Cu. X.] THE MASSACRE AT FORT MIMMS. afford them protection, in case of an attack. The settlers also very generally began to take refuge in the fortifications, if so we may term them, along the Alabama River. Having obtained an abundant supply of arms and ammunition from Pensacola -furnished, as was charged, by the British—the hostile Creeks determined to venture upon some exploits which should signalize their share in the war. Accordingly, Fort Mimms, on the Alabama, not far from Mobile, was marked out for destruction, in the summer of 1813. This was one of the usual stockaded forts on the river's bank, to which Governor Claiborne had sent Major Beasly, with a hundred and eighty men. The inhabitants of the Tensas settlement were collected there; and subsequently, Claiborne dispatched orders to Beasly, urging him to the utmost vigilance and caution; charging him to complete the block houses, to strengthen the stockades, and to keep a vigilant watch against sudden attack. Under some unaccountable delusion, Beasly acted as if there was no danger to be feared. Near the end of August, a negro came in, who brought warning that the Indians meant to attack the post. The warning was more than once repeated; but, unhappily, was unheeded. On the night preceding the massacre, the dogs of the garrison, who are said to be able to smell the Indians, gave notice of danger by a peculiar growling. Yet there was no alarm felt; but all were confident of security. The next day, August 30th, the fatal delusion was dispelled. Towards noon, the Indians advanced through an open 205 field, to within thirty yards of the fort before they were discovered; so well devised, bold, and fortunate, was the plan of the blood thirsty sav- 1813. ages! The gate, too, was wide open, and raising their fearful whoop they rushed into the fort. Every man who could fight seized his weapon and hurried to his post. The first struggle took place at the gate, and the slaughter was dreadful. Beasly himself, shot through the body, was one of the first victims. Crowds on crowds of Indians pressed to the attack, driving in by mere numbers the vainly brave garrison, whose immovable security had betrayed them to the enemy. For some hours the fight literally raged. It was a hand to hand combat; bayonet, sword, and clubbed rifle clashing and colliding with tomahawk, scalping knife, and war club. The defences of the white men were fired; they were shot down from without; and encumbered by the women and children, and other non-effectives who had taken refuge in the fort, they were, in spite of the most desperate valor, completely overpowered. At length, about five in the afternoon, the few who survived, not one of whom was without a wound, and sev eral had received more than one, gath ering the guns of their fallen comrades, and throwing them with the ammunition they could not carry into the flames, resolved to force their way out. The upper part of the block-house, to which some of the women had retreated, was rapidly consuming, it was certain destruction to remain where they were, perhaps they might succeed in fighting their way through the swarms of the enemy. Seventeen only, and notwithstanding their wounds, did succeed. Above three hundred and fifty persons --including volunteers and militia, the ordinary garrison, refugees from the neighborhood, (twenty families and more,) friendly Indians, and some hundred of negroes-perished during the fight, or in the flames, or were put to death after all resistance had ceased, with barbarities too revolting to be narrated. The entire number of those who escaped was under thirty. The scene presented to those who came to bury the dead, after the Indians had withdrawn, exceeded all description. Gloom and consternation took possession of the whole south-western frontier. Every fort was crowded with fugitives, and Mobile, which General Wilkinson had seized in the month of April, was now a most welcome harbor of refuge to multitudes, whom terror at the news of the tragedy at Fort Mimms drove from their homes. The whole region was in a deplorable state, and the distress of the people during the sickly season, in September, was extreme. The number and fierceness of the Indians were frightful, and every station, every block-house, and every fort was assailed by the open foe, or by lurking bands of concealed savages. In this emergency, it was felt that no help from the government at Washington was to be obtained; the people of the neighboring states must give the requisite assistance, or the whole country must be abandoned by the whites. "The people and government of the contiguous states, Georgia and Tennessee, and of those convenient, South and 1813. North Carolina, instantly acted with excellent decision, before it was possible to furnish the means, hardly to give orders, from the seat of government. In war, the well-being of popular government requires that each sovereignty act in its own sphere, and perform the constitutional duty prescribed to it. Irregularities of action betray infirmities which are not inherent in the system. The communities and governments of the states of Georgia and Tennessee faced the emergency with alacrity and energy. similar to what was displayed in Ohio, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania."