Held, that the provisions made for notice in s.-s. 1 of s. 531 of the Municipal Act, 1892, as amended, are applicable only to cases of actions brought against a township, city, town, or incorporated village, alone, and not to cases of actions brought against two or more of them. Sub-section 7 of s. 531 was passed to meet the injustice resulting from the law not allowing contribution between co-tort-feasors-see Sombra v. Moore, 19 A. R. 144-and in the case of two or more municipalities jointly liable for the keeping in repair of a public road, street, bridge, or highway, it provides that there shall be contribution between them as to the damages sustained by any person by reason of their default in keeping the same in repair. This right to contribution is an absolute right given by the statute, and is not limited to the case of an action having been brought by a person who has sustained damages by reason of their default, for the proportion which each is to bear is to be settled either in the action or otherwise, and the claim of the person who has sustained damages might be settled without suit, and still the right to contribution exist. It was no defence for the township, which received due notice, that the village had not received due notice, for the right to contribution of the township from the village did not depend upon such notice having been given to the village, but existed independently of it. The cause of action is still a several one as regards each corporation, although the statute requires that both shall be joined in the action; and although the plaintiff might have failed against the village by reason of want of notice, he might still be entitled, notwithstanding such failure against the village, to recover against the township, which had due notice.

Order made setting aside nonsuit and directing a new trial. Costs of the last trial and of this motion to be paid by the defendants.

Hilliard, for the plaintiff.

W. Johnston, for the defendants.

[MEREDITH, C.J., ROSE, J., MACMAHON, J., 20TH NOVEMBER, 1897. HEATON v. FLOOD.

Chattel mortgage-Omission to renew-Mortgagee taking possession—Sufficiency of Seizure by execution creditor-57 V. c. 37, ss. 38, 40.

A mortgagee, having omitted to renew a chattel mortgage,

issued and delivered to his bailiff, after the time limited for such renewal, a warrant directing the seizure of the goods, which the bailiff accordingly seized, but left them in the possession of the mortgagor's son, who resided with his father on the premises, and his son-in-law, who resided on the adjoining premises, taking from them an instrument, under seal, whereby they acknowledged that they had received the goods, and undertook to deliver them to the bailiff, when demanded. Subsequently the sheriff, at the suit of a creditor who had obtained execution against the mortgagor's goods, seized the goods in question.

Held, that to make the possession effective, there must be an actual and continued change of possession, and that what took place did not constitute such a possession.

Quare, whether, in any event, the taking of possession, after the time for renewal had expired, could validate the mortgage. A creditor, prior to the placing of his execution in the sheriff's hands, has no locus standi to attack a mortgage.

Clarkson v. McMaster, 25 S. C. R. 96, commented on. Sections 38 and 40 of 57 V. c. 37 do not apply to a case of this kind.

M. Wilson, Q.C., for the plaintiffs.
F. A. Anglin, for the defendants.

BROCK v. TEW.

[13TH DECEMBER, 1897.

Fleading-Embarrassment-Prolixity-Tendering issue- Striking out.

An appeal by the defendant in two actions brought by the same plaintiffs, in respect of different estates assigned for the benefit of creditors to the defendant, from an order of FALCONBRIDGE, J., in Chambers, affirming an order of the Master in Chambers striking out the 10th and 11th paragraphs of the statement of defence. The actions were brought by creditors against the assignee for an account and to obtain dividends upon the estates. The two paragraphs in question set up that the defendant had offered to pay dividends upon certain terms, and set out at great length the correspondence and disputes between the solicitors in relation to such terms.

R. McKay, for the defendant, cited Stratford Gas Co. v. Gordon, 14 P. R. 407, and Bank of Hamilton v. George, 16 P. R. 418.

H. Cassels, for the plaintiffs, contra.

THE COURT held that the paragraphs in question tendered no issue, and that prolix pleading of this kind should be discouraged.

Appeal dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs in any event.

[14TH DECEMBER, 1897.

CONNOLLY v. DOWD.

Discovery-Examination of party-Residence out of jurisdiction—Subpœna -Special order.

