165 Opinion of the Court. should be beneficiaries of the bond, and prescribed no other remedy. Howard v. United States, supra. Mr. George T. Havel, with whom Mr. Henry N. Benson was on the brief, for Patrick J. Malone; and Mr. Pierce Butler, Jr., with whom Messrs. M. J. Doherty and R. O. Sullivan were on the brief, for National Surety Corporation, respondents. By leave of Court, Solicitor General Jackson, Assistant Attorney General Shea, and Messrs. Melvin H. Siegel, Robert K. McConnaughey, and Oscar H. Davis filed a brief on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether petitioner, a private user of the mails, may without the consent of any officer of the United States bring suit on the bond of an acting postmaster for consequential damages resulting from misdelivery of mail. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a judgment of the District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissing petitioner's complaint.1 We granted certiorari 2 because of an alleged conflict with a decision of this Court and because an important question in the administration of the postal laws was involved. 3 The complaint alleged that petitioner was engaged in the business of automobile financing in Minneapolis, in the course of which it purchased from automobile dealers the installment notes of buyers secured by their sales contracts. A dealer living at Montgomery, Minnesota, 103 F.2d 450, affirming 23 F. Supp 411. 2308 U. S. 534. 'Howard v. United States, 184 U. S. 676. L Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. where the respondent Malone was acting postmaster, is alleged to have put into operation a scheme to defraud petitioner by selling it forged notes and contracts, which he sent petitioner along with a fictitious list of credit references. Petitioner, before purchasing, followed its usual practice of mailing letters of inquiry to the references, and after purchasing mailed payment books, insurance certificates, and receipts to the purported makers of the notes. The dealer persuaded the acting postmaster Malone, allegedly in violation of the Postal Regulations,* to turn over to him all letters that arrived in Montgomery in petitioner's envelopes. Then he sent forged replies to petitioner's letters and made installment payments out of the money which petitioner had paid him in buying the notes. The dealer thus defrauded the Finance Company of some $34,000. The respondent Malone, on taking office as acting postmaster, had executed a bond for $16,000 to the United States as sole obligee with the respondent Surety Corporation as surety. The condition of the bond was: "That if the said Patrick J. Malone shall on and after the date he took charge of the post office faithfully discharge all duties and trusts imposed on him as acting postmaster either by law or by the regulations of the Post Office Department, and shall perform all duties as fiscal agent of the Government imposed on him by law or by regulation of the Treasury Department made in conformity with law, and shall also perform all duties and obligations imposed upon or required of him by law, or by regulation made pursuant to law, in connection with Postal Laws and Regulations (1932), § 777. "Mail matter should be delivered to the person addressed or in accordance with his written order..." "2. When a person requests delivery to him of the mail of another, claiming that the addressee has verbally given him authority to receive it, the postmaster, if he doubts the authority, may require it to be in writing, signed and filed in his office. . . 165 Opinion of the Court. the Postal Savings System, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise, of force." In its complaint, without alleging specific authorization from the United States to sue, petitioner asked judgment on the bond for the defaults of Malone as postmaster. At the close of the testimony at the trial motions to dismiss the complaint were made by respondents and the district judge reserved judgment. After a jury verdict for petitioner the motions were granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that a private user of the mails cannot maintain such an action as is here alleged without the consent of the United States, the obligee in the bond, and that no consent was given either by the statutes, expressly or by implication, or by any appropriate officer of the United States. The respondent gave a statutory bond in compliance with an enactment of the Congress for the purposes specified in the statute. As the bond is part of an integrated system of postal regulations, the determination of the parties authorized to sue upon it is a federal question governed by federal law." We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no consent and that such consent is necessary. Consequently there is no occasion to determine whether the bond was intended to protect private users of the mail from all loss or damage, however consequential, occasioned by the postmaster. The record shows the only effort made to secure consent of an officer was a request to the Attorney General for 39 U. S. C. § 34, Postal Laws and Regulations § 410: "Every postmaster, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall give bond, with good and approved security, and in such penalty as the Postmaster General shall deem sufficient, conditioned for the faithful discharge of all duties and trusts imposed on him either by law or the rules and regulations of the department." 6 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, ante, p. 94. authority to sue. This was refused. Whether as a matter of right a third party may sue on the instrument for loss covered by an official bond running only to the statutory obligee depends upon the intention of the legislative body which required the bond. This intention may be evidenced by express statutory language or by implication. This was the rule announced in Corporation of Washington v. Young. There a bond had been given to the Corporation of Washington, a municipality, by the manager of a lottery "truly and impartially to execute" his duties. Without the city's consent, the holder of a winning ticket sued on the bond. This Court said: "No person who is not the proprietor of an obligation, can have a legal right to put it in suit, unless such right be given by the Legislature; and no person can be authorized to use the name of another, without his assent given in fact, or by legal intendment." 8 In Howard v. United States this comment was made upon the Young decision: "That case undoubtedly is authority for the proposition that, generally speaking, an obligation taken under legislative sanction cannot, in the absence of a statute so providing, be put in suit in the name of the obligee, the proprietor of the obligation, without his consent." Such official bonds are often part of a general statutory plan for the operation of governmental activities. While all the activities of a government of course confer benefits on its citizens, frequently the benefits are incidental 'Cf. United States v. United States Lines Co., 24 F. Supp. 427; Moody v. Megee, 31 F. 2d 117; United States ex rel. Brumberg Bros. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 26 F. 2d 191, 193; Idaho Gold Reduction Co. v. Croghan, 6 Idaho 471, 473; 56 P. 164; United States v. Griswold, 8 Ariz. 453, 456; 76 P. 596. 165 Opinion of the Court. and unenforceable.10 In the case of an official bond, even if its benefits are not incidental, it may well be that the legislative body is of the opinion that actions on the bond should be limited to the government in order to secure unified administration of claims. 11 We have recognized a similar need for a single control in regard to a sale bond required by a district court in an equity receivership. This Court in Munroe v. Raphael had before it an injunction granted by a federal district court upon the motion of its receiver to rescind a consent to sue and forbid further proceedings in a suit in a state court in the name of the United States upon a sale bond of the estate in receivership. The sale bond had been given for assets purchased from the receiver. It ran to the United States only and guaranteed the payment of a certain percentage of indebtedness to all creditors of the estate. The suit had been instituted in the state court by one creditor, with permission of the district court obtained prior to the receiver's motion for injunction. This Court upheld the injunction on the theory that the bond, a part of the estate, remained within the control of the court and that to ensure ratable payments to all creditors one should not be permitted to carry on the litigation. In the opinion, it was declared: "Certainly no creditor could bring a suit in his own name on the bond, for his share of the purchase money. Nor could he institute such an action without leave of the District Court." 12 Petitioner's attack is pointed at the application of the consent rule rather than at the rule itself. While with 10 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220, 231. 11 288 U. S. 485. 12 Ibid. at 488; see District of Columbia to Use of Langellotti v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 50 App. D. C. 309; 271 F. 383. |