"That continuity furnishes a just foundation for a claim of territory, in connection with those of discovery and occupation, Continuity. would seem unquestionable. It is admitted by all, that neither of them is limited by the precise spot discovered or occupied. It is evident that, in order to make either available, it must extend at least some distance beyond that actually discovered or occupied; but how far, as an abstract question, is a matter of uncertainty. It is subject, in each case, to be influenced by a variety of considerations. In the case of an island, it has been usually maintained in practice to extend the claim of discovery or occupancy to the whole; so likewise in the case of a river, it has been usual to extend them to the entire region drained by it, more especially in cases of a discovery and settlement at the mouth; and emphatically so when accompanied by exploration of the river and region through which it flows. Such, it is believed, may be affirmed to be the opinion and practice in such cases since the discovery of this continent. How far the claim of continuity may extend in other cases is less perfectly defined, and can be settled only by reference to the circumstances attending each. When this continent was first discovered, Spain claimed the whole, in virtue of the grant of the Pope; but a claim so extravagant and unreasonable was not acquiesced in by other countries, and could not be long maintained. Other nations, especially England and France, at an early period contested her claim. They fitted out voyages of discovery, and made settlements on the eastern coasts of North America. They claimed for their settlements, usually, specific limits along the coasts or bays on which they were formed; and, generally, a region of corresponding width extending across the entire continent to the Pacific Ocean. Such was the character of the limits assigned by England in the charters which she granted to her former colonies, now the United States, when there were no special reasons for varying from it. How strong she regarded her claim to the region conveyed by these charters and extending westward of her settlements, the war between her and France, which was terminated by the treaty of Paris, in 1763, furnishes a striking illustration. That great contest, which ended so gloriously for England, and effected so great and durable a change on this continent, commenced in a conflict between her claims and those of France, resting on her side on this very right of continuity, extending westward from her settlements to the Pacific Ocean; and, on the part of France, on the same right, but extending to the region drained by the Mississippi and its waters, on the ground of settlement and exploration. Their respective claims, which led to the war, first clashed on the river Ohio, the waters of which the colonial charters, in their western extension, covered; but which France had been unquestionably the first to settle and explore. If the relative strength of these different claims may be tested by the result of that remark able contest, that of continuity westward must be pronounced to be the stronger of the two. England has had at least the advantage of the result, and would seem to be foreclosed against contesting the principle, particularly as against us, who contributed so much to that result, and on whom that contest and her example and pretensions, from the first settlement of our country, have contributed to impress deeply and indelibly. But the treaty of 1763, which terminated that memorable and eventful struggle, yielded, as has been stated, the claims and all the chartered rights of the colonies beyond the Mississippi." Mr. Calhoun, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pakenham, British minister, Sept. 3, 1844, See, as to the settlement of the Oregon question, Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I., The question of a claim of title on the ground of contiguity may be regarded as generally defined by the celebrated Contiguity. correspondence of Mr. Webster with the Peruvian Government, in 1852, in the Lobos Islands controversy, in which Mr. Webster laid down the proposition that inasmuch as according to 'the well-settled rule of modern public law, the right of jurisdiction of any nation whose territories may border on the sea, extends to the distance of a cannon-shot, or three marine miles from the shore, this being the supposed limit to which a defence of the coast from the land can be extended,' the whole discussion must turn upon this, viz: The Lobos Islands lying in the open ocean, so far from any continental possessions of Peru as not to belong to that country by the law of proximity or adjacent position, has the Government of that country exercised such unequivocal acts of absolute sovereignty and ownership over them as to give her a right to their exclusive possession, as against the United States and their citizens, by the law of undisputed possession?' The Peruvian Government proved that . . . its right to the islands rested. . . upon substantial and unequivocal acts of jurisdiction and possession exercised over them from time immemorial. It was ascertained . . . that as early as 1590 the people were in the habit of taking guano from the islands off the coast, and that the territory had been, by public decree, specifically annexed to the provinces or districts of the Republic. . . . "It appeared . . . that Lord Palmerston had suggested, in 1834, that the proximity of the islands to Peru would give her a prima facie claim to them. Mr. Webster said no, however, and that it was certain that any such view was incorrect, because the distance of the Lobos Islands from the shore of Peru was five or six times greater than the three marine miles extend.' . . . "In the Aves Island case, the United States insisted, in the same way, that it should be shown affirmatively that Venezuela constantly maintained such territorial sovereignty and possession of the island as other governments and their citizens were bound to respect. (Aves Island case, S. Ex. Doc. 10, 36 Cong. 2 sess. 225.) "The island of Navassa, said to be somewhere from 27 to 35 miles from the southwest part of Hayti, was explored in July, 1857, by eitizens of the United States, who discovered that it contained deposits of guano, and the United States asserted a right to the territory under the act of 1856. . . . It was firmly maintained by Mr. Fish [in a note to the Haytian minister of Dec. 31, 1872] that as Hayti was unable to show an actual possession and use of the island, or