of the German Admiralty be put in force, it seems clear, afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens.

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that his Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality in the deceptive use of the United States flag in the sea area defined by the German declaration, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessel of a friendly power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

You will impress upon his Majesty's Government the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German Admiralty.

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to the German Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and citizens if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put into effect.

SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN NOTE TO GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY AND MAIN POINTS OF GERMANY'S REPLY. An American note to Great Britain and Germany expresses the hope that the belligerents may, by means of reciprocal concessions, discover a basis of understanding, the result of which would tend to free ships engaged in neutral and peaceful commerce from the serious dangers to which they are exposed in passing through the coastal waters of the belligerent countries.

This suggestion, the note proceeds to say, should not be considered as a proposal by the American Government, whom it naturally did not behoove to propose conditions for such an agreement, though the question at issue had a direct and far-reaching interest for the Government and people of the United States.

The note says the United States ventures solely to take a liberty which it is convinced can be conceded to a sincere friend who is actuated by a desire to cause inconvenience to neither of the two nations and possibly serve the_common interests of humanity.

The suggestion is made that Germany and Great Britain should agree, first, that isolated drifting mines should be laid by neither party, that anchored mines should be laid exclusively for defensive purposes within gun range of harbors, and that all mines should bear the mark of the Government of origin, and be so constructed as to become harmless after breaking loose from their anchorages.

It is suggested, second, that the submarines of neither of the two Governments should be employed to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except for the purpose of carrying out the right of holding them up and searching them; and, third, that mercantile ships of neither of the parties should employ neutral flags as a war ruse or for the purpose of concealing their identity.

Great Britain, it is suggested, should agree that foodstuffs should not be placed on the list of absolute contraband, and that the British authorities should neither disturb nor hold up cargoes of such goods, when addressed to agencies in Germany, the names of which are communicated by the United States Government, for the purpose of receiving such goods and handing them over to licensed German retailers for further distribution exclusively to the civil population.

Germany, it is contended, should declare her agreement that foodstuffs from the United States, or any other neutral country, should be addressed to such agencies.

Finally, the American Government says it wishes to safeguard itself against the idea that it either acknowledges or repudiates any right on the part of the belligerents or neutrals established on the principles of international law. The American Government would rather regard such an agreement as a modus vivendi, which is based more on suitableness than on legal right.

The German Reply.

The German reply to the note of the United States was dispatched shortly after the receipt of the American note. It begins as follows:

The German Government has taken note of the American suggestion with lively interest, and sees therein new proof of friendly feelings, which are fully reciprocated by Germany. The suggestion corresponds also to the German wishes that the naval war should be waged according to rules which, without subjecting one or the other belligerent Power to one-sided restrictions of methods of warfare, would take into consideration the interests of neutrals as well as the laws of humanity.

In this sense, the German note of February 16 already has pointed out that the observance of the London Declaration by Germany's enemies would create a new situation, from which Germany would gladly be prepared to draw conclusions.

Starting from this conception, the German Government has submitted the American suggestion to attentive examination, and believes that it can recognize therein an effectively suitable basis for a practical solution of the questions at issue.

On particular suggestions contained in the American note the following remarks are made:

Germany would be prepared to make the suggested declaration concerning the non-employment of drifting mines and the construction of anchored mines, and further agrees with the suggestion to attach a Government mark to any mines which may be laid. On the other hand, it appears to Germany not to be practicable for the belligerent powers fully to renounce the employment of anchored mines for offensive purpose.

Second-German submarines would employ force against mercantile vessels of whatsoever flag, only in so far as it is required for the purpose of carrying out the right to hold up and search. If the hostile nationality of a ship or the presence of contraband were proved, the submarines would proceed according to the general international rules..

Third-As the American note provides for the above-mentioned restriction in the employment of submarines, it follows that enemy mercantile vessels should abstain from the use of neutral flags and other neutral signs. In this conclusion it is obvious that hostile mercantile vessels should not be armed, and should refrain from offering violent resistance, since such conduct, which is opposed to international law, renders it impossible for submarines to proceed in accordance with international law.

Fourth-The regulation of the legitimate importation of food supplies to Germany, as suggested by the American Government, appears in general to be acceptable. This regulation would, of course, be restricted to importation by sea; but on the other hand, it would also include indirect importation via neutral ports.

Germany would, therefore, be prepared to make declarations such as are provided for in the American note, so that the employment of imported food supplies would be guaranteed to be exclusively for the peaceful civil population.

In this connection Germany must, however, emphasize that the importation also of other raw materials for peaceful economic purposes, and including fodder, should be made possible. For this purpose the hostile Governments would have to allow free passage to Germany of raw materials mentioned in the free list of the London Declaration, and to treat in the same manner as foodstuffs those materials contained in the list of conditional contraband.

The note concludes as follows:

The German Government hopes that the understanding suggested by the American Government will, regard being paid to the foregoing remarks, be realized, and that thereby peaceful neutral shipping and peaceful neutral commerce will not have more to suffer than is absolutely necessary from the effects of the naval warfare.

Such effects, moreover, would be substantially diminished if, as already pointed out in our note of February 16, means and ways could be found to exclude the importation of war material from neutral to belligerent States on ships of whatsoever flag.

The adoption of a definite attitude must, of course, be postponed until the German Government, on the basis of further communication from the American Government, is in a position to see what obligations the British Government, on its side, is prepared to assumę.

FULL TEXT OF IDENTIC NOTES SENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS PROTESTING AGAINST THE INVASION OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS INVOLVED IN A BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL ESTABLISHING A LONG-RANGE BLOCKADE OF EUROPEAN WATERS.

