THE

DISTRICT COURTS IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK:

THEIR CREATION, ORGANIZATION, AND HISTORY.

THESE Courts are, in fact, the courts of the people, for it is in these limited aud inferior tribunals that the large majority of the daily civil disputes and differences occurring between the people are brought for trial, decision, and settlement. They were designed for the collection of small claims, and redress for in-. ferior wrongs, and were organized and intended to occupy the same relative position in the administration of justice, in this city, as "courts of justices of the peace" do in the country. They are not "courts of justices of the peace," however, within the meaning of the Code (Mills o. Winslow, 3 Code Rep. 44; S. C., 2 E. D. Smith, 18; Id. 527; Boston Mills v. Eull, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 319; S. C., 37 Barb. 299, 305).

The history of these courts is curious, and presents a remarkable illustration of the truth of the saying that law is uncertain and full of entanglements. The plan and details, one would think, ought to be of great simplicity; but this is not the case, for the changes have been so frequent and various, and some of them so entire and radical as to entitle the judges who administer this precarious jurisdiction, to great credit for exercising it safely, and generally so correctly; especially when it is remembered that it is done at the risk of an

action for any assumption of power not warranted by a strict construction of the acts relating to these courts. The justices must act in strict conformity with these statutes, and if a justice transcends these powers his proceedings are absolutely void, and he is liable to an action at the suit of the aggrieved party for all damages sustained thereby (Cow. Tr., §§ 19, 20). Thus, if a party should be arrested, or his goods taken by execution upon a judgment void for want of jurisdiction, he may recover his damages for the injury against the justice, and the party, and his attorney also, if he has actively directed the service of the process, in the same manner as if the act complained of had been committed without color of law (11 Johns. 44; 15 Id. 152; 28 N. Y., 659). Again, where a justice who is authorized to issue an attachment "whenever it shall satisfactorily appear to him," that a debtor has departed the county with intent to defraud creditors, and the proof offered showed the belief of the party that such was the fact, issued an attachment, it was held that his proceeding was void, and he was a trespasser (10 Wend. 420; 11 Johns. 177; 4 Den. 118).

The reason of this liability is that inferior jurisdictions like these, not proceeding according to the course of the common law, are confined strictly to the authority and power given by the statute. They take nothing by implication but must show the power given them, under which they act, in every instance; but so far as respects regularity and form, when jurisdiction has been acquired, their proceedings are to be liberally construed in reviewing them. But if the justice have jurisdiction, and merely errs in its exercise, the act is voidable, and can be taken advantage of only on appeal (4 Den. 118; 18 N. Y. 335; 34 Barb. 144; 45 Id. 394; 6 Wend. 597). A justice cannot acquire jurisdiction in any case, by the consent of the parties where, by law, it is not conferred upon him; it being a well-established principle that consent cannot confer

jurisdiction. In any case, however, where the justice has jurisdiction of the subject matter, he may acquire. jurisdiction of the parties by their consent, or their voluntary appearance without objection (Cow. Tr., §§ 19, 20). The justices of these courts have, therefore, no slight responsibility in the administration of justice, especially when we come to examine the creation, organization, and history of these courts, and the laws. under which they act, and consider how repeatedly these courts have been remodeled. In every instance the departure from the plan previously existing has been so entire, that the most ingenious mind must find itself baffled, in attempting to trace even the slightest resemblance between the form and character with which they were from time to time invested. In many cases it was utterly impossible, without the severest scrutiny, to distinguish their application, and error after error was the result. Upon one branch of their powers alone, to say nothing of others of equal obtuseness and difficulty, that relating to the amount of which these courts had jurisdiction, a most laborious examination was instituted by Judge IRVING, whose opinion, comparison, and analysis of the various provisions of the acts is set forth in the case of Van Lew v. King (3 Cow. 375), and sanctioned by the Supreme Court. An examination of this case will most certainly cause the reader to sympathize with those justices who are called upon at such great peril (for example, an action of trespass), to administer this branch of the judicial system of the State of New York, as well as with those poor people whose money and rights depend upon such subtle and refined criticisms upon and distinctions in the power of those tribunals, which, from their very nature, object and intent, should be so simple, clearly defined, and readily, as well as safely accessible.

These courts are as old, and were created as far: back as any court in this State.

In 1759 an act was passed by which the mayor, recorder, or any one of the aldermen, might hold a court in the city of New York, for the trial of causes, when the amount demanded did not exceed the value of £5, which cause might be tried by any one of these officers alone, or with a jury, if demanded, with six persons. This act was the origin of "justices' courts" in this city, for the trial of civil causes. The amount was afterwards raised to £10, and by an act passed in 1781, the previous acts were repealed and the power was conferred upon officers commissioned by the governor, called "associate justices," who held what was called "assistant justices' court."

After the revolution in 1787, an elaborate act was passed, by which the governor was authorized, by the advice and consent of the council of appointment, to appoint as many "assistant justices" for the city of New York as he should deem necessary, with the powers possessed by justices of the peace in other counties in the State. Doubts having arisen under this act as to whether the aldermen of the city (being ex officio justices of the peace) could not also exercise. the same power and jurisdiction, it was deemed necessary to and the act was explained by declaring that the power and jurisdiction thus conferred was to be solely and exclusively exercised by the assistant justices, thereby created, and in conformity to such declaration, an act was passed on the 21st day of February, 1791, by which the power of the aldermen in this respect was expressly taken away, and the power and jurisdiction for the recovery of debts not exceeding £10, embraced in the act of 1787, given to the assistant justices exclusively.

The assistant justices continued to exercise this power and jurisdiction until the 16th day of February, 1797, on which day an act was passed, reciting among other things, that the plan then in operation was not calculated to produce the results originally contem

plated ; and abolishing the assistant justices, and creating in their place and stead "justices of the peace for the city and county of New York," who were unlimited in number, with the same power and jurisdiction, and constituting these justices into one court, but requiring two of them to sit in rotation at the City Hall, in the city of New York. This new tribunal continued in existence until the year 1804, when it was again found to be unfit and inoperative; and so, accordingly, on the 4th day of March, 1804, another act was passed, by which the governor was authorized to appoint eight justices of the peace, for the city and county of New York, with the same power and jurisdiction, requiring them to hold two courts in different districts of the city; and two of the justices to sit in rotation as required by the act of 1797. On the 4th day of April, 1806, this act was amended in regard to some of its minor details; and finally on the 6th day of April, 1807, an act was passed entirely abolishing and wiping out these new tribunals and creating the "assistant justices' courts" in very nearly the form and manner in which they now exist, their jurisdiction, however, being limited to the sum of twenty-five dollars. A "justice's court," consisting of three justices, and with nearly the same powers which that court now possesses, was also created by this act. The system, however, was not yet entirely satisfactory, or complete ; and on the 18th day of March, 1808, an act was passed, amendatory of the act of 1807, creating the assistant justices' courts, and defining their territorial jurisdiction.

The system and change was further completed by an act, passed April 9th, 1813, entitled "An Act to reduce several laws, relating particularly to the City of New York, into one act." Among other provisions, it divided the city of New York into ten wards, and created the "justices' courts."

By section 85 of this act the person who adminis