261 Opinion of the Court. poses upon the carrier many duties and creates in the individual corresponding rights. For the violation of the private right it affords "a private administrative remedy." The interested person can file as of right a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the carrier is required to make answer. We said that the Federal Trade Commission Act "contains no such features." Id., p. 26. The present Act, drawn in analogy to the Federal Trade Commission Act, contains no such features. As Congress has in this instance created a public agency entrusted by the terms of its creation with the exclusive authority for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act, decisions dealing with the legal obligations arising under the Railway Labor Act 11 cannot be regarded as apposite. Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 569, 570; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 543, 544. We think that the provision of the National Labor Relations Act conferring exclusive power upon the Board to prevent any unfair labor practice, as defined,—a power not affected by any other means of "prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise❞—necessarily embraces exclusive authority to institute proceedings for the violation of the court's decree directing enforcement. The decree in no way alters, but confirms, the position of the Board as the enforcing authority. It is the Board's order on behalf of the public that the court enforces. It is the Board's right to make that order that the court sustains. The Board seeks enforcement as a public agent, not to give effect to a "private administrative remedy." Both the order and the decree are aimed at the prevention of the "45 U. S. C. 151. See 50 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1090. unfair labor practice. If the decree of enforcement is disobeyed, the unfair labor practice is still not prevented. The Board still remains as the sole authority to secure that prevention. The appropriate procedure to that end is to ask the court to punish the violation of its decree as a contempt. As the court has no jurisdiction to enforce the order at the suit of any private person or group of persons, we think it is clear that the court cannot entertain a petition for violation of its decree of enforcement save as the Board presents it. As the Conference Report upon the bill stated,1 in case the unfair labor practice is resumed, "there will be immediately available to the Board an existing court decree to serve as a basis for contempt proceedings." The order of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's motion is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration and decision of this cause. MINNESOTA EX REL. PEARSON v. PROBATE COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. No. 394. Argued February 6, 7, 1940.-Decided February 26, 1940. Under a Minnesota statute a person may be subjected to a proceeding akin to lunacy proceedings with a view to his restraint if proven to be of a "psychopathic personality." In a prohibition proceeding the State Supreme Court construed the statute as intended to include those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil 12 Conference Report, Cong. Rec., 74th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 9, p. 10,299. 270 Opinion of the Court. on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire; and upheld the statute and quashed the alternative writ. Upon appeal here, held: 1. This Court must accept the state court's construction. P. 273. 2. The word "include" as used in that court's opinion, will be taken as defining the entire class of persons to whom the statute applies and not as describing merely a portion of a larger class. Pp. 273-274. 3. The statute, so construed, is not too vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation. P. 274. 4. The objection that it denies the equal protection of the laws because of unreasonable classification, is untenable. P. 274. The legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. 5. In its procedural aspect, the statute is not invalid on its face. P. 275. 6. Procedural objections that are based upon possible applications of the statute in the progress of the cause which have not as yet been passed upon by the state court, are premature. P. 277. 205 Minn. 545; 287 N. W. 297, affirmed. APPEAL from a judgment quashing an alternative writ of prohibition. Mr. Joseph F. Cowern for appellant. Messrs. Chester S. Wilson and Kent C. van den Berg, with whom Messrs. J. A. A. Burnquist and John A. Weeks were on the brief, for appellee. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, Charles Edwin Pearson, petitioned the Supreme Court of Minnesota for a writ of prohibition commanding the Probate Court of Ramsey County, and its Judge, to desist from proceeding against him as a "psychopathic personality" under Chapter 369 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1939. A proceeding under the statute had been brought in the Probate Court for the H Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. commitment of appellant and an order for his production and examination had been issued. Appellant contended that the statute violated the due. process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. After hearing upon an alternative writ, the Supreme Court overruled these contentions and quashed the writ. 205 Minn. 545; 287 N. W. 297. The case comes here on appeal. Jud. Code, § 237 (a); 28 U. S. C. 344 (a). The statute, in § 1, defines the term "psychopathic personality" as meaning "the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons." Section 2 provides that, except as otherwise therein or thereafter provided, the laws relating to insane persons, or those alleged to be insane, shall apply with like force to persons having, or alleged to have, a psychopathic personality. There is a proviso that before proceedings are instituted the facts shall first be submitted to the county attorney who if he is satisfied that good cause exists shall prepare a petition to be executed by a person having knowledge of the facts and shall file it with the judge of the probate court of the county in which the "patient" has his "settlement or is present." The probate judge shall set the matter down for hearing and for examination of the "patient." The judge may exclude the general public from attendance. The "patient" may be represented by counsel and the court may appoint counsel for him if he is financially unable to obtain such assistance. The "patient" is entitled to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. 270 Opinion of the Court. The court must appoint two duly licensed doctors of medicine to assist in the examination. The proceedings are to be reduced to writing and made parts of the court's records. From a finding of the existence of psychopathic personality, the "patient" may appeal to the district court. After setting forth the general principles which governed its determination, the state court construed the statute in these words: "Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably be said that the language of § 1 of the act is intended to include those persons who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act impracticable of enforcement and, perhaps, unconstitutional in its application, but would also be an unwarranted departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined." This construction is binding upon us. Any contention that the construction is contrary to the terms of the Act is unavailing here. For the purpose of deciding the constitutional questions appellant raises we must take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has interpreted it. Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 32; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 513; Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 172; Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165, 170. Moreover, as it was the manifest purpose of the court to determine definitely the meaning of the Act, we accept the view presented by the Attorney General of 215234°-40--18 |