posed to deal with by that process. Questions of foreign policy and of the recognition or nonrecognition of foreign States are of a purely political nature and do not fall within the domain of judicial decision; and upon these questions this Government has in the present paper defined its position.

Mr. Root, writing to a succeeding Colombia minister on February 10, 1906, said:

The real gravamen of your complaint is this espousal of the cause of Panama by the people of the United States. No arbitration could deal with the real rights and wrongs of the parties concerned unless it were to pass upon the question whether the cause thus espoused was just-whether the people of Panama were exercising their just rights in declaring and maintaining their independence of Colombian rule.

We assert and maintain the affirmative upon that question. We assert that the ancient State of Panama, independent in its origin and by nature and history a separate political community, was confederated with the other States of Colombia upon terms which preserved and continued its separate sovereignty; that it never surrendered that sovereignty; that in the year 1885 the compact which bound it to the other States of Colombia was broken and terminated by Colombia, and the Isthmus was subjugated by force; that it was held under foreign domination to which it had never consented; and that it was justly entitled to assert its sovereignty and demand its independence from a rule which was unlawful, oppressive, and tyrannical. We cannot ask the people of Panama to consent that this right of theirs, which is vital to their political existence, shall be submitted to the decision of any arbitrator. Nor are we willing to permit any arbitrator to determine the political policy of the United States in following its sense of right and justice by espousing the cause of this weak people against the stronger Government of Colombia, which had so long held them in unlawful subjection.

There is one other subject contained in your note which I can not permit to pass without notice. You repeat the charge that the Government of the United States took a collusive part in fomenting or inciting the uprising upon the Isthmus of Panama which ultimately resulted in the revolution. I regret that you should see fit to thus renew an aspersion upon the honor and good faith of the United States in the face of the positive and final denial of the fact contained in Mr. Hay's letter of January 5, 1904. You must be well aware that the universally recognized limitations upon the subjects proper for arbitration forbid that the United States should submit such a question to arbitration. In view of your own recognition of this established limitation, I have been unable to discover any justification for the renewal of this unfounded assertion.

It is important to note also that the Government of Colombia has never to this day presented anything even approaching a question justiciable by arbitration, it being a universally recognized principle that neither indefinite nor purely political matters are of a nature to be arbitrated.

It is perhaps useful to advert somewhat more to the background of previous events. On January 22, 1903, was signed at Washington the treaty between the United States and Colombia, known as the Hay-Herran treaty, for the construction of an interoceanic canal by the United States. This treaty, although essentially conforming to the proposals of Colombia, besides being eminently just and even generous, was enthusiastically welcomed by its direct beneficiaries, the people of the Panaman Isthmus. In Bogota it was coldly received. At the first signs of opposition in the Colombian Congress discontent and resentment were manifested in Panama. As the possibility of the treaty's being rejected at Bogota grew to a probability, the idea of regaining their historical autonomy awakened and became strong in the minds of Panamans. The contingency of secession was openly discussed and advocated. Months before the event the representatives of Panama in the Congress at Bogota raised their voices in unheeded warning. The certainty, which soon became evident, that the canal treaty would be rejected proved their warning true. The bloodless revolution of November 3, 1903, followed, with instant success. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of Panaman independence the last vestige of Colombian authority on the Isthmus had disappeared and the people of Panama, through the unanimous vote of their municipalities, had ratified the Republic.

Imbued with the inherited spirit of territorial nationality and the recollection of their ancient geographical entity, the keen interest of the Panaman people in the establishment of interoceanic transit through their territory is readily comprehensible and it is no cause for surprise that they were impatient of the obstacles set by the Government at Bogota, through its rejection of the HayHerran treaty, in the way of the accomplishment of the stupendous work of the canal. The feelings of the people of Panama were early shown through the declaration made by their representative in the Colombian Congress and echoed by other farsighted members, that a failure to ratify the canal treaty would be followed immediately by a separatist revolution. It was a matter of common notoriety in the city of Bogota that such an outcome of the rejection of the treaty was inevitable. Although amply forewarned, the authorities at Bogota appear to have courted the impending result. The Colombian President contributed to bring it about by his amazing departure from the practice of nations in failing even to recommend for approval a treaty signed under the explicit direction of its President on behalf of the sovereign State by its empowered agent. In the light of the manifested spirit of the people of Panama, it is evidently quite superfluous to allege that this revolutionary sentiment was fomented by persons in the United States. Outside pressure, even by interested private parties, would seem to have been a work of supererogation, even if its existence were a fact. The separation became a patent certainty from the moment the Colombian executive and Congress foredoomed the treaty to failure.

The Government of the United States, being satisfied that a de facto government, republican in form and without substantial opposition from its own people, had been there established, extended its recognition to the new Republic of Panama on November 6, 1903. From almost the very day in November, 1903, that Panama regained the attribute of self-government which that State had possessed without question from the time of emancipation from Spanish domination to the time of its incorporation by conquest into the centralized Government of Colombia, the Government of the United States bent its earnest efforts toward effecting a just and practical settlement to which Panama, equally with the United States and Colombia, should be a party.

