16

state citizenship. In applying this constitutional principle this Court has determined that the right to operate an independent slaughter-house," to sell wine on terms of equality with grape growers 18 and to operate businesses free of state regulation 19 were not privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. And a state inheritance tax statute which limited exemptions to charitable corporations within the state was held not to infringe any right protected by the privileges and immunities clause.20 The Court has consistently refused to list completely the rights which are covered by the clause, though it has pointed out the type of rights protected.21 We think it quite clear that the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business or calling 22 such as the deposit understood is, that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it." 10 Idem, 78-79.

17

18

Slaughter-House Cases, supra.

Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446; cf. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657; Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304.

19 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530.

20 Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553; cf. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U. S. 314.

"They have been described as "privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the national government, and granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States." In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448. See also Slaughter-House Cases, supra, at 79-80; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97.

22

"Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 94.

of money in banks is not a privilege of national citizenship.

In the states, there reposes the sovereignty to manage their own affairs except only as the requirements of the Constitution otherwise provide. Within these constitutional limits the power of the state over taxation is plenary. An interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause which restricts the power of the states to manage their own fiscal affairs is a matter of gravest concern to them.23 It is only the emphatic requirements of the Constitution which properly may lead the federal courts to such a conclusion.

Appellant relies upon Colgate v. Harvey 24 as a precedent to support his argument that the present statute is not within the limits of permissible classification and violates the privileges and immunities clause. In view of our conclusions, we look upon the decision in that case as repugnant to the line of reasoning adopted here. As a consequence, Colgate v. Harvey must be and is overruled.

Affirmed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES concurs in the result upon the ground, as stated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, that the classification adopted by the legislature rested upon a reasonable basis.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS:

I think that the judgment should be reversed. Four years ago in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, this court held that the equal protection clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit such a discrimination as results from the statute now under review. I adhere to the views expressed in "Twining v. New Jersey, supra, 92.

24 296 U. S. 404.

the opinion of the court in that case, and think it should be followed in this.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS joins in this opinion.

JAMES STEWART & CO. v. SADRAKULA,
ADMINISTRATRIX.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.

No. 251. Argued January 12, 1940.-Decided January 29, 1940.

1. Under Jud. Code § 237 (a) and the Act of January 31, 1928, this Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment of a state court of last resort, sustaining a recovery of damages for accidental death, which necessarily upholds a state statute under which the damages were awarded against the contention that, in its application to the locus in quo-a post-office site-it violated the provisions of the Constitution as to authority of the United States in such places. P. 97.

2. Upon the transfer from a State to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction of a site for a postoffice, the state laws in effect at the time continue in force as federal laws, save as they may be inappropriate to the changed situation or inconsistent with the national purpose, and save as Congress may have provided otherwise. P. 99.

3. Section 241 (4) of the New York Labor Law, which requires the planking-over of floor beams on which iron or steel work is being erected in building construction, remained in force as to the postoffice site in New York City after the acquisition of the site by the United States, and was applicable to a contractor engaged in constructing the post office under a contract with the Government. P. 100.

The fact that the Labor Law contains numerous administrative and other provisions inapplicable in the changed situation does not render § 241 (4) inapplicable.

4. The possibility that the safety requirement of boarding-over the steel tiers may slightly increase the cost of construction to the Government does not make the requirement inapplicable to the postoffice site. P. 104.

94

Argument for Appellant.

5. While the government building contract is in a sense the means by which the United States secures the construction of its post office, the contractor in carrying out the contract has not the immunity of a government instrumentality. P. 105.

6. A contract for the building of a post-office in the City of New York provided that "State or Municipal Building Regulations do not apply to work inside the Government's lot lines," the sentence quoted being in a section of the contract relating to "licenses, permits, etc." Held that the intention was to relieve the contractor from provisions of the city building code relating to types of material, fire hazards and the like. P. 105. 254 App. Div. 892; 5 N. Y. S. 2d 260, affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, entered on remittitur from the Court of Appeals, 280 N. Y. 651, 730; 20 N. E. 2d 1015; 21 N. E. 2d 217, and sustaining an award of damages for accidental death.

Mr. Clarence E. Mellen for appellant.

Upon transfer of jurisdiction, certain state laws, termed municipal, governing the personal and property rights of the inhabitants in their relations with one another, remain effective, unless they conflict with the political character, institutions or Constitution of the United States. That rule, borrowed from international law, results from the necessity of avoiding the alternative that, until action by Congress, there would be no law there for the protection of such rights. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 541; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 546, 547; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 277, 278; Vilas v. Manila, 220 U. S. 345; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439; Halleck, International Law, c. 34, § 14; 38 Col. L. Rev., p. 133.

Implicit in such rule is the assumption that laws which thus continue in force have been adopted by the new government as its own. Such adoption should be only presumed of laws which are clearly within the purpose of

Argument for Appellant.

309 U.S.

the rule and which, when applied, will not interfere with the activities of the Government.

The New York Labor Law is a comprehensive code of regulations designed to promote the health, welfare and personal safety of those engaged in many different occupations. Article 10, of which § 241 is part, relates to the construction of buildings. In New York City, its enforcement is entrusted to the superintendent of buildings, a municipal official, who is also charged with the enforcement of the city Building Code, a municipal ordinance which has the force of a statute. That official is empowered to enter upon all premises in which such work is being conducted, require compliance with both the Labor Law and the Building Code, and, if he deem it necessary, stop all work meanwhile.

Those provisions for its executive administration and enforcement clearly distinguish this statute from those which have been classified as "municipal." Crook v. Old Point Comfort, 54 F. 2d 669; McCarthy v. Packard Co., 105 App. Div. 436; 182 N. Y. 555.

Exercise of such executive authority in federal terri- . tory would clearly infringe upon federal sovereignty. Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 451, 452; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 388, 389; Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F. 2d 323, 326; United States v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 88 F. 891, 894, 895.

May it then be reasonably inferred that the Federal Government intended that this statute should be even partially effective in its territory? Cf. Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U. S. 315, 319.

Even though its executive provisions be deemed eliminated, the mandates of the statute, as applied herein, are not "municipal," but "political."

The only building to which the statute could apply was to be constructed pursuant to a contract with the