It is to be hoped, that these historical students will know, that the alleged causes of the war were the orders in council and impressment; that the former were in fact repealed six days after the declaration of war; that Mr. Madison refused an armistice proposed by admiral Berkeley, after he knew of the repeal; that he carried on a war, much more against his own country, in effect, than against the enemy, for two years, to maintain the principle of protecting all who sail under the American merchant flag; a principle which he well knew England would concede, as soon as Mr. Jefferson could leave his "clover fields" to have the pleasure of dining with Mons. Le General Pichegru in London, (see his 3d vol. p. 314,) and not a moment sooner.

It will not be overlooked either, that the diplomatic instructions to the peace-makers gradually declined from a high tone of demand, to the simple command Make peace at all events. Peace was made; and nothing else was made, during the two years that preceded it, but distress, calamity, and debt, excepting that there was proof enough made, that Americans can fight, when they are properly called on to engage in that business. The matter of English impressment remains just where it was, when the national government was instituted, excepting only, that it may be somewhat the worse for the war.

The concerns of this world are too insignificant, in the view of any rational man, to be intentionally misrepresented, when all his connexion with them is soon to end. If any injustice has been done to Mr. Madison in these remarks, it is not intended. He was Mr. Jefferson's friend and associate, in their joint views of federalism. If, in defending the fame of men as honest, as wise, and patriotic, as either Mr. Madison, or Mr. Jefferson, will hereafter be considered to have been, some painful truths must be asserted, it is the necessity of the case, and not the gratification of any unworthy feeling, that calls for them. The people of this country are deeply interested to know what sort of public agents and servants, in high places, they have had, that they may make their own comparisons, and judge correctly of present and of future ones, as they successively arise.

LETTER LXVIII.

JANUARY 27, 1834.

THE Convention was in ́session from the 15th of December, 1814, to the 5th of January following. It sat with closed doors, and no information was given, by any of its members, while sitting, of the measures which were discussed. This secrecy was construed to mean, most treasonable designs, and all the friends of the administration were industrious to have the matter so understood. To the opponents of the administration, who knew the men there assembled, and knew also, that they could listen to no counsels, nor propose, nor adopt any measures inconsistent with duty, self-respect, and sober wisdom, the secrecy was in no wise alarming, but, on the contrary, satisfying and consolatory.

The only measure, which the legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut thought it necessary immediately to adopt, on receiving the report of the convention, was to send commissioners to Washington. Harrison G. Otis,

Thomas H. Perkins, and William Sullivan were sent from Massachusetts; Nathaniel Terry and Calvin Goddard from Connecticut. The nature of their duties and, in effect, the whole mischief of the Hartford Convention may be truly understood by this extract from the commission :

"To make earnest and respectful application to the gov"ernment of the United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement whereby the state of Massachusetts, separately, or in concert with neighbouring states, may be "enabled to assume the defence of their territories against "the enemy; and that to this end a reasonable portion of "the taxes, collected within said states, may be paid into the "respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the pay"ment of the balance due to the said states and to the "future defence of the same; the amount so paid into the "treasuries to be credited, and the disbursements so made "to be charged to the United States." The commissioners were further required, "to consult with and to solicit the "assistance and co-operation of the senators and representa"tives of this Commonwealth in the Congress of the United "States."

This commision was dated the 31st of January, 1815. The commissioners had just arrived at Washington about the middle of February, when the news of peace was received at that place. The joy was universal and unalloyed; and if greater among any one class than another, it was so among administration men, who saw before them not only peace, but the prospect of retaining their power.

In proof of the propriety of the measures adopted by New England, and of the desperate condition in which the administration found itself, it should be added, that a bill had been introduced, at the session of the existing Congress, to authorize the several states to take measures to DEFEND themselves. This was the principle object of the Hartford Convention. As the conscription had been defeated, there is little doubt, that such authority would have been given to the states, if the war had continued.

So general and heartfelt was the joy at being at peace again, that celebrations were had in all the cities, in which both sexes, all ages, and all parties united with the strongest enthusiasm. There were splendid processions, bonfires, and illuminations, as though the independence of the country had been a second time achieved.

There was too universal and too sincere a joy, on the restoration of peace, to allow of comment on Mr. Madison's self-congratulatory address to Congress, announcing the treaty, concluded at Ghent on the 24th of December, 1814, by Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, John Q. Adams, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell, on the part of the United States, and Lord Gambier, Henry Gouldburn, and William Adams, on the part of England.

