of the Mexican front, Scott resolved to cut a passage through the thick chaparral on his right, so as to turn the left flank of the enemy, whose care had been confined to obstructing the main road. To mask this movement, General Twiggs was ordered, on the 17th of April, to advance against a fortified position, with a steep ascent, almost directly in front of the main entrenchment. This was carried by Colonel Harney, with the rifles and some detachments of infantry and artillery, and a heavy gun having been dragged with immense toil up to the height, a demonstration was made against another fort in its rear. Early on the next morning, the troops moved forward in columns to make a general attack on the enemy's line. Pillow's brigade assaulted the right, but was compelled to retire; and it was of the less moment, because this was not the key of the position. Twiggs's division stormed the centre, carried the fortifications, and cut them off from support; while Riley's brigade drove the main body of the Mexicans into complete rout, and turned their own guns upon them as they fled. Shields's brigade, in the mean time, assaulted and carried the battery in the rear of the enemy's left, and deprived them of the opportunity of rallying. The American loss was, sixty-four killed, and three hundred and fiftythree wounded. The loss of the Mexicans, in killed and wounded, was never known, but our countrymen took three thousand prisoners, amongst whom were five generals, four or five thousand stands of arms, and forty-three pieces of artillery. Santa Anna himself with great difficulty escaped to Orizaba, where he exerted himself with great diligence to get together again a force sufficient to make head against Scott's advance upon the capital. The army advanced, as soon as pos sible after their victory, on Jalapa and Perote, which were abandoned to them without a blow; the latter on the 22d of April, and with it a vast accumulation of warlike stores. At Amozoque, they were unsuccessfully attacked by Santa Anna; and on the 22d of May, Puebla submitted to General Worth, whilst the Mexican forces re- 1847. tired upon the capital. This failure to retrieve the disaster at Cerro Gordo, kindled anew the flames of revolution in Mexico; and the various parties and factions in that unhappy country could agree upon no one point, except that the northern invaders were to be opposed to the last extremity, and that no peace was to be made while an enemy remained on the soil of Mexico. The head-quarters of the army were now fixed at Puebla, where General Scott remained until the beginning of August; in part because of the necessity of recruiting his troops, and in part because the home government renewed their overtures of negotiations to the government of Mexico, as soon as the news of the victory at Cerro Gordo reached Washington. But this long halt grievously tried both the health and the morale of the army. The numbers in hospital were unprecedented, when the total strength of the forces are taken into consideration, amounting CH. VI] SCOTT'S ADVANCE ON THE CAPITAL. sometimes to a fifth, and even to a quarter of the whole; and the desertions were more frequent and extensive than, under all the circumstances, could have been conceived. Into the unpleasant differences and disputes between the general-in-chief and the authorities at Washington, growing out of the scheme of superseding Scott, by the appointment of a lieutenant-general, we need not enter; neither is it material to enlarge upon the mission of Mr. N. P. Trist, who was sent by the president as commissioner, with full powers to seize upon the earliest opportunity of negotiating a peace with Mexico. The historians of the war, Ripley, Mansfield, and others, will furnish all the details desired by the reader. Having at length been well reinforced, although he left behind him eighteen hundred men in hospital, on the 7th of August, General Scott took the road to the capital of Mexico; and in four days the advanced division reached Ayotla, about fifteen miles from the city of the Montezumas. By this route, however, it was soon 445 culiarly favorable to guerilla warfare, and in which no amount of contributions which might be levied could compensate for the destruction of its communications with the sea and the fleet. The attempts which were made to annoy and harass the advance of the American army confirm this statement in the most convincing manner. As might be supposed, the Mexicans made intense efforts to defend their capital city. On every road approaching it were strong earth-works and batteries, and around the city itself was a complete girdle of entrenchments. There was, however, an insufficiency of artillery, and the disposable troops were not above twenty thousand in number; the services of some ten thousand armed citizens might perhaps be reckoned upon, in addition to the army; and although the lines were long, the invading force was too inconsiderable to make this of any great moment. In view of all the circumstances, the plans of Santa Anna (as stated by him after the battle was lost,) appear to have been arranged with greater skill than discovered that Mexico