Advances in Game TheoryPrinceton University Press, 21. 6. 1964 - Počet stran: 679 A classic treatment of game theory from the acclaimed Annals of Mathematics Studies series |
Obsah
Preface | 1 |
Games With a Random Move | 29 |
A Search Game | 39 |
The Rendezvous Value of a Metric Space | 49 |
Generalized Gross Substitutability and Extremization | 55 |
Adaptive Competitive Decision | 69 |
By Morton Davis | 85 |
10 | 120 |
16 | 307 |
On the Cardinality of Solutions of FourPerson Constant | 327 |
The Doubly Discriminatory Solutions of the FourPerson | 345 |
ThreePerson Cooperative Games Without Side Payments | 377 |
Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative Games | 407 |
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games | 443 |
Stable Payoff Configurations for Quota Games | 477 |
On the Bargaining Set M of mQuota Games | 501 |
A Variational Approach to Differential Games | 127 |
11 | 139 |
an Open | 175 |
The Convergence Problem for Differential Games II | 195 |
13 | 211 |
14 | 226 |
Homogeneous Games III | 255 |
15 | 264 |
Property of Stability Possessed by Certain Imputations | 513 |
Coalition Bargaining in nPerson Games | 531 |
The nPerson Bargaining Game | 547 |
Valuation of nPerson Games | 577 |
Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games | 627 |
A General Solution for Finite Noncooperative Games Based | 651 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
admissible set Annals of Mathematics assume B₁ bargaining set C₁ catalogues characteristic function coalition coalition structure components consider constant-sum games contains convex cooperative games corresponding counter objection defined definition denote dominates doubly discriminatory E₁ equation example exists finite follows given Hence implies imputation inequalities K-game Lemma linearly equivalent m-coalitions matrix maximal mixed strategy n-person games Neumann obtain optimal strategy pair payoff vector play Princeton PROOF prove pure strategies quota game quota split RAND Corporation regular decomposition risk-dominance S₁ S₂ saddle-point satisfies Section sequence Shapley Shapley value simple game space stability strategy set subgame subset Suppose Theorem theory tion two-person v{ij value function w₁ w₂ weak player winning X₁ Y₁