SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., D.C.L., LL.D., OF LINCOLN'S INN, ASSISTED BY O. A. SAUNDERS, J. G. PEASE, AND ARTHUR B. CANE, 12 CLARK & FINNELLY; 2 JONES & LATOUCHE; 2 COM- LONDON: SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED, 3, CHANCERY LANE. BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN & CO. 1904. PREFACE TO VOLUME LXIX. In the case of Lord Dungannon v. Smith, p. 137, it has been thought right to omit a considerable proportion of the judicial opinions, and some of the judgments in the House of Lords. The points of general application actually settled by the decision, namely that the question whether a limitation is bad for remoteness or not has nothing to do with the state of external facts, and that, as the rule against remoteness has nothing to do with intention, the instrument must be construed as if the rule did not exist, "and then to the provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied" (Gray on the Rule against Perpetuities, § 629) are by this time elementary. No modern student of conveyancing reading the head-note can fail to see that the gifts in question were bad. The difficulty is to understand how such eminent judges as Parke and Patteson ever contrived to think they could be supported. Lord Lyndhurst's judgment contains the whole law of the case, and is the only one to which we can find any later judicial reference. There is a curious observation of Lord Campbell's in Thomson v. The Advocate-General, at p. 17, that "the doctrine of domicile has sprung up in this country very recently . . but it is a very convenient doctrine." If Lord Campbell were still with us he would perhaps modify the following statement that "it is now well understood." See the very recent case of Winans v. Attorney-General [1904] A. C. 287, where the House of Lords was not unanimous on the interpretation of the facts. Nevertheless the rival doctrine of nationality, which now prevails in Continental jurisprudence, gives rise to quite as great difficulties, especially |