Washington, March 30, 1915.

The Secretary of State to the American Ambassador at London:

You are instructed to deliver the following to his Majesty's Government in reply to your numbers 1,795 and 1,798 of March 15: The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the subjects treated in the British notes of March 13 and March 15, and to the British Order in Council of the latter date.

These communications contain matters of grave importance to neutral nations. They appear to menace their rights of trade and intercourse, not only with belligerents but also with one another. They call for frank comment in order that misunderstandings may be avoided. The Government of the United States deems it its duty, therefore, speaking in the sincerest spirit of friendship, to make its own view and position with regard to them unmistakably clear.

The Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace.

The Government takes it for granted that there can be no question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is, of course, unlimited, and that sovereignty suffers no diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it, by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights, which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war.

A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right of capture and condemnation if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's government or armed forces.

It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts, and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service and to condemn them if the suspicion is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal quality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war.

It is confidently assumed that his Majesty's Government will not deny that it is a rule sanctioned by general practice that, even though a blockade should exist and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent shipments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory, without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition, or confiscation.

Moreover, the rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856-among them that free ships make free goods-will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn agreement.

His Majesty's Government, like the Government of the United States, have often and explicitly held that these rights represent the best usage of warfare in the dealings of belligerents with neutrals at sea. In this connection I desire to direct attention to the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Peterhof, which arose out of the Civil War, and to the fact that that opinion was unanimously sustained in the award of the Arbitration Commission of 1871, to which the case was presented at the request of Great Britain. From that time to the Declaration of London of 1909, adopted with

modifications by the Order in Council of the 23d of October last, these rights have not been seriously questioned by the British Government. And no claim on the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with the clear rights of the United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain, which would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn_obligations of this Government in the present circumstances. And for Great Britain to make such a claim would be for her to abandon and set at naught the principles for which she has consistently and earnestly contended in other times and circumstances.

The note of his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which accompanies the Order in Council, and which bears the same date, notifies the Government of the United States of the establishment of a blockade which is, if defined by the terms of the Order in Council, to include all the coasts and ports of Germany and every port of possible access to enemy territory. But the novel and quite unprecedented feature of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties.

It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral power on the seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with.

The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old form of "close" blockade, with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines and air craft; but it can hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the established rules of war. If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or country it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports, by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon.

This traffic would, of course, include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country, except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade, since the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either entering or leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing.

The Government of the United States notes that in the Order in Council his Majesty's Government gives as their reason for entering upon a course of action, which they are aware is without precedent in modern warfare, the necessity they conceive themselves to have been placed under to retaliate upon their enemies for measures of a similar nature, which the latter have announced it their intention to adopt and which they have to some extent adopted, but the Government of the United States, recalling the principles upon which his Majesty's Government have hitherto been scrupulous to act, interprets this as merely a reason for certain extraordinary activities on the part of his Majesty's naval forces and not as an excuse for or prelude to any unlawful action. If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened nations, it cannot be supposed, and this Government does not for a moment suppose, that his Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on their part in so far as they affect neutral rights.

It is thus that the Government of the United States interprets the language of the note of his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

which accompanies the copy of the Order in Council, which was handed to the Ambassador of the United States by the Government in London and by him transmitted to Washington.

This Government notes with gratification that "wide discretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may in the circumstances be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under the order." That "the effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon executive officers of his Majesty's Government," and that "the extent to which these powers will be actually exercised, and the degree of severity with which the measure of blockade authorized will be put into operation, are matters which will depend on the administrative orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities especially charged with the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes, according to the merits of each case.'

The Government further notes with equal satisfaction the declaration of the British Government that "the instructions to be issued by his Majesty's Govern. ment to the fleet and to the customs officials and executive committees concerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with that object, which is succinctly stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany.

In view of these assurances formally given to this Government it is confidently expected that the extensive powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive officers of the crown will be restricted by orders issued by the Government, directing the exercise of their discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in practical application those provisions of the Order in Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his Majesty's Government, the United States takes it for granted that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order in Council will not be interfered with when it is known that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war, or goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected.

The Government of the United States assumes with the greater confidence that his Majesty's Government will thus adjust their practice to the recognized rules of international law, because it is manifest that the British Government have adopted an extraordinary method of "stopping cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory," which, owing to the existence of unusual conditions in modern warfare at sea, it will be difficult to restrict to the limits which have been heretofore required by the law of nations. Though the area of operations is confined to "European waters including the Mediterranean," so great an area of the high seas is covered, and the cordon of ships is so distant from the territory affected that neutral vessels must necessarily pass through the blockading force in order to reach important ncutral ports which Great Britain, as a belligerent, has not the legal right to blockade, and which, therefore, it is presumed she has no intention of claiming to blockade.

The Scandinavian and Danish ports, for example, are open to American trade. They are also free, so far as the actual enforcement of the Order in Council is concerned, to carry on trade with German Baltic ports, although it is an essential element of blockade that it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals.

This Government, therefore, infers that the commanders of his Majesty's ships of war, engaged in maintaining the so-called blockade, will be instructed to avoid an enforcement of the proposed measures of non-intercourse in such a way as to impose restrictions upon neutral trade more burdensome than those which have been regarded as inevitable, when the ports of a belligerent are actually blockaded by the ships of its enemy.

The possibilities of serious interruption of American trade under the Order in Council are so many, and the methods proposed are so unusual, and seem liable to constitute so great an impediment and embarrassment to neutral commerce, that the Government of the United States, if the Order in Council is strictly enforced, apprehends many interferences with its legitimate trade which will impose upon his Majesty's Government heavy responsibilities for acts