and effect repairs and the necessity that all the fighting components arrive together and ready for action, this means that, from the time of leaving the canal until its arrival where it would probably be needed, the shortest time interval to any of the places mentioned above is about 58 hours to Guantanamo, and the longest is about 33 days to Manila, during which the enemy will not have been idle. The canal will be a great military asset in war, and an equally great one in anticipation of war; but it is quite beside the mark to say that it will double the effectiveness of the Navy, or do anything approaching that.

The truth, as usual, lies between these two extreme views just examined, and the writer believes that the former is much nearer the truth than the latter. By its very nature the problem of determining just what will be the effect of the canal upon the strength of the Navy cannot be mathematically demonstrated. The solution is largely one of opinion, and will be modified as greater or less weight is given to the several considerations on which it is based. If the general formula advanced above for fixing the strength of the navy be accepted, then manifestly, canal or no canal, the minimum permissible strength of the Navy is that which will enable us to meet, with our entire force, our strongest probable enemy, wherever situated. Under the same conditions the maximum strength that can be claimed as necessary is the sum of that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus that of the Standard Pacific Fleet (Great Britain being excluded for reasons above given). This amounts to saying that the max

imum strength that can be claimed as necessary is that which will enable us to conduct a war with prospect of success in both oceans at once, which is the Two-ocean Standard again. If the possible antagonists in the two oceans, in relation to whom our formula for strength is founded, were equally strong, our minimum permissible Navy would be half as strong as the maximum Navy that will ever be necessary. They are not equally strong, however, and our Standard Atlantic Fleet should now, and the condition is probably permanent, be stronger than the Standard Pacific Fleet need be. The Standard Atlantic Fleet, therefore, is the measure of our minimum permissible strength; and, to avoid any misunderstanding, the words "minimum permissible strength" are used in the narrow sense of indicating the very least strength that can logically be believed allowable by anybody who believes in a Navy at all for well-founded reasons. The Standard Atlantic Fleet does not represent the writer's views of what our minimum naval strength should be.

Our total naval strength at this minute is not equal to that of what is called above the Standard Atlantic Fleet. Hence, the completion of the canal should have no immediate effect upon our building. It remains to find an answer to the question: What effect will it have upon our building policy for the future?

The writer's personal opinion is that, when the canal is finished, our policy should be to have eventually, and as soon as possible, a total strength not less than that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus three-quarters

that of the Standard Pacific Fleet. These so-called "standard" fleets are not fixed quantities, but will vary from year to year as foreign nations increase their own naval strength. The policy itself can, however, be fixed, and some policy should be established. The reasons that have appealed to the writer in reaching this conclusion are as follows:

(a) With no canal our total strength should be the sum of both the Standard Atlantic Fleet and the Standard Pacific Fleet.

(b) The canal so greatly shortens distances between the two oceans that some reduction of strength below that of (a) is justifiable when it shall be finished, in view of the heavy financial burden imposed by a great navy, and the rather remote possibility of simultaneous war in both oceans.

(c) This reduction should not be sufficient to leave the nation in a hopeless case in either ocean if war broke out in one while war was being waged in the other.

(d) As the strength of the Standard Atlantic Fleet must be maintained in any event, the Pacific Fleet is the one in which to make the reduction in strength.

(e) Our interests are so great, and are scattered over such immense distances in the Pacific, that anything less than three-quarters of the Standard Pacific Fleet would make even a defensive war in that ocean hopeless.

(f) With three-quarters of the Standard Pacific Fleet a defensive war, a containing war so to speak, would not be hopeless while waging a war on equal terms in the Atlantic.

(g) If there were no prospect of war in the Pacific at a time when engaged in war in the Atlantic, then one-half of the Standard Pacific Fleet, and perhaps less, would suffice to guard our interests in the Pacific, leaving the rest of the fleet in that ocean free to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet and give in the Atlantic a marked superiority of force.

(h) If at war in the Pacific with no prospect of war in the Atlantic, a great superiority of force could be maintained in the Pacific that would be the more valuable, owing to the distances over which the Navy would have to operate in that ocean.

The composition of the fleet will be little affected by the existence of the finished canal. All classes of fighting ships will be as much needed after the canal as before, and the numbers and proportions deemed requisite for the duty in either ocean will be necessary, canal or no canal. It is not improbable that the defense of the canal itself may demand a limited number of certain classes of vessels that would not otherwise be necessary. But in its large aspect the composition of the fighting fleet can hardly be affected by the completion of the canal. Even in the matter of auxiliaries the same thing appears to be true. If the Navy depended upon its own auxiliaries for the transfer of supplies and fuel from one ocean to the other, the canal would naturally serve to diminish the number of supply and fuel ships; but such cargoes are practically all sent by contract. Other auxiliaries are based in number on the fighting ships they have to serve, and

distance has little to do with the question. Speaking in a broad way, then, the existence of the canal will have no effect on the composition of the fleet.

It is more than probable that the completion of the canal will effect some changes in the disposition of the fleet in time of peace. It has already been pointed out that the Navy is not now as strong as is theoretically necessary in the Atlantic alone; so that for a considerable time to come, whatever building program may be adopted, it will be necessary to concentrate our entire fighting fleet in time of war, trusting to Providence that the part sent to the threatened ocean will not be needed during the war in the ocean from which it is withdrawn. In effecting this concentration the canal will be a very great military advantage to us. Even in time of peace, however, the completion of the canal will enable some desirable changes to be made in the present disposition of the fleet. The disposition hitherto, while dictated by reasons of convenience under the conditions then existing, has yet not been very logical considered in the light of all-round preparedness for war. One suggested disposition is the maintenance of a force of fixed strength in each ocean, with a shifting squadron that will go first into one and then into the other. This can be so managed as to keep in both oceans a force better balanced in all its components of fighting strength than is now the case with either. The outcome in accord with the best professional opinion, however, would be the organization under one command of the entire military fleet, with the exception