was in- he had shown before. It was his deaccessible; a new road was therefore sign to have fallen back before Scott's constructed, to the south of that run- advance, and given battle on ground ning direct from Vera Cruz; and be- he had chosen, and in which his numtween the 15th and the 18th of the bers would have told with effect upon month, the army had rounded Lakes the comparatively small army of the Chalco and Xochimilco, and reached invaders. But the gross disobedience San Augustin, on the Acapulco road, of General Valencia disconcerted the only eight miles distant from the ob- whole plan. As if he had determined ject of its long journey. Nothing can to seize the first opportunity of attack better show the exhaustion of the mili- ing the Americans, in entire forgetful. tary power of the government, than ness of the first duty of a subordinate this daring march of less than eleven commander, and in spite of the untenthousand men, so far into a country pe-able character of the ground about 1847. Contreras, (or Padierna,) he left his position at Coyoacan and San Angel, and advanced to Contreras, and on the heights there entrenched himself, not only without any orders from Santa Anna, but without so much as consulting him respecting the movement. By this means he weakened the force opposed to Scott's direct advance, and at the same time he could not prevent that advance, because the nature of the ground in his front neutralized the menace of his position on Scott's flank. It was, nevertheless, considered safest to dispose of Valencia's force in the first instance; and, accordingly, Worth was sent with Harney's cavalry to threaten San Antonio, and Pillow's division consisting of Pierce's and Cadwallader's brigades, was despatched against Contreras, on the left, across the Pedregal, an almost impassable lavatract, over which a party, covered by Twiggs's division, undertook the making of a road. 1847. On the afternoon of the 19th of August, these two divisions arrived within range of Valencia's guns; and the small field batteries of Magruder and Callender were, with great labor, brought into play against them, while the front was extended to the right in such a manner, that, by the aid of Morgan's regular infantry and Shields's volunteers, (which were sent to reinforce them at sunset,) the rancho of Ansaldo was carried, and Valencia's communications threatened. Amid the darkness and rain of the night, which rapidly fell upon the field, and terminated the conflict for a short time, General Persifer F. Smith proposed a plan for the assault of Valencia's camp, which Captain Lee, of the engineers, toiling alone across the perilous intervening space, through the impervious gloom and storm, communicated to General Scott, and ob tained his approbation for making trial of it. 1847. About three in the morning of the 20th of August, Riley's brigade, fol lowed by Cadwallader's and Smith's, set out, and toiling through the rain and mud, by sunrise reached an eleva tion in the rear of the Mexican position, from which they were able to attack the entrenchments with such advantage, that in seventeen minutes they were carried. Scott had sent Twiggs's division against the works in front, to effect a diversion, if it should be required; Smith's brigade discov ered and routed a mass of Mexican cav alry, while Shields's not only held other masses in check, but captured great numbers of fugitives from Contreras The American force engaged in this brilliant action was about four thousand five hundred, whilst the enemy numbered about six thousand, and Santa Anna was sufficiently near, with double that number, to have shared in the fight if he had felt disposed. This decisive victory, however, was not all that was accomplished on that day. Whilst the divisions just mentioned were engaged on the left, General Worth, by a skillful and daring movement on the right, had turned and forced the enemy's strong position at San Antonio, and then advanced directly upon a strong, well-built for tification, the tête du pont of Cheru busco, the other divisions hastening to Ca. VI.] ATTEMPTS AT NEGOTIATION. the same point from the field of Contreras. Pierce and Shields crossing the Rio de Cherubusco by a bridge on the left, turned the position, and engaged Santa Anna's troops, whilst Twiggs assaulted and carried the works round the church of San Pablo,, and Worth's and Pillow's troops were engaged in carrying the tête du pont itself. At every point the contest was most furious; but the Mexicans again proved themselves unable to contend successfully with American soldiers; at every point our countrymen triumphed, and the dragoons chased the scattered and disheartened enemy to the very gates of the capital. We have no returns by which to estimate with any accuracy the losses of the Mexicans in killed and wounded in these obstinate conflicts; but it must have been very great. Nearly sixteen hundred were taken prisoners, including three generals. Seven field pieces were captured, with great quantities of ammunition, and about a thousand mules and horses. General Scott's loss in the battles of the 19th and 20th of August, in regulars and