an extension and exercise of jurisdiction and authority over it, before the discovery of guano by the Americans, in 1857, her pretension of proprietorship of, and sovereignty over, the island was inadmissible, and that the absence of proof of such acts on her part could not be supplied by the fact of the proximity of the island to her territory, and that the island had, up to the date of the recent discovery, remained a wilderness. Mr. Fish said: The utmost to which the argument in her behalf amounts to, is a claim to a constructive possession, or rather to a right of possession; but in contemplation of international law such claim of a right to possession is not enough to establish the right of a nation to exclusive territorial sovereignty. (Citing Vattel, Bk. 1, chap. xviii, sec. 208.) Although fifteen years have elapsed since Duncan and Cooper discovered and settled upon the island, no evidence has been adduced by Hayti going to establish the affirmative proposition of its ever having been occupied, or even showing any act of positive jurisdiction ever having been exercised over it by that government." "The Haytian minister having recurred again to the cases of Alta Vela and Cayo Verde, Mr. Fish, in his second note of the 10th of June, 1873, disposed of that part of the argument in this way: . . . In the case of Alta Vela it was shown to have been included by name within a political and also within a judicial district of San Domingo. As to Cayo Verde, both occupancy and jurisdiction were shown to have been exercised on that island by the local authorities of Jamaica long previous to the discovery of guano on it by citizens of the United States. . . The exercise of jurisdiction is one of the highest evidences of sovereignty; the extension of the laws of an empire over a colonial possession forms one of the chief muniments of the nation's title to sovereignty over the colony; and the absence of these important links in the chain of testimony advanced in support of Hayti's claim to sovereignty over Navassa, must, I submit, appear to any reasonable mind fatal to that claim, nor can this absence be supplied by the facts of contiguity, or that Navassa had, up to the date of Peter Duncan's discovery, remained a wilderness.' Brief of J. Hubley Ashton, Esquire, Counsel for the United States, in the case of Gowen and Copeland v. Venezuela, No. 16, U. S. and Venezuelan Claims Commission, convention of Dec. 5, 1885. See Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 3354. Berlin declaration. An examination of the older cases, in which title rests upon occupation, will show that in most of them "the acts relied upon as giving title, previously to the actual plantation of a colony, have been scattered at somewhat wide intervals over a long space of time. Until recently this has been natural, and indeed inevitable. When voyages of discovery extended over years, when the coasts and archipelagoes lying open to occupation seemed inexhaustible in their vastness, when states knew little of what their own agents or the agents of other countries might be doing, and when communication with established posts was rare and slow, isolated and imperfect acts were properly held to have meaning and value. . . . But of late years a marked change has occurred. Except in some parts of the interior of Africa, there are few patches of the earth's surface the ownership of which can be placed in doubt. . . . declared itself to exact that more solid than used to be adopted as sufficient. The most notable evidence of this tendency is afforded by the declaration adopted at the Berlin Conference of 1885. By that declaration Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the United States agreed that any power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the power which assumes a protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to A tendency has A tendency has consequently grounds of title shall be shown the other signatory powers of the present act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own,' and 'the signatory powers of the present act recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and transit under the conditions agreed upon.' . . The declaration, it is true, affects only the coasts of the continent of Africa; and the representatives of France and Russia were careful to make formal reservations directing attention to this fact; the former, especially, placing it on record that the island of Madagascar was excluded. Nevertheless, an agreement, made between all the states which are likely to endeavor to occupy territory, and covering much the largest spaces of coast which, at the date of the declaration, remained unoccupied in the world, can not but have great influence upon the development of a generally binding rule." Hall, Int. Law, 4th ed. 118-119. Numerous notifications relating to new acquisitions or to the delimitation of territory or of spheres of influence have been given under the Berlin declaration. (See For. Rel. 1885, 389, 390, 441-442; For. Rel. 1888, II. 1058.) The subject is fully examined by Westlake, Int. Law, 155 et seq. In several recent cases notifications of claims and acquisitions have been given By the protocol of March 7, 1885, between Germany, Great Britain, and Spain, the two former powers recognized "the sovereignty of Spain over the places effectively occupied, as well as over those that are not yet so, of the Sulu Archipelago." (Br. and For. State Papers, LXXVI. 58.) As to the British protectorate over Amatongaland, see For. Rel, 1895, I. 721; over Cook's Island, For. Rel. 1889, 485; and over Zanzibar, For. Rel. 1890, 476. As to the Spanish protectorate on the west coast of Africa, between Western Bay and Cape Bajador, see For. Rel. 1885, 769. For the notice of France's assumption of sovereignty over the country of the Quatchis, in Africa, see For. Rel., 1885, 389. As to Portugal's renunciation of her protectorate over the coast of Dahomey, see For. Rel. 1888, II. 1390. Notice was given by Italy Aug. 7, 1888, of the establishment of a protectorate over Zoula, in Africa. (For. Rel. 1888, II. 1058.) As to the recognition by Sultan Osman Mahmud of an Italian protectorate over Somaliland, see For. Rel. 1901, 299. "It can not be irrelevant to remark that spheres of influence' and the theory or practice of the Hinterland' idea are things unknown to international law and do not as yet rest upon any recognized principles of either international or municipal law. They are new departures which certain great European powers have found necessary and con |