An appeal by the plaintiff from an order of FALCONBRIDGE, J., in Chambers, affirming an order of the Master in Chambers requiring the plaintiff to attend, at his own expense, for examination for discovery pursuant to a subpoena and appointment served upon him at Toronto for his examination there, he being only temporarily in Toronto when served, his residence being out of the jurisdiction, and he having failed to attend for examination pursuant to the subpoena and appointment.

D. Armour, for the plaintiff, contended that he could not be required to attend upon payment of ordinary conduct money or without a special order, the Rules only providing for the examination at Toronto of parties resident in the county of York.

J. M. Clark, for the defendant Dowd, contra.

Held, that, owing to the changes in the Rules since Comstock v. Harris, 12 P. R. 17, that case is no longer an authority, and a party residing out of the jurisdiction cannot now be examined. in the way that was attempted here: Rules 439, 443, 477.

Appeal allowed with costs to the plaintiff here and below in any event.

MALONE v. MUNDY.

Parties-Action to set aside fraudulent conveyance-Simple contract creditor -Decease of debtor-No representation of estate-Debt barred by Statute of Limitations.

An appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of ARMOUR, C.J., dismissing the action, which was brought to set aside a conveyance of land to the defendant, made by his wife, since deceased, as fraudulent and void against the plaintiff, who alleged that he was a creditor of the wife in respect of a bill of costs. was no personal representative of the wife before the Court.

There

The appeal was dismissed with costs, the Court holding that, even assuming the action was properly framed, it would be useless to set aside the conveyance unless the plaintiff could establish his debt, which appeared to be barred by the Statute of Limitations; and Rose and MACMAHON, JJ., being of opinion that the action was not properly framed, approving Gibbons v. Darvill, 12 P. R. 478.

W. L. Ross, for the plaintiff.
T. F. Lyall, for the defendant.

[16TH DECEMBER, 1897.

REGINA v. WALSH.

Liquor License Act-R. S. O. c. 194, s. 54—“ Sale or other disposal ”—Gift -Construction of statute-Summary conviction.

Motion to quash a summary conviction of the defendant by the police magistrate for the city of Ottawa for "disposing of " intoxicating liquor upon the defendant's licensed premises during prohibited hours. The question raised was whether under s. 54 of the Liquor License Act, R. S. O. c. 194, upon the facts found by the magistrate, there was an offence at all. The magistrate found that the defendant gave the liquor away to friends in his hotel on a Sunday; that there was no sale or disposal in the nature of a sale, and no request from the persons to whom it was given. The defendant contended that the words of the section" sale or other disposal" did not include such a gift.

THE COURT held that the word "disposal

was to be taken "sale," which

in its natural sense, uncontrolled by the word preceded it, and so taken was wide enough to include a gift. The object of the enactment was to keep licensed premises closed in certain hours, to forbid any intoxicating liquor being poured out in such hours. The provisions of ss. 57 and 59 of the Act, with regard to liquor on polling days and liquor on boats, were in pari materia, and a construction must necessarily be put upon those sections which would forbid the giving away of liquor on polling days or on ships.

MEREDITH, C.J., called attention to the word "other preceding "disposal" in s. 54, which implied that the disposal must be something different from a sale.

ROSE, J., referred to Maxwell on Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 413, as to the rule of construction, and to State of Minnesota v. Depsting, 33 Minn. 102, as a case very similar to this.

Motion dismissed with costs.

Haverson, for the defendant.
Langton, Q.C., for the Crown.

[BOYD, C., FERGUSON, J., ROBERTSON, J., 18TH DECEMBER, 1897. LEA v. LANG.

Security for costs-Order for-Application to set aside-Terms-Payment of costs-Form of order-Dismissal of action.

An appeal by the plaintiff from an order requiring him to give security for costs, upon the ground that the costs of a former action brought by plaintiff against defendant for the same cause were unpaid, was dismissed by a Judge in Chambers, and a further appeal by a Divisional Court, which held, 17 P. R. 203, that the plaintiff could not answer the application for security by showing that the former action was brought without his authority. The costs of the appeals were made payable to the defendant in any event. The plaintiff, upon application in the former action, then had the judgment for costs against him therein set aside, upon the ground that the action was brought without his authority; and afterwards applied to set aside the order for security for costs.