the separate use of the property, to which she was entitled under the Married Women's Act in force at the date of the marriage, 1894, ceased, by her death in 1896.

W. H. Irving, for the plaintiffs.

C. A. Ghent, for the defendant.

[ARMOUR, C.J., 2ND JUNE, 1898.

MANNING v. ROBINSON.

Will-Construction-Gift to charities-Validity-Legacies-Deduction of legacy duty-" Protestant charitable institutions."

On motion for judgment on the pleadings in an action for construction of the will of James Robinson, deceased:

Held, that the gift of the residue to the executors to be distributed among such Protestant charitable institutions as my said executors and trustees may deem proper and advisable, and in such proportions as they

nay deem proper," was a valid gift, having regard especially to s. 8 of 55 V. c. 20, R. S. O. c. 112, the provision in force at the time of the testator's death in 1895.

Held, also, that the legacy duty payable to the Government was to be deducted from the legacies and should not be paid out of the residue, and the plaintiffs had no discretion to pay such duty out of the residue: Kennedy v. Protestant Orphans' Home, 25 O. R. 235.

Held, also, that the House of Refuge for the Poor of the County of Peel was not within the terms of the residuary gift. The word "Protestant," as used in the will, was referable as well to the objects of the charitable 'institutions as to their government; and "Protestant charitable institutions" are such charitable institutions as are managed and controlled exclusively by Protestants, and are designed for the bestowal of charity upon Protestants alone.

Justin, for the plaintiffs.

Hollis, for the defendant Robinson.

J. R. Cartwright, Q.C., for the Attorney-General for On

tario.

[ROSE, J., 25TH APRIL, 1898.

MALCOLM v. PERTH MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE

COMPANY.

Malicious prosecution-Finding of jury-Reasonable and probable cause— Bona fides-Malice.

In an action for malicious prosecution brought against an insurance company by reason of its laying an information. charging the plaintiff with arson, and causing his arrest thereon, the jury found that the company's officers, who laid the charge, believed it to be true; but that such belief was not under the circumstances reasonable, and that they did not act on it in laying the charge and causing the arrest, but that they were actuated by other and improper motives.

Held, that the first finding, being a finding that the defendants acted on their honest belief, and the evidence warranting that finding, absence of reasonable and probable cause could not be held to have been shown simply because further inquiries might have been made and further facts shown; that the question of malice was of no importance; and the defendants were entitled to judgment.

Brewster and G. D. Heyd, for the plaintiff.
J. P. Mabee, for the defendants.

[26TH MAY, 1898.

SCOTTISH ONTARIO AND MANITOBA LAND CO. v. CITY OF TORONTO.

DEFOE v. CITY OF TORONTO.

Municipal corporations-Waterworks-Supply of water-Statutory obligation -Breach of contract.

In actions by consumers of water against a municipal corporation for not providing a proper supply of pure water for the plaintiffs' elevators according to agreement, and for negligently and knowingly allowing the water supplied by them to become impregnated with sand, which greatly damaged the elevators:

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Held, that there was no right of action in the plaintiffs by reason of any statutory obligation on the part of the defendants.

2. That, on the evidence, there was no contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants by which the latter were bound to supply the former with water free from sand.

The relation was rather that of licensor and licensee than one founded upon contract.

Ritchie, Q.C., and II. M. Mowat, for the plaintiff company.
Walter Read, for the plaintiff Defoe.

Robinson, Q.C., and Fullerton, Q.C., for the defendants.

[STREET, J., 14TH MAY, 1898.

BAKER v. TRUSTS AND GUARANTEE CO.

Bond--Condition-Penalty-Maintenance-Lien on land-Enforcement

Registration.

The plaintiff sold her share in her father's real estate to her brother, and accepted in payment a bond from him in the penal sum of $400 conditioned for her maintenance and support, and giving her a lien on the land, which bond was registered.

In an action brought after her brother's death against subsequent mortgagees of the land to establish and enforce a lien for her maintenance:

Ield, that she was not limited to the amount of the penalty in the bond, but had the right to sue for her support as it accrued from time to time, and that the registration of the bond gave her a lien on the land as against the defendants.

R. Smith and George H. Pettit, for the plaintiff.
Leitch, Q.C., for the defendants.

[26TH MAY, 1898.

BROCK v. BENNESS.

Limitation of actions-Infant heir-at-law-Entry-Evidence of leaseEstoppel-Adverse title - Overholding lessees-Tenants in common.

In an action of ejectment, it appeared that the father of the defendant died intestate in 1849, the owner of the fee in and in possession of the lands in question. He had been twice married, but none of the children of his first marriage had been heard of since 1853. His widow continued in possession after his death with her children; she married again. in 1852, and her husband lived with her upon the land until her death intestate in 1871. At this time her husband and the youngest daughter of her first marriage, the defendant, were the only members of the family upon the land. Soon after her death, her eldest son made a lease of the land to his stepfather and his sister, the defendant, for five years from the 1st November, 1871, at the yearly rent of one dollar. In this lease, which was executed by the lessees, the lessor was described as the eldest son and heir at law of his father, the original owner. This lease was never renewed, and no evidence was given of the payment of any rent under it, but the lessees remained together in possession of the property, without acknowledgment or interruption, until 1892, when the stepfather died intestate, leaving a son, one of the plaintiffs, surviving him, and since that time the defendant had been in possession, also without acknowledgment or interruption, until this action was brought in 1897, by the surviving brother and sister of the defendant and her half-brother. The lessor had died in 1878; it was said that he left one son, who, when very young, in 1880, was taken by his aunt, one of the plaintiffs, to the house upon the land, where he stayed one night; and the aunt said that she told her sister, the defendant, that he was the heir to the property.

Held, that, even if the boy were the true owner, this was not an entry upon the land, as owner, sufficient to stop the running of the statute.

2. The defendant and her stepfather, being in possession without any title, and accepting a lease from the eldest son of the second marriage, as the heir-at-law, were estopped from

setting up the adverse title of the real heir-at-law, the eldest son of the first marriage, as against the lessor or persons claiming under him.

3. The plaintiffs' claim to possession under conveyance from the alleged heir-at-law of the lessor could not be allowed, because there was no evidence that he was the heir-atlaw, and because his title, if he had any, had been barred by the possession of the defendant and her stepfather since 1876, when the lease expired.

4. The title acquired by the defendant and her stepfather by length of possession was acquired by them as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants, and therefore, upon the death of the latter, his undivided half descended to his son.

Ward v. Ward, L. R. 6 Ch. 789, distinguished.
T. H. Luscombe, for the plaintiffs.

Talbot Macbeth, for the defendant.

NOVA SCOTIA.

En the Supreme Court.

[THE JUDGES IN BANC, 28RD MARCH, 1898. McISAAC v. BROAD COVE COAL COMPANY AND HUSSEY.

Pleading-Statement of claim-Late delivery-Irregularity-Motion.

The defendants appeared in the action, and demanded delivery of a statement of claim. After the time for such delivery had expired, the plaintiff delivered a statement of claim. The defendants moved at Chambers to strike it out, on the ground that it was delivered too late, and Judge at Chambers ordered it to be struck out.

Held, on appeal, that the defendant not having moved to dismiss the action for want of prosceution before the state