On this occasion Mr. Madison said, among other things, "I lay before Congress the treaty, &c.; while performing "this act, I congratulate you and our constituents upon an " event which is highly honorable to the nation, and ter"minates, with peculiar felicity, a campaign signalized with "the most brilliant successes.

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"The late war, although reluctantly declared by Congress, had become a necessary resort, to assert the rights "and independence of the nation. It has been waged with a success, which is the natural result of the wisdom of the "legislative counsels, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the valor of the military

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"and naval forces of the country. Peace, at all times a "blessing, is peculiarly welcome, therefore, at a period "when the causes of the war have ceased to operate, "when the government has demonstrated the efficiency "of its powers of DEFENCE, and when the nation can "review its conduct without regret and without reproach."

It would not be difficult to make a version of this congratulatory message, partaking, at the same time, of the serious and the ludicrous. But the high esteem and respect, in which Mr. Madison is held by most of his countrymen, are a very sufficient reason for not doing it. In truth, the main object of these pages (as has been more than once acknowledged) is to weigh the worth of Mr. Jefferson's evidence against a numerous body of his fellow citizens, a purpose not to be effected without investigating his own worth and the value of his services. No such motive is felt towards Mr. Madison, who has not appeared as a calumniator of his fellow citizens, except in a single instance. How Mr. Madison could have conceived the American public would credit that purchased renegado, John Henry; and what Mr. Madison saw in that man's disclosures, which warranted him to proclaim the existence of crimes, which, if real, would have deserved a halter, we leave to Mr. Madison to explain. He included in his comprehensive denunciation many men as honorable, as wise, and as patriotic as any discerning and impartial historian will consider him to have been. With this exception, we know not, that Mr. Madison departed from the dignity implied in being the President of a whole people, by stooping to traduce and vilify a portion of them. Mr. Jefferson stands in a very different light in this sort of odious offence. He not only descended to the lowest calumnies in his life time, but provided for the republication of them when, he knew, that he could not be called to account.

If Mr. Madison had not been so intimately associated with all Mr. Jefferson's public policy, as to identify his own therewith, the present might not be a proper occasion for even adverting to the talents and integrity of Mr. Madison, as a statesman. We should have left this gentleman to be dealt with in the tribunal of history. Nor is it now expedient to do more, than suggest the questions to which some future historian may think it his duty to furnish the proper

answers.

1. Why did Mr. Madison, after having been among the ablest of the able men who framed the federal constitution; after having been the associate of Jay and Hamilton in commending it to public favor; and after faithfully advocating its adoption by the Convention of Virginia, become the leader of opposition to the administration of that very system under Washington?

2. Why did Mr. Madison frame and present his famous resolutions in January 1794, based on Mr. Jefferson's commercial report, designed to hamper the commerce of this country with one nation, and to restrict it to a disadvantageous intercourse with another?

3. Did, or did not, Mr. Madison, under the seductive and persuasive influences of Mr. Jefferson, desire to see this country depart from neutrality, and engage in the wars of Europe on the side of the French republic?

4. Did Mr. Madison know and approve of the investigation, instituted by Giles, Monroe, and Venables, into the official conduct of his former associate, Hamilton?

5. Did Mr. Madison know and approve of his friend Jef ferson's patronage of Jacobin clubs; and of his nullifying doctrines expressed in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798?

6. Was Mr. Madison the friend and counsellor of Thomas Jefferson, (when Secretary of State from March, 1801, to March, 1809,) and did he approve of all that Mr. Jefferson did as President in these eight years? Did he advise to the exercise of executive power, to convert the government into an exclusive party machinery; -to diminish the judicial power; to substitute gun boats for a navy; to the purchase of Louisiana? Was fear of or favor to Napoleon, among the motives?—to the gift of two millions to Napoleon; to the course of restrictions on commerce, and to its annihilation by embargo; and to the tyranny of the enforcing law?

7. Why did Mr. Madison plunge this country into war, when he knew it to be wholly unprepared for an appeal to arms?

8. Why did he refuse an armistice, when the cost and calamities of war could have been thereby prevented?

9. Why did he persevere in the war after the pacification in Europe of 1814? was it to settle, by war, the question of