rejected the schedule'; and there was not a county in which the opposition to the schedule was not greater than the opposition to some of the other amendments. Obviously, to the minds of thousands of voters, the word "schedule" conveyed no idea, and they were taking no chances.

In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze the collective mind of the people of Ohio, as it was brought to bear upon political and economic problems of great importance. It has been shown that that mind was not adequately aroused nor sufficiently instructed; that only about half of those who ordinarily vote were interested in the constitutional changes and that thousands of those who did vote based their decisions on insufficient data. In so far as generalization is admissible on the basis of such a vote, it appears that the people of Ohio are conservative when asked to spend money or to share political privilege. They welcome changes, however, which give them new political rights or protect their economic interests or increase their control over their political servants. We have seen that the rural communities of the state are very conservative, while the cities welcome political and economic changes. Although the vote was taken in the heat of a political campaign, partisan politics seem to have exercised little influence upon the people's decisions upon constitutional questions. Finally, we have seen that the public mind will not voluntarily inform itself even upon matters of great importance. The average voter regards it as one of the prerogatives of citizenship to decide off-hand upon the questions which face him upon the referendum ballot. Most of his blunders are ascribable to ignorance, carelessness or indifference; they do not prove incapacity. These are among the lessons taught by the vote on the Ohio constitution of 1912.

OBERLIN, OHIO.

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN.

1

1 Cf. Map III.

* In the state as a whole there were twenty-six amendments that received less opposition than did the schedule.

THE PROPOSED SUGAR TARIFF

NCE more Congress has undertaken the reform of the

ON tariff, and again, as in 1894, the struggle centers upon

sugar and wool. From certain points of view, the situation is remarkably similar to that which existed twenty years ago. Now, as then, the Democrats, after many successive defeats, have won an electoral campaign with the tariff as their main issue and have come into full control of the national

legislative power. Once more they hold the presidency, a very large majority in the House and a narrow majority in the Senate; and again Democratic senators representing local interests, among which sugar is still prominent, threaten to defeat the schedules of the House bill. And in 1913, as in 1894, an income-tax measure is coupled with the tariff bill to offset the anticipated decline in customs receipts.

From other points of view, the parallel disappears. The political atmosphere has changed. Tendencies formerly regarded as radical have become merely progressive. The federal Constitution, long regarded as formally unchangeable except through civil war, has recently been amended in two important matters; and the amendments have a direct bearing upon the solutions of the pending problems of taxation. What is perhaps of still greater significance, the underlying economic conditions are greatly changed. The tendency toward largescale organization and operation, which had only begun to manifest itself in 1894, has since become of controlling importance both in commerce and in industry. The population of the United States has increased forty per cent, and this increase has been in the urban and not in the agricultural population, which has remained practically stationary. The importance of our agricultural production and exports has declined, relatively at least, while that of our manufactured products and exports has greatly increased. If these movements continue we shall soon become importers rather than exporters of wheat and other agricultural products.

The most disturbing of all the economic changes that have occurred since 1894 is the great rise in general prices-the cost of living. The great majority of the Democratic leaders and politicians have put the blame upon the tariff and the trusts, and, at bottom, upon the tariff as the mother of the trusts. A comparison of the prices, here and abroad, of protected and trust-made articles has seemed to show that part of the blame, at least, has been put where it belongs.

In view of the entire political situation and the platform pledges of the victorious party, it was to be expected that the present Congress would undertake a general revision of the tariff. It was to be expected, in particular, that an attack would be made upon the sugar duties; for sugar is not only one of the commonest of necessities, but it is also generally supposed to be one of the most completely controlled of the trust-made products. In the minds of most people, indeed, the sugar trust has come to be a typical representative of the nefarious methods of the trust octopus. It has engaged not only in rebating, forestalling and intimidating, but also in lobbying, both in national and state legislatures, and in distributing campaign funds to both parties. Its long-continued and malodorous custom-house frauds are not yet forgotten. From every point of view, the sugar schedule was bound to attract the attention of the tariff reformer.

The present line-up of sugar interests before the congressional committees is very different from that of 1894. In order to appreciate the significance of this change it is necessary to recall a little tariff history. Our sugar tariffs have been composed of two parts: first, a duty on the raw sugar and, second, an additional amount for the refiners' protection, usually called the refiners' differential. The old Dutch standard (color test) has been used in connection with the polariscope test in such a way as to heighten the advantage to refiners; in other words, the Dutch standard has been a sort of "joker" though it is now of comparatively little importance. Though the distinction is not scientifically exact, sugar below (darker than) no. 16 Dutch standard is considered raw sugar for tariff purposes. That of lighter color is considered refined and is

subject to the refiners' differential, in addition to the duty it pays as raw sugar.

