and to bring the case within the ruling in Gibbons v. Wilson, 17 A. R. 1.

Held, that all the circumstances, necessarily known to his solicitor in the transaction of the business, must be assumed to have been known to the mortgagee, and the whole affair considered as one transaction contrived to evade the consequences of illegally preferring a particular creditor over others, and that, under the circumstances, the advance made was not a bona fide payment of money within the meaning of the statutory exceptions.

Judgment of the Court below reversed.

Gibbons, Q.C., for the appellants.

Ritchie, Q.C., for the respondent Wilson.

J. J. Scott, for the respondents the W. E. Sanford Manufacturing Company.

In re CENTRAL BANK OF CANADA.

HOGABOOM'S CASE.

Winding-up Act--Moneys paid out of Court-Order made by inadvertenceJurisdiction to compel repayment-R. S. C. c. 129, ss. 40, 41, 94— Locus standi of Receiver-General-55 & 56 V. c. 28, s. 2-Construction of. The liquidators of an insolvent bank passed their final accounts, and paid into Court a balance remaining in their hands. It appeared that by orders, issued either through error or by inadvertence, the balance so deposited had been paid out to a person who was not entitled to receive the money, and the Receiver-General for Canada, as trustee of the residue, intervened and applied for an order to have the money repaid in order to be disposed of under the provisions of the Winding-up Act.

Held, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 24 A. R. 470, 17 Occ. N. 281, that the ReceiverGeneral was entitled so to intervene, although the three years from the date of the deposit mentioned in the Winding-up Act had not expired.

Held, also, that, even if he was not so entitled to intervene, the provincial Courts had jurisdiction to compel repayment into Court of moneys improperly paid out.

S. H. Blake, Q.C., and W. R. Smyth, for the appellants. Newcombe, Q.C., and F. E. Hodgins, for the ReceiverGeneral.

McCarthy, Q.C., for the liquidator.

QUEBEC.]

[16TH FEBRUARY, 1898.

PERRAULT v. GAUTHIER.

Trade union-Combination in restraint of trade-Preventing non-union workmen from obtaining employment—Action for damages.

Workmen, who, in carrying out the regulations of a trade union forbidding them to work at a trade in company with. non-union workmen, without threats, violence, intimidation, or other illegal means, take such measures as result in preventing a non-union workman from obtaining employment at his trade in establishments where union workmen are engaged, do not thereby incur liability to an action for damages.

Judgment of the Court below affirmed.

Lafleur and Lanctot, for the appellant.
Geoffrion, Q.C., for the respondent.

[26TH FEBRUARY, 1898.

MACDONALD v. GALIVAN.

Appeal-Jurisdiction--Amount in controversy-Monthly allowance-Future rights" Other matters and things"-R. S. C. c. 135, s. 29 (b)--56 V. c. 29-Established jurisprudence in Court below.

In an action en declaration de paternit the plaintiff claimed an allowance of $15 per month until the child, then aged four years and nine months, should attain the age of ten years, and for an allowance of $20 per month thereafter "until such time as the child should be able to support and provide for himself." The Court below, following the decision in Lizotte v. Descheneau, 6 Legal News 107, held that,

under ordinary circumstances, such an allowance would cease at the age of fourteen years.

Held, that the demande must be understood to be for allowances only up to the time the child should attain the age of fourteen years, and no further, so that, apart from the contingent character of the claim, the demande was for less than the sum or value of $2,000, and consequently the case was appealable under the provisions of s. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act; and that, even if an amount or value of more than $2,000 might become involved, under certain contingencies, as a consequence of the judgment of the Court below, no appeal would lie.

Rodier v. Lapierre, 21 S. C. R. 69, followed.

Held, also, that the nature of the action and demande did not bring the case within the exception as to "future rights" mentioned in the section of the Act above referred to.

O'Dell v. Gregory, 24 S. C. R. 661, followed.

Appeal quashed with costs.

A. R. Hall and Smith, for the motion.

St. Pierre, Q.C., contra.

Chose in action-Assignment of-Novation-Set-off.

A firm of G. & P., which had contracted with the defendants to supply them with a number of bicycles, was subsequently dissolved, G. retiring, and S. taking his place. The

notice of dissolution stated that the business would be carried on by S. & P., who would pay the indebtedness of the firm, and who were alone authorized to collect its debts, and, by the agreement of dissolution, the partners released each other from all liability, and it was agreed that all the claims of the firm belonged to and would be collected by S. & P. as the owners thereof. The defendants wrote to the new firm notifying them of the contracts they had made with the firm before dissolution, on which they said they had a large claim for damages for non-fulfilment, and trusted the new firm had made this a consideration in the change of the firm; that they were ready at any time to settle up their account, but must first have a settlement of their claim for damages. The plaintiffs, in answer, disputed the defendants' claim for damages, but not on the ground that they, the plaintiffs, had not undertaken to pay the liabilities of the old firm.

Held, that what took place constituted a novation, and the defendants were therefore entitled to claim against the plaintiffs the damages which the defendants had sustained. through the breach of the contract; but that such damages must be limited to the damages arising from breaches occurring prior to the dissolution.

Judgment of ARMOUR, C.J., 27 O. R. 631, 16 Occ. N. 264,

varied.

Aylesworth, Q.C., and Hume Cronyn, for the appellants. II. D. Gamble and Hellmuth, for the respondents.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

[ARMOUR, C.J., FALCONBRIDGE, J., STREET, J., 29TH APRIL, 1898. In re REGINA ex rel. HALL v. GOWANLOCK. Prohibition-County Court Judge-Municipal election inquiry― Municipal Act, s. 220, 8.-s. 4; s. 227-Proceedings by two relators-Duty of Judge as to second proceeding-Collusion-Jurisdiction.

An appeal by the relator from the order of FERGUSON, J., ante 184, prohibiting the senior Judge of the County Court of York from further proceeding to try the validity of the

election of the respondent as an alderman for the city of Toronto, on the ground that prior proceedings had been taken before the Master in Chambers, upon the relation of one Winton, to try the validity of the same election, and that, under s. 227 of the Municipal Act, it was the duty of the County Court Judge to make the second motion returnable before the Master.

Held, STREET, J., dissenting, that s. 220, s.-s. 4, of the Act having given to the County Court Judge, the Master in Chambers, and a Judge of the High Court equal jurisdiction and authority in respect of these matters, no one of them had power to prohibit another; also, that there was no such want of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction in the County Court Judge as warranted an order of prohibition or injunction. The County Court Judge had jurisdiction to grant a fiat, as he did, for the initiation of proceedings by the relator Hall, and upon the return he had jurisdiction to inquire whether there was a previous motion and before whom it was returnable, and whether it was a real motion or a pretended and a collusive one; if it was the latter, it was no motion at all, and was not made to try the validity of the election.

At most, what was done by the County Court Judge was but error in procedure, and not the subject of prohibition or injunction. The respondent's proper method of proceeding was by a motion before the County Court Judge calling upon both relators to show cause why the second motion should not be made returnable before the Master, upon which motion the question of collusion might have been tried; and this course was still open to the respondent.

Per STREET, J., dissenting:-There is no power in the High Court to prohibit. The absolute duty of the County Court Judge was to make the second motion returnable before the Master; and he had no power to enter upon the question of collusion. The order should not, however, have done more than prohibit the Judge from trying the matter. Decision of FERGUSON, J., reversed.

DuVernet and S. B. Woods, for the appellant.

Marsh, Q.C., and G. G. S. Lindsey, for the respondent.