nations by compelling compliance with the decisions of a tribunal by diplomatic, economic or military pressure. Nor, on the other hand, does it imply any such action, or interfere with the independence or sovereignty of states except in this one respect, that it would prohibit any member, before submitting its claims to arbitration, from making war upon another on pain of finding itself at war with all the rest. The proposal is only a suggestion, defective probably, crude certainly, but if, in spite of that, it is the most promising plan for maintaining peace now brought forward, it merits sympathetic consideration both here and abroad. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE BY GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON THERE have been some arguments against the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. One of the most frequently advanced of these arguments is that the carrying out of the platform of the league would violate the so-called Monroe Doctrine. These words, the Monroe Doctrine, have been used to designate or to conceal such a variety of ideas and practices that it is necessary to start with some premise as to what the Monroe Doctrine may be. If the Monroe Doctrine is, as Professor Bingham says, an "obsolete shibboleth," it is clear that the relation of the platform of the league to the content of the doctrine would be one of historical and speculative interest only. If on the other hand it is, as M. Pétin says, the substitution by the United States of an "American law for the general law of nations," the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the platform of the league would be a fundamental question. If the Monroe Doctrine is an assertion of the "supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere" or "supremacy in political leadership," there would also be reason for careful deliberation. 1 This paper, by the Professor of International Law at Harvard University, was read at the First National Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace at Washington on May 26, 1916, under the general topic "Practicability of the League Program." Professor Wilson has revised the paper for inclusion in this book. In any case, a careful investigation would show that the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law. The statement of the doctrine has varied. Early discussions in the Cabinet before the doctrine was set forth in Monroe's Message seem to have been as lively as some later ones upon the same subject. Jefferson, when consulted upon the advisability of a policy which would not "suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs," comparing the Declaration of Independence with this doctrine, said: “That [the Declaration] made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us." In the early days of the Monroe Doctrine the aim was to avoid further European interference in American affairs. Later, particularly from the days of President Polk, the doctrine assumed a more positive form. Bismarck is reported to have called the doctrine a piece of "international impertinence." In 1901 President Roosevelt in his Annual Message declared: "The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States," and in 1904 he said that "the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." President Taft intimated in his Message in 1909 that "the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have already disappeared and neither the doctrine as it exists nor any other doctrine of American policy should be permitted to operate for the perpetuation of irresponsible government, the escape of just obligations or the insidious allegation of dominating ambitions on the part of the United States." The construction of the Panama Canal gave rise to new problems. The rumor that foreigners were making purchases of land about Magdalena Bay in Mexico led to pronounce ments in the United States Senate, in 1912, that the United States could not view foreign possession of this or any such harbor "without grave concern," and it was admitted that this is a "statement of policy, allied to the Monroe Doctrine, of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it." As in the early days the United States considered it within its rights to assert a policy defensive in its nature, but for the preservation of its well-being, so in later days the same general policy has taken differing forms. President Wilson early in his Administration endeavored to assure the Americas of his desire for the cordial coöperation of the people of the different nations, and a little later he asserted, "we are friends of constitutional government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions"; and, in the same message, he declared that the United States "must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." President Roosevelt had in 1901 asserted that the doctrine referred not merely to European, but to "any non-American power." This was recognized abroad, as Sir Edward Grey said in 1911 of the United States: "They had a policy associated with the name of Monroe, the cardinal point of which was that no European or non-American nation should acquire fresh territory on the continent of America." In December, 1913, Mr. Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, announced a late form of policy, saying: "We have now developed subtler ways than taking their lands. There is the taking of their bonds, for instance. Therefore, the important proposition is that no sort of financial control can, without the consent of the United 1 Since this paper was written President Wilson has proposed a "Monroe Doctrine for the whole world." [Author's note.] States, be obtained over these weaker nations which would in effect control their government." These and many other views as to the significance of the Monroe Doctrine show the varying forms in which the United States has stated its opposition to the permanent occupation of territory or acquisition of political control in the American i hemisphere by non-American powers. It has seemed necessary to present these differing ideas of the Monroe Doctrine to show that it is not law and to show that, as a manifestation of policy, it is not set forth in any single formula. As single nations and as groups of nations have policies which vary in different parts of the world, and as the con!flict of policies rather than the violation of established law is the frequent cause of international differences, it is evident that, if the League to Enforce Peace cannot provide any aid in case of conflict of policies, its function will be comparatively restricted. The conflict of policy would rarely take a form which would make justiciable methods practicable as a means to settlement. This being the case, reference of such matters would be to the council of conciliation provided for in the second article of the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. The first article provides for justiciable questions and the second states: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation. Here it should be repeated that the League to Enforce Peace does not bind itself to carry out the recommendation which the council of conciliation may make but merely binds itself to see that no power goes to war over such a matter until the question has been submitted. The conflicts of policy would, in most cases, be settled |