volunteers, was a hundred and thirty-three killed, and eight hundred and sixty-five wounded. This was the most sanguinary of all the engagements in the whole course of the war; but in its effects, it was certainly one of the most decisive. At this point, everything seemed favorable for entering upon negotiations for peace, on terms which would be acceptable to the United States. General Scott, at his head-quarters, at Tacubaya, and only three miles from the city of Mexico, arranged an armistice, 447 1847. with a view to a treaty; having enforced the offer by the alternative of an assault, which no one doubted would have been successful. Some pause, too, was desirable for his own men, after so long a march and such severe engagements. And for several days after the 24th of August, the commissioners appointed by the two parties attempted to ascertain the existence of some ground of agreement, whence they might start in drawing up the articles of a final treaty. But beside the fact, that Scott was determined to obtain every thing which his coun try expected from the war, the Mex icans did not know how to proceed for they not only wished to have it appear that they were unsubdued, but they were also split up into numerous factions and parties, and could agree upon no line of policy calculated to meet the emergency. Mr. Trist, whose unpleasant quarrel with General Scott, had been put to rest some time previ ously, endeavored to carry out the instructions of his government; but the result showed, that there was no reliance to be placed on Santa Anna or his real purposes in all this movement; and, in fact, every effort failed to arrange a peace on mutually satisfactory terms. Santa Anna thought that he would make one more trial to meet the victorious invaders on the field of battle. The Mexican general, according to common report, had been very diligent in strengthening his fortifications, during the armistice, although he had stipulated not to do so; several huge church bells had been cast into cannon, and the remaining portions of the armies that had been raised were organized for the purpose of once more trying the fate of battle. General Scott, meanwhile, had not been idle nor unobservant; he had employed the time in such drilling and military exercise of his troops as their position rendered possible; and put into serviceable condition the artillery which had been captured, and refilled his exhausted ammunition wagons from the stores which victory had put into his power. He had no need to strengthen his position, for his object (if peace was not negotiated) was not to maintain the ground he occupied, but to take that of the enemy; and we do not hear of his receiving any reinforcements from the coast. The armistice having now lasted for two weeks, and there appearing no probability of a treaty being arranged, General Scott, on the 6th of September, notified Santa Anna that he was aware of his infractions of the armistice, and demanded satisfaction on account of them before noon on the following day, 1847. under pain of declaring the suspension of arms at an end, and proceeding with hostilities forthwith. The reply, which was sent on the 7th, accepted the latter alternative, and announced the resolution to try the fortune of war once more. Before night Scott had fully determined upon his plan of action. Having ascertained that the western side of the city seemed to be less strongly fortified than the south side, he resolved to assault it by a flank attack. But there lay directly in the line of operations, on this plan, three strong positions-El Molino del Rey, La Casa Mata, and Chapultepec; the latter a castellated height, which under ordinary circumstances could only have been reduced by a regular siege. Nev ertheless, knowing the quality of his own men, and the inefficiency of the enemy, he expected to carry it, as well as the rest, by assault, and gave orders accordingly; the King's Mill-El Molino del Rey-being the first point to be carried. ap About four o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September, the different sections of General Worth's division took their posts at the places assigned to them; and as soon as dawn peared, Huger's twenty-four pounders thundered against the walls of the old mill, preluding the assault on the advanced battery, which was effected in so gallant a style by Major Wright and Captain Smith, that in spite of the grape and canister showered upon the attacking column, in spite of a desperate rally on the part of the Mexicans, and a struggle in which eleven out of fourteon American officers fell, the place was taken, and the guns in it turned upon the fugitives, who rushed in the wildest disorder to the forts. In the mean while, Garland's brigade, sustain ed by Drum's artillery, assaulted the enemy's left, near the Molino, and after an obstinate contest drove them from their position under the protecting guns of Chapultepec. The American guns, being advanced to the position which had been carried, made dreadful havoc amongst the routed foe. While these vigorous efforts were being made on the Mexican centre and left, Duncan's battery was blazing away |