* Amongst other means for reducing the Creeks, now thought of, was the employment of the Choctaws against them. A "Committee of Safety" set forth at length the reasons which appeared to them to call for this measure; the most convincing, in their opinion, being, that if the United States did not secure the co-operation of these Indians, the enemy might do so, and then, instead of being subdued, the Creeks would be reinforced. "In the emphatic language of Major Gibson," says Monette, "the point was narrowed down to this, 'We must engage the Choctaws, or fight them!" It was not, however, till the month of November, that the requisite negotiations were completed, and it was the middle of the month before General Claiborne, accompanied by the Choctaw auxiliaries, advanced towards Weatherford's Bluff, on the Alabama, for the * Ingersoll's "History of the Second War," vol. i, CH. X.] THE GEORGIA AND TENNESSEE FORCES. purpose of erecting a stockaded dépôt, to receive supplies and military stores for the use of the Tennessee troops, under General Jackson, who were on the march, along the line of the Coosa. Before the close of November, this was done; and Fort Claiborne, with its palisades, block-houses, and half-moon battery, presented a frowning front to all unbidden navigators of the stream. 207 advancing from East Tennessee in the same direction under General Cocke. Mr. Ingersoll, in speaking of this matter, says, that the federal government adopted the men thus raised and in active service, and reimbursed the money, some $200,000, which the legislature of Tennessee had appropriated for the maintenance of the war against the Creeks; and he adds: "Riddance of the country from the savages, theretofore the terror, if not the masters of it, was mainly effected by local popular and state action, consummated by operations of the federal government. The part each one performed, the ap Georgia and Tennessee very actively seconded the efforts of Mississippi, and had General Flournoy been a more ef ficient commander, much effusion of blood and waste of property would have been spared. On the western edge of Georgia, about the mid-propriate function of each, are lessons 1813. dle of October, was stationed General Floyd, at the head of some two thousand five hundred men; and by the beginning of November, he had advanced with nearly a third of them, and four hundred allied Indians, into the Creek country about the Tallapoosa and its tributaries. He very soon made his presence known, as we shall see presently. of that conflict which cannot be too durably impressed on the American mind. While it is one of the most unquestionable and gratifying demonstrations of the war of 1812, that the states saved the United States in several emergencies, it is equally true, that excessive state or popular action embarrassed and endangered the Union; and that it is by the harmonious adjustment of all the elements, popular, state, and federal, that national safety, dignity, and vindication, are accomplished. If obliged to wait the orders, forces, and contributions of the federal government, the Creek war would never have been crushed, as it was, in one victorious campaign. Yet that campaign proved, even without state or popular disaffection, that something more than six months militia and volunteers is indispensable to general safety and welfare."* Although it is somewhat in advance *"History of the Second War," vol. i., p. 334. 1813. of the progress of our narrative thus far, it will be most convenient, we think, to relate the conclusion of the Creek war, in the present connection. On the 2d of November, General Coffee was detached, with nine hundred men, against Tallushatches, a Creek town, and reached the place about daylight the next morning. The Indians, aware of his approach, were prepared to receive him. Within a short distance of the village they charged upon him with unexampled boldness; and although repulsed, made a most obstinate resistance. They refused to give or receive quarter, and were slain almost to a man. Nearly two hundred of their warriors were killed in this affair. The women and children were taken prisoners. The loss of the Americans was five killed and forty wounded. Four days later, having been informed that Lashly's Fort, at the village of Talladega, about thirty miles distant, belonging to the friendly Creeks, was in great danger from the hostile party, Jackson set off with alacrity to relieve the place. At twelve o'clock the same night, he, took up his line of march, at the head of twelve hundred men, and arrived within six miles of the fort the next evening. At midnight he again advanced, and by seven o'clock of the following morning was within a mile of the enemy. He now made the most judicious arrangements for surrounding them; and approached, within eighty yards, almost unperceived. The battle commenced on the part of the Indians with great fury. Being repulsed on all sides, they attempted to make their escape, but found themselves enclosed; and had not two companies of militia given way, whereby a space was left open through which a considerable number of the enemy escaped to the mountains, they would all have been taken prisoners or destroyed. In the pursuit many were sabred or shot down. In this action, the American loss was fifteen killed, and eighty wounded. That of the Creeks was not much short of three hundred killed, their whole force exceeding a thousand. "In a very few weeks," wrote General Jackson, "if I had a sufficiency of supplies, I am thoroughly convinced I should be able to put an end to Creek hostilities." Jackson had ordered General White to join him after Coffee's first success, intending to press forward and crush the Indians before they had time to recover from the panic produced by these blows. White, however, who was subordinate to General Cocke, was detached by him, on the 11th of November, against the hostile towns on the Talapoosa River, where the Hillabees resided. At daylight, on the 18th, White entered a Hillabee town, and out of about three hundred and sixteen warriors killed some sixty, and took the rest prisoners. Having burnt several villages, which had been deserted by the Indians, he returned on the 23d, without the loss of a single man. 1813. At the close of November, a signal victory was obtained by General Floyd, at the head of the Georgia militia, at Autossee, on the Talapoosa. This was "the Creek metropolis," and the very ground was held to be sacred. It was defended with a spirit animated by every consideration that interest, re |