1912-Presented by Mr. Coleman of Pennsylvania:

Resolved, That hereafter representation in the Republican national convention shall be as follows: One delegate from each congressional district within the various states of the Union, and one additional delegate from each of said congressional districts for every 10,000 votes, or majority fraction thereof, cast at the last preceding presidential election for Republican elector receiving the largest vote, and two delegates each from the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

This latest and already almost forgotten plan, supposed to embody the demands of the ultra-progressive minority in that convention, goes back to the congressional district unit of representation, and in so doing eliminates the delegates-at-large. By its provisions all the delegates would be district delegates. Each congressional district would be assured one delegate with the opportunity to add to the number for each 10,000 votes or major fraction recorded for the national ticket. This last proposed reorganization plan would obviously accentuate the preponderance of the big states over the little states, and would also give the territories not yet integral parts of the union as many, if not more, votes than it would give to certain of the states (those having but one congressional district) admitted to full membership in the union.

But for the 1916 convention, the Republicans have conditions confronting them which were not within the purview of any of these reapportionment plans when proposed. No one pretends that the vote polled for the Republican candidate in 1912 would furnish a fair basis for any of these apportionment schemes. Every one knows that in two states the Republicans were last year deprived of even a party place on the ballot. In many states large numbers of Republicans voted the Democratic ticket or the Progressive ticket with no intention of permanently abandoning their own party, and they expect to participate in the next presidential preliminaries-in fact, the very purpose of reorganization is to bring them back. The strangest thing is that the southern states, for the most part, whose over-representation had precipitated the trouble, would suffer less from

the defections in the last election than would several northern states priding themselves on being the bulwark of the Republican party. To go back to 1908 for a basis of representation would hardly supply the deficiency, for under normal stress the changes of eight years would alter relative values, and it is certain the 1908 returns do not now reflect the distribution of the party's strength among and within the states and territories.

Still another new development demands consideration, and that is the change in the body of the electorate. If the disfranchisement of the blacks in the South vitiated the allotment of delegates on the electoral college plan, the enfranchisement of the women in other states, almost doubling the number of voters, has there sent the pendulum as far in the other direction. A congressional district in California, for example, elects but one member of Congress (being apportioned on the basis of population) and adds but one member to the electoral college. But in choosing convention delegates such district, if awarded an additional delegate for each 10,000 votes or major fraction, would have two votes for one as compared with the non-suffrage district. The unfairness of this disproportionate representation would differ only in degree from the unfairness of giving to southern states convention delegates for disfranchised black voters shut out of the polls at the election.

Still another new condition must be borne in mind, although the obstacle thus presented is perhaps local. Quite a few of our states have enacted legislation purporting to govern the election of national convention delegates. In my own state of Nebraska, in Wisconsin, in Oregon, and I believe also in other states which have similar statutes, this law provides for the choosing of delegates for all political parties at one primary election, and in the same manner. As drawn it calls for the election every fourth year of four delegates-at-large and two delegates in each congressional district; in other words, all these laws assume the permanency of the existing apportionment. If they control, they must be changed to meet any change promulgated by the party itself. It should be mentioned that able lawyers wholly deny to the states any power to legislate over national conventions or to fix the representation of the

state in such conventions. It is, however, not necessary in this connection to explain the reasoning or to pursue the point they

make.

III

One may concede the injustice of the present apportionment and yet reply that it is easy to criticise and to pick to pieces. It is a proper and pertinent question to ask what one has to offer in its place. Let me attempt an answer. From my study of the subject I am convinced that the national nominating convention should rest on the same dual basis of equality between the states, and proportion to numbers as does the national legislature in its two branches. I would retain the delegates-atlarge for the state in double the number of its senators as now, and I would accord each congressional district one delegate, with the right to earn an additional delegate, or delegates, by substantial contribution to the voting strength of the party. To avoid the disproportion arising from the varying suffrage qualifications in the different states, I would compute this ratio, not by absolute number of 10,000 votes, but by a proportion, say 20 or 25 per cent, of the entire vote for president cast in each particular district. If the vote were doubled then by the inclusion of the women, the percentage representation would still maintain the parity. In the matter of the territories, the District of Columbia, and the insular possessions, I would go back to the original plan of the first Republican conventions, which also conforms to the practice of Congress, and admit territorial delegates to have a voice in the councils of the party, but with no vote in them. Reduced to the text of a definite proposal, this is what I would offer:

That representation in the next Republican convention be apportioned as follows:

Four delegates-at-large from each state.

One additional delegate-at-large from each state for each representative in Congress elected at large.

One delegate from each congressional district.

One additional delegate from each congressional district in which the Republican candidate polled more than one-fourth of the total vote

last cast for president in such district, and one additional delegate for each additional one-fourth of said total vote so polled.

Two delegates each from Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, which delegates shall have a voice in the convention, but no vote either in the convention or in any of its committees.

The advantages which should commend this proposal, as I see them, may be briefly enumerated:

(1) It insures a national, as against a sectional, party organization. It does this by according delegate representation in the convention to every state, congressional district and territorial possession.

(2) It makes party strength a main, but not exclusive, factor in determining representation. To that extent it reduces the disproportion of representation, and gives effective voice to the party membership in states which must be depended on to elect the ticket.

(3) It holds to the dual unit of state and congressional district representation with accompanying safeguards against misrepresentation of each constituency.

(4) It provides against complete disfranchisement of party membership in any state by "grandfather clauses," or other arbitrary restrictions, imposed by legislatures under domination of a hostile political party.

(5) It contains an element of elasticity by which it will adjust itself to changes in the electorate whether limited by education tests or poll taxes, or enlarged by woman suffrage. This percentage method of computation would also protect the representation where but a small total vote is polled in states or districts practically uncontested because "sure" for one side or the other.

(6) While formulated to meet the conditions of Republican convention representation, it will stand the test of general application, and would in like manner work a similar improvement in the apportionment plan of the Democrats, the Progressives, or of any political party in the national arena. VICTOR ROSEWATER.

OMAHA, NEBRASKA.

IN

THE BALKAN ADJUSTMENT

N a previous article,' the author traced the course of events in the Balkans from the overthrow of Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks in July, 1908, to the Peace Conference held in London in January, 1913, to consider the terms of peace between the victorious allies and the defeated Turks. The concluding sentence of that article read as follows: "Prophecy in the field of politics is proverbially hazardous, and to forecast the future of the Balkan states is a futile undertaking." Seldom have events more amply justified a point of view.

It will be remembered that when the Peace Conference met at London, December 13, 1912, there was also opened upon the invitation of Sir Edward Grey, a conference of the ambassadors of the great powers to keep in touch with the progress of the negotiations. It is not too much to say that but for the existence of this ambassadorial conference it would have been impossible to keep the peace during the past year between the two great powers most directly interested in the Balkan problem, viz. Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Peace Conference came to naught and hostilities were resumed on February 14, 1913, because of the impossibility of agreement between the allies and Turks on three important points: the status of Adrianople, the disposal of the Ægean islands and the payment of an indemnity by Turkey. Bulgaria and Turkey both maintained that Adrianople was essential to their national safety. Moreover its possession by Bulgaria was absolutely necessary were she to secure the hegemony in the Balkans at which she aimed. On the other hand, to the Turks, Adrianople is a sacred city around which cluster the most glorious memories of their race. Thus they would yield it only as a last necessity. The ambassadorial conference, anxious to bring to an end a war which was threatening to embroil AustriaHungary and Russia and desirous also to make the settlement

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, March, 1913, vol. xxviii, pp. 95-122.