He had come out for a purpose; it was accomplished, and he reassured himself that this country is not wanting in patriotism. He had made ten speeches in halls and the same number from the rear platform of the train. He had spoken to approximately 100,000 people and had been welcomed by perhaps five times that number. The large foreign element came out to hear him and became enthusiastic, and the greatest demonstration had been at the farthest points West, where, it had been predicted, he would have the least sympathy.

Such was the President's remarkable campaign for military preparedness. For a week the press of the country kept this one issue before the people, and the psychological effect was very great indeed. The nation was astir, but a better spirit prevailed. The President left the details of the plan to be worked out by Congress, and the vocal part of the nation was in general accord with the outlines. The patriotism of the nation was aroused, and, with a feeling of satisfaction for what had been accomplished and a confidence in what Congress would do under the steady pressure of the demands from the people down home, the President returned to Washington to hasten action and await results.

The effect of the appeal to the people was felt on the continent of Europe, and the nations at war pondered over his words and took warning. England read in his utterances a determination to force the central powers to another plane of international morality; and Germany

interpreted his language to mean that the rights of Americans to trade in Europe must be respected by the

Allies. And both parties to the war understood that America was determined to be prepared for any emergency that might arise.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE NATION FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

The nation had been discussing the issue for over twelve months, and the grand climax to all the arguments and debates was the President's tour of the country. But the time had come now to act. It was generally agreed that our defenses should be greatly strengthened and the efficiency of our military establishment should be increased. But the great question was, how?

The Federal Constitution gave Congress the power to raise and support a standing army. Moreover, it was empowered to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for calling it forth in times of need. However, there has not been a decade since the Constitution was established and since these two resources for the protection and safety of the nation were provided, that this question has not arisen: Shall the safety of our land defenses rest finally upon a standing army, or upon the militia? In every proposed plan for the reorganization of the army or for strengthening our defenses, the debate has revolved around this question. It was debated when the Federal Constitution was adopted. It was argued during the war of 1812. It was

a problem when the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated; and in 1836, nearly fifty years after the debate first began, the whole argument was stated anew, though in a partisan manner, by Edward Everett of Massachusetts:

"There are two resources," he said, "for protection and safety in the first outbreaking of war and in times of civil commotion. One is a well-organized, patriotic militia, ever present, rarely seen, quartered among us, not in camps and forts, but at the fireside, in the counting room, the workshop, the place of business. This is one. The other resource is a standing army, encamped on Boston Common or stationed on Castle Island. One or the other we must have. And the man who sets himself to ridicule the militia, to exaggerate the defects of the system, to embarrass its administration, to bring it into discredit, wishes one of two things he either wishes the country to be wholly exposed to insult from abroad, and a prey at home to anarchy, to mob law, club law, and a general scramble, or he wishes to see a flag staff planted in front of the State House, a couple of cannon pointing down State Street, to hear the morning gun at daybreak, and to hold the exercise of his daily rights as a citizen at the discretion of a military commander."

And he proposed the following toast:

"A well-organized, efficient, and patriotic militia—in time of peace, the bulwark of the law; in war, the basis of defense: May it be restored to the public favor."

This toast makes it quite evident that Edward Everett

was afraid of a standing army and the influence of the army officer in the nation. After eighty years that feeling still abides in the nation. However, the militia as a real fighting machine is not held in much esteem by those who think most of arms and invasion and defenses, and it is quite evident that the eighty years have not increased the love of the army officer for the militia. The campaign for preparedness was renewed in earnest soon after the outbreak of the European war. But every measure that looked toward meeting the needs of our defenses resolved itself sooner or later into the old question, shall the standing army or the militia be the basis of our defenses?

The continental army plan that was finally presented to Congress by Mr. Wilson on December 7 was worked out by Mr. Garrison, the Secretary of War, and the army experts. In its purpose to create a continental army of 400,000 citizen soldiers under direct national control, it favored the Federal Army and minimized the importance of the National Guard. However, as soon as it was presented to the House, the Committee on Military Affairs dissented and the fight began the old, old fight that was more than a century old.

Mr. Garrison was unalterably opposed to building up the National Guard. The Committee on Military Affairs, however, was in favor of strengthening the National Guard. It was apparent to Mr. Garrison that Congress would turn down his recommendations unless President