The earlier representations of the Colombian Government, after the recognition of the Republic of Panama and the conclusion of the canal treaty, did not urge arbitration, except by way of alternative submission of pending questions to an impartial court should a diplomatic arrangement not be feasible. These representations were made up of complaints and charges against the United States with imputation of violation of treaty and general bad faith. Colombia then insisted upon reparation being made by the Government of the United States. This is shown by the correspondence heretofore published.

As an element of the proposed negotiation for a conventional settlement a suggestion of arbitration was made which looked to "the settlement of the claims of a material order which either Colombia or Panama by mutual agreement may reasonably bring forward against the other as a consequence of facts preceding or following the declaration of independence of Panama." This proposition, as formulated, was favored by Secretary Hay, together with the proposal that a plebiscite should determine whether the people of the Isthmus preferred allegiance to the Republic of Panama or to the Republic of Colombia (Mr. Hay to Gen. Reyes, Jan. 13, 1904). Both these proposals were considered in the subsequent negotiations of the tripartite treaties, which aimed to settle all claims "of a material order" between Colombia and Panama and which were, in terms, largely responsive to the Colombian demands in this regard; but the only

subject to be submitted to arbitration under the abortive treaty between Colombia and Panama signed by Messrs. Cortes and Arosemena was the boundary line in the long-disputed district of Jurado. No provisions for a Panaman plebiscite appeared therein. Even that proposed alternative of arbitration thus disappeared when the parties to the controversy reached the conventional accord formulated in the tripartite treaties of January 9, 1909.

The negotiations of these treaties with the United States and Panama for the adjustment of all questions between the three parties were proposed by the Government of Colombia itself.

The negotiations stretched over a period of some three years, being interrupted from time to time by fresh demands on the part of Colombia and hampered in their course by what seemed a very inconsistent reversion of the Colombian plenipotentiaries of the time to attempt to create issues any bases for which had in effect been set aside by Colombia's own proposal to settle the material questions involved. On one occasion the obstructive tactics of the Colombian plenipotentiary were virtually disavowed by his recall and the substitution of another more in accord with the policies of his Government.

The issue had thus been early narrowed to the question of compensation for the losses and injuries pleaded by Colombia, and, it being undeniable that Colombia had suffered by failure to reap a share of the benefits of the canal, the Government of the United States was entirely willing to take this consideration into account, and to endeavor to accommodate the conflicting interests of the three parties by the conventional fixation of a just measure of compensation, in money or in material equivalence. Throughout the whole discussion the course of the United States was marked by kindly forbearance and equitable generosity. The result was the signature on January 9, 1909, of three treaties, one between the United States and the Republic of Colombia, one between the United States and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colombia and Panama, all three being interdependent, to stand or fall together. The treaties between the United States and the respective Republics of Colombia and of Panama received the advisory and consenting approval of the Senate on the respective dates of February 24 and March 3, 1909. That between Colombia and Panama was ratified by the Republic of Panama January 27, 1909, while the treaty with the United States was ratified by Panama three days later.

It seems unnecessary for the purposes of this report to narrate the elaborate negotiations which preceded the signature of the tripartite" treaties. The Senate, in executive session, was apprised of the processes by which the conventional results were reached and the nature of those results is made apparent by the text of the three instruments. That their provisions sought to deal, adequately, justly, and in the only practical manner so far suggested, with the international problems growing out of the secession of Panama and out of the assumption by the United States of the great work of constructing the canal, would appear to be evident to the unprejudiced mind. The interests and honor of the three countries were, throughout the negotiation, jealously guarded by their respective plenipotentiaries, and their agreement on all vital points was a confirmatory safeguard.

Nevertheless, negotiated as these treaties were at the instance of Colombia, and framed as they were with every desire to accommodate their terms to the just expectations of Colombia; and although they were accepted by the Colombian cabinet, which made repeated efforts to bring about conditions favorable to their approval by the Congress, the treaties still remain unacted upon.

It thus remained for the Colombian Government to hold up the treaties, to

propose the nullification of all the negotiations which had led up to their conclusion and which it had invited, and to suggest entrance upon new negotiations with the United States alone. This suggestion the United States then declined to accept, holding that the "tripartite" treaties must stand or fall together and that no such substitutionary arrangement could be considered without the harmonious agreement of all three parties. In the same attitude, the Colombian Government, without seeking the consent of the United States to enter, after these two rebuffs, upon a discussion of an entirely different character, sought to revert to its former proposal of some kind of settlement by arbitration.

The next proposal of Colombia, on January 5, 1910, was that the United States and Panama should agree to submit to a plebiscite the question of the separation of Panama with the promise that the interests of the United States in the Canal Zone should not be affected by the result. This proposal as made was considered intangible and impracticable, although, as late as March 26, 1910, it appears to have been the subject of an informal suggestion of the Colombian minister, coupled with the promise that if the vote should be unfavorable to the status of Panama the Government of Colombia would formally recognize the acts of Panama in the canal matter.

