New Essays on the A Priori

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Paul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke
Clarendon Press, 26. 10. 2000 - Počet stran: 490
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The topics of a priori knowledge and a priori justification have long played a prominent part in epistemology and the theory of meaning. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the proper explication of these notions. These newly commissioned essays, by a distinguished, international group of philosophers, will have a substantial influence on later work in this area. They discuss the relations of the a priori to meaning, justification, definition and ontology; they consider the role of the notion in Leibniz, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein; and they address its role in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind. Particular attention is also paid to the a priori in logic, science and mathematics. The authors exhibit a wide variety of approaches, some remaining sceptical of the notion itself, some proposing that it receive a non-factualist treatment, and others proposing novel ways of explicating and defending it. The editors' Introduction provides a helpful route into the issues.

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Frege on Apriority
Rationalism Empiricism and the A Priori
A Priori Knowledge Revisited
Naturalism and the A Priori
Apriority as an Evaluative Notion
Stipulation Meaning and Apriority
Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic
Apriority and Existence
The Programme of Moderate Rationalism
Implicit Definition and the A Priori
Representation Scepticism and the A Priori
The Status of Logic
Externalism and Armchair Knowledge
Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts
The Psychophysical Nexus

Knowlege of Logic

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Strana 369 - Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements. which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.
Strana 369 - The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.
Strana 94 - By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours ; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition.
Strana 93 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Strana 179 - ... to obey a rule." It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. - To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).
Strana 103 - In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, ie his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
Strana 369 - But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.
Strana 301 - What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it
Strana 106 - Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experiences can be fitted and arranged.
Strana 195 - This seems to abolish logic but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement (1953: 241-242).

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