary of State on May 12, 1941 CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agree ment disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations. Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale [amicable understanding], arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization. For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem illsuited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act. It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments. Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit: 1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations. 2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War. 3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair. 4. Commerce between both nations. 5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area. 6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area. Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding : 1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers. Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples. Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations. Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral principles and concepts. II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War. The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe. The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it. The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact. The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security. III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair. The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek régime to negotiate peace with Japan. IV. Commerce between both nations. When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs. VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area. a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment. b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination. Addendum. The present Understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan. The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments. [Annex] ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT II. Par. 2. Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War. Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged 63 This refers to an earlier draft which was never officially presented to the Government of the United States. |