Again the suggestion of arbitration in somewhat more tangible form appears in the shape of a confidential memorandum, under date of November 30, 1910, expressing the view of Señor Olaya, the Colombian minister for foreign affairs, that, as the provision of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846 in regard to the guarantee by the United States of Colombian sovereignty over the territory of the Isthmus was differently interpreted by the two Governments, the question whether the acts of the United States on the Isthmus in 1903 were not in harmony with the engagements of Article XXXV, appeared to be a judicial issue proper for arbitral determination. This informal suggestion appeared to involve proposals already rejected by Secretaries Hay and Root. It did not, moreover, materialize in a shape admitting of discussion, and was lost to sight when, about the same time, a new turn was given to the matter by the suggestion of the Colombian foreign office that, with a few changes ("more apparent than real") the treaties might be approved. No tangible proposal was offered, however, as to the changes desired, although it was intimated in January, 1911, that they might import confirmation of Colombia's claim to the ownership of the Panama Railway and of alleged rights and interests in any canal contract or concession granted by Colombia. This intimation, like others put forward during 1910, never reached the stage of diplomatic discussion.

Still another phase supervened when, on March 28, in view of the statement alleged to have been made by ex-President Roosevelt in an address delivered at Berkeley, Cal., on March 23, to the effect that " he took the Canal Zone," the Colombian minister, Señor Borda, construing this reported utterance as an admission that his nation had been "gratuitously, profoundly, and unexpectedly offended and injured,” demanded that the dignity and honor of Colombia should "receive satisfaction." No diplomatic discussion of this incident ensued.

At the end of May, 1911, Señor Borda took leave of the President, and returned to Colombia, being replaced by Gen. Pedro Nel Ospina, who presented his credentials May 31, 1911.

No record exists of any effort by this new minister of Colombia to reach an understanding in regard to the Panama controversy or the tripartite treaties until his note of November 25, 1911. In that note he recited "the utter unlikelihood" of a diplomatic settlement of the Panaman issues; characterized the

attempt to regulate the situation by the direct agreement embodied in the tripartite treaties of 1909 as most unfortunate," owing to the adverse sentment of the Colombian people which had brought about the expatriation of the head of the Government and of the plenipotentiary (Señor Cortes) by whom they were signed; asserted that it had been demonstrated practically that the desired settlement of the existing differences could not be reached by direct agreement, and urged resort to the decision of an impartial tribunal as to the interpretation to be given to that part of the still existing treaty of 1846, by which the United States, in return for valuable concessions, assumed the obligations to guarantee to New Granada (now Colombia) "the rights of sovereignty and property which she has and possesses over the territory of the Isthmus of Panama."

In conformity with usage, it was to be expected that the envoy would follow up such a communication by seeking personal conference with the Secretary of State to clear the way for formal treatment of a proposal alike so important and so vaguely comprehensive. As a matter of course, and as a part of the public duty of his office, the Secretary of State was and is, at all times, ready to hold such conference with a foreign representative, knowing the advantage to both parties in such a case, of thoroughly understanding each other's views before their expression in official correspondence. Moreover, a just regard for the sensibilities of a nation with which this Government sincerely desires to maintain friendly intercourse naturally made the Secretary of State averse to making a categorical refusal of the proposition, while on the other hand the vagueness of the proposal, like the nature of some of its implications, forbade its academic discussion without a more distinct understanding of its true scope. Gen. Nel Ispina, however, held aloof from the Department of State.

Matters were in this posture when, on the eve of the departure of the Secretary of State on a mission of good will and earnest amity toward the several Republics of the Caribbean, a kindly personal intimation of the pleasure it would afford the Secretary to include Colombia in his itinerary was met by the assertion that such a visit would be "inopportune." Included in this reply to an urbane note were arguments and also accusations tending to impugn the honor and good faith of the United States. It is gratifying to know that this singular course of the minister was taken on his own initiative and was reprobated by his Government. The incident was not of international moment, but it was closed by the spontaneous recall of the envoy by his Government, leaving nothing in the path of that good understanding which this country desires to maintain with its fellow Republic.

It is thus seen that the request of Colombia for arbitration has only recently advanced from the status of a suggested contingent alternative, as a resort in case of failure to attain a diplomatic adjustment, to that of a request predicated on the impossibility of such a direct settlement, an impossibility, if it be one, only because of the act of the Colombian Government in twice repudiating settlements already agreed upon on two occasions by the procedure usual in the intercourse of nations.

It is also to be seen that, while the request takes the same form as the earlier suggested contingent alternative and appears to confine the subject matter of arbitration to ascertainment of the true intent of an isolated clause of Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846, a decision in that regard would revive the old charges and bring them into the arbitral proceedings.

It does not seem timely or pertinent to the purposes of this message to discuss these charges, which were exhausted in the correspondence of 1904 and