New Essays on the A PrioriPaul Boghossian, Christopher Peacocke Clarendon Press, 26. 10. 2000 - Počet stran: 490 The topics of a priori knowledge and a priori justification have long played a prominent part in epistemology and the theory of meaning. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the proper explication of these notions. These newly commissioned essays, by a distinguished, international group of philosophers, will have a substantial influence on later work in this area. They discuss the relations of the a priori to meaning, justification, definition and ontology; they consider the role of the notion in Leibniz, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein; and they address its role in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind. Particular attention is also paid to the a priori in logic, science and mathematics. The authors exhibit a wide variety of approaches, some remaining sceptical of the notion itself, some proposing that it receive a non-factualist treatment, and others proposing novel ways of explicating and defending it. The editors' Introduction provides a helpful route into the issues. |
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Výsledky 1-5 z 62
Strana 24
... validity . But he interpreted and used his notion of generality differently . He departs from both Leibniz and Kant in defin- ing apriority in terms of generality . He departs from both in saying little about the relation between ...
... validity . But he interpreted and used his notion of generality differently . He departs from both Leibniz and Kant in defin- ing apriority in terms of generality . He departs from both in saying little about the relation between ...
Strana 25
... validity . This enters his formulation of rules of inference . But the universal validity of logical laws is supposed ... valid inference . Here Frege sided with Leibniz against Kant in holding that one can derive truths about particular ...
... validity . This enters his formulation of rules of inference . But the universal validity of logical laws is supposed ... valid inference . Here Frege sided with Leibniz against Kant in holding that one can derive truths about particular ...
Strana 33
... validity ( Allgemeingultigkeit ) for all possible intuitions , which belong under the same concept . Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting the object corresponding to this concept , either through mere imagination in pure intuition ...
... validity ( Allgemeingultigkeit ) for all possible intuitions , which belong under the same concept . Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting the object corresponding to this concept , either through mere imagination in pure intuition ...
Strana 34
... validity of geometrical truths by maintaining that the particularity of pure intuition is only apparent . They can therefore ' count as representatives of the whole of their kind ' . Like Kant , he sees the particulars as serving as ...
... validity of geometrical truths by maintaining that the particularity of pure intuition is only apparent . They can therefore ' count as representatives of the whole of their kind ' . Like Kant , he sees the particulars as serving as ...
Strana 35
... valid . He thinks that the basic principles are in the form of generalizations . But he does not hold that the root of geometrical warrant the apriority of geome- try — lies in generality . The synthetic apriori axioms — and the ...
... valid . He thinks that the basic principles are in the form of generalizations . But he does not hold that the root of geometrical warrant the apriority of geome- try — lies in generality . The synthetic apriori axioms — and the ...
Obsah
11 | |
Rationalism Empiricism and the A Priori | 43 |
A Priori Knowledge Revisited | 65 |
Naturalism and the A Priori | 92 |
Apriority as an Evaluative Notion | 117 |
Stipulation Meaning and Apriority | 150 |
Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic | 170 |
Apriority and Existence | 197 |
The Programme of Moderate Rationalism | 255 |
Implicit Definition and the A Priori | 286 |
Representation Scepticism and the A Priori | 320 |
The Status of Logic | 333 |
Externalism and Armchair Knowledge | 384 |
Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empirical Facts | 415 |
The Psychophysical Nexus | 433 |
Index | 473 |
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New Essays on the a Priori Paul Artin Boghossian,Christopher Peacocke Náhled není k dispozici. - 2000 |
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accept actual analytic analytic propositions apriority argue argument arithmetic axioms basic belief Carnap Christopher Peacocke claim cognitive conclusion Crispin Wright distinction empirical empiricism epistemic epistemological Euclidean geometry evidence example existence experience explain externalist fact framework Frege geometry given grasp Hartry Field Hume's Principle idea implicit definition inductive inference judgements justification Kant Kant's kind know a priori Kylie's puzzle language Leibniz linguistic logical truth mathematical matter meaning mental metaphor modus ponens natural number necessary norma norms notion objects ontology Oxford particular perceptual philosophical physical possible posteriori premisses priori knowledge problem proof properties proposition purely question Quine Quine's Quinean rational intuition rationalist reference reflective equilibrium relation relevant Resnik role rule-circular rules scepticism scientific second-order logic seems semantic sense sentence stipulation suppose theoretical theory things thought tion transcendental true understanding universal quantification University Press valid water is wet
Oblíbené pasáže
Strana 369 - Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements. which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.
Strana 369 - The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.
Strana 94 - By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours ; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition.
Strana 93 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Strana 179 - ... to obey a rule." It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. - To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).
Strana 103 - In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, ie his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.
Strana 369 - But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.
Strana 301 - What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it
Strana 106 - Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experiences can be fitted and arranged.
Strana 195 - This seems to abolish logic but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement (1953: 241-242).