New Essays on the A PrioriPaul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke Clarendon Press, 26. 10. 2000 - Počet stran: 490 The topics of a priori knowledge and a priori justification have long played a prominent part in epistemology and the theory of meaning. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the proper explication of these notions. These newly commissioned essays, by a distinguished, international group of philosophers, will have a substantial influence on later work in this area. They discuss the relations of the a priori to meaning, justification, definition and ontology; they consider the role of the notion in Leibniz, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein; and they address its role in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind. Particular attention is also paid to the a priori in logic, science and mathematics. The authors exhibit a wide variety of approaches, some remaining sceptical of the notion itself, some proposing that it receive a non-factualist treatment, and others proposing novel ways of explicating and defending it. The editors' Introduction provides a helpful route into the issues. |
Vyhledávání v knize
Výsledky 1-5 z 48
Strana 13
... connection and natural order of truths , which is always the same . " ' Frege draws his quotation of Leibniz from Leibniz ( 1705 , 1765 , 1989 : IV , vii , 9 ) . 5 Cf. Leibniz ( 1705 , 1765 , 1989 : IV , ix , 1 , 434 ) ; Leibniz ( 1989 ...
... connection and natural order of truths , which is always the same . " ' Frege draws his quotation of Leibniz from Leibniz ( 1705 , 1765 , 1989 : IV , vii , 9 ) . 5 Cf. Leibniz ( 1705 , 1765 , 1989 : IV , ix , 1 , 434 ) ; Leibniz ( 1989 ...
Strana 23
... idealism , he would take this as equivalent to the empirical truth of the generalization . This is a matter that could bear more investigation . Like them he believed that apriority is deeply connected with Frege on Apriority 23.
... idealism , he would take this as equivalent to the empirical truth of the generalization . This is a matter that could bear more investigation . Like them he believed that apriority is deeply connected with Frege on Apriority 23.
Strana 24
Paul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke. Like them he believed that apriority is deeply connected with some form of generality of application , or universal validity . But he interpreted and used his notion of generality differently . He ...
Paul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke. Like them he believed that apriority is deeply connected with some form of generality of application , or universal validity . But he interpreted and used his notion of generality differently . He ...
Strana 28
... connection between apriority and independence of the experience of the senses . Frege seems to accept this connection . It has dominated conceptions of apriority since Kant . What seems to me thoroughly doubtful is that our cognition of ...
... connection between apriority and independence of the experience of the senses . Frege seems to accept this connection . It has dominated conceptions of apriority since Kant . What seems to me thoroughly doubtful is that our cognition of ...
Strana 30
... connection with sensibility . He further notes that in the Tran- scendental Aesthetic part of Critique of Pure Reason the connection is added ( hinzugedacht ) , and must be added to serve as a principle of our cognition of synthetic a ...
... connection with sensibility . He further notes that in the Tran- scendental Aesthetic part of Critique of Pure Reason the connection is added ( hinzugedacht ) , and must be added to serve as a principle of our cognition of synthetic a ...
Obsah
| 11 | |
Rationalism Empiricism and the A Priori | 43 |
A Priori Knowledge Revisited | 65 |
Naturalism and the A Priori | 92 |
Apriority as an Evaluative Notion | 117 |
Stipulation Meaning and Apriority | 150 |
Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic | 170 |
Apriority and Existence | 197 |
The Programme of Moderate Rationalism | 255 |
Implicit Definition and the A Priori | 286 |
Representation Scepticism and the A Priori | 320 |
The Status of Logic | 333 |
Externalism and Armchair Knowledge | 384 |
Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts | 415 |
The Psychophysical Nexus | 433 |
Index | 473 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
New Essays on the a Priori Paul Artin Boghossian,Christopher Peacocke Náhled není k dispozici. - 2000 |
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
accept actual analytic analytic propositions apriority argue argument arithmetic axioms basic belief Carnap Christopher Peacocke claim cognitive conclusion Crispin Wright distinction empirical empiricism epistemic epistemological Euclidean geometry evidence example existence experience explain externalist fact framework Frege geometry given grasp Hartry Field Hume's Principle idea implicit definition inductive inference judgements justification Kant Kant's kind know a priori Kylie's puzzle language Leibniz linguistic logical truth mathematical matter meaning mental metaphor modus ponens natural number necessary norma norms notion objects ontology Oxford particular perceptual philosophical physical possible posteriori premisses priori knowledge problem proof properties proposition purely question Quine Quine's Quinean rational intuition rationalist reference reflective equilibrium relation relevant Resnik role rule-circular rules scepticism scientific second-order logic seems semantic sense sentence stipulation suppose theoretical theory things thought tion transcendental true understanding universal quantification University Press valid water is wet
Oblíbené pasáže
Strana 369 - Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements. which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.
Strana 369 - The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.
Strana 94 - By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours ; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition.
Strana 93 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Strana 179 - ... to obey a rule." It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. - To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).
Strana 103 - In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, ie his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
Strana 369 - But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.
Strana 301 - What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it
Strana 106 - Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experiences can be fitted and arranged.
Strana 195 - This seems to abolish logic but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement (1953: 241-242).