In the tariff law of 1883, the combined duties placed upon refined sugar were from $3.00 to $3.50 per 100 pounds. On account of the different classification obtaining at that time and the way in which the Dutch standard was handled in connection with the polariscope test, it is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate exactly the refiners' differential; but it probably ranged between $0.75 and $1.25 per 100 pounds. This estimate is probably too low rather than too high.

Between 1883 and the passage of the next tariff bill in 1890 there were several new developments. The treasury surplus became extremely troublesome to the friends of protection. If tariff rates were to be kept up, schemes had to be devised to spend the revenue. Then in 1887, the sugar trust was formed. The Brooklyn refinery of the four Oxnard brothers was taken into the trust. Two of the brothers remained in the old line of business; but two began the movement that later resulted in the development of the present domestic beet-sugar industry. Henry T. Oxnard (later head of the American Beet Sugar Company) appeared before the Ways and Means Committee in 1889 and asked for protection for this new industry. Instead of encouraging beet-sugar production indirectly, through a protective rate on raw sugar, the McKinley Bill of 1890 put raw sugar upon the free list and provided a bounty of two cents on every pound of sugar produced in the United States. This plan cut down the revenue and increased expenditure, thus doing double service in reducing the surplus. Refiners were protected by a differential of $0.50 per 100 pounds.

In 1894, the Democrats faced, not a surplus, but a deficit; hence, for fiscal reasons, it was proposed to put a 40 per cent ad valorem duty on all sugar. This meant protection to the Louisiana and Hawaii sugar producers and also to the then insignificant beet-sugar industry. But it meant no protection to the refiners. These interests, through their supporters in the Senate, secured the amendment of the House bill so as to restore their old differential of $0.50 per 100 pounds. Further changes have since been made. The Dingley Act of 1897

gave 95° raw sugar a rate of $1.65 per 100 pounds and cut the refiners' differential to $0.125. The Payne-Aldrich Bill further reduced the refiners' differential to $0.075, where it stands to-day. The concession to Cuba (December 27, 1903) of a twenty-per-cent reduction on her imports makes the duty $1.32 per 100 pounds upon her 95° sugar (which is the form in which most of it enters the United States).

The bill now pending proposes an immediate reduction of approximately twenty-five per cent of present duties and admittance of all sugar free of duty after May 1, 1916. To be more exact, this means a duty of $1.36 per 100 pounds upon foreign refined (100°, or pure sugar) and a duty of $1.23 upon 95° raws, without regard to color. Cuban 95° sugar would pay only $0.984; that is, it would have an advantage of $0.246 as compared with other foreign raw sugar in United States markets. The pending bill makes no mention of the Dutch standard nor of the present limitation upon the free entry of Philippine sugar (300,000 tons per year), nor does it make any provision for a refiners' differential.

In 1894 the chief lobbyist before Congress was the trust, and it was fighting, not primarily for a duty upon raws, but for the refiners' differential. To-day the refiners' differential is comparatively insignificant; the refiners have no hope of increasing it and little hope of maintaining it. So far as the recent records of congressional committees show, and so far as the writer has been able to learn from other sources (including personal obser

'The provisions of the Dingley Act were as follows. Sugars not above no. 16 Dutch standard and not above 75° polarization, $0.95. For every additional degree polarization, $0.035. Sugars above no. 16 Dutch standard and all refined, $1.95. This is equivalent to $1.65 upon 95° sugar. This is also equivalent to $1.825 on 100°, a pure refined sugar, if there were no differential of $0.125; that is, $1.825 plus $0.125 equals $1.95, the Dingley rate upon refined. The Payne-Aldrich Bill of 1909 changed the sugar rates only by making the rate on refined $1.90 instead of $1.95, that is, by cutting the refiners' differential from $0.125 to $0.075. The bill now pending before Congress proposes a duty of $0.71 upon all sugar not above 75° with an increase of $0.026 per 100 pounds for every additional degree shown by the polariscope test.

'Cf. Hearings of the Special Committee appointed to investigate the American Sugar Refining Company and others (Hardwick Committee Hearings), 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1911) and 2d Sess. (1911-12).