not be placed in the same position as if they had never entered into the partnership, which entailed losses. Oteri v. Scalzo, 145 U. S. 578; FULLER, C. J., 1892.

18. Accounting. Where a settlement of partnership accounts covering large transactions, embracing many items, some of which rested only in the memories of the partners, had been acquiesced in for three years, it was held, at the suit of a creditor of one of the partners who claimed under an assignment of the latter's interest in a judgment recovered by the firm, which had been paid into court, that the evidence of mistake was insufficient to warrant a reopening of accounts; and it seems that mistake should be clearly shown. Gregory v. Harrison, 18 U. S. App. 27 (7th Cir.); PER CUR., 1893. 19. In Transactions Outside of the Firm Business.-The violation, by one partner, of his undertaking to give to the firm or his associate an opportunity or option to engage in any particular transaction not within the scope of the firm's business, does not entitle his co-partners to convert him into a constructive trustee in respect to the profits realized therefrom. Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524; JACKSON, J., 1893.

VI. RIGHTS AND POWERS AFTER DISSOLUTION, 20.

20. When the Firm is under Contract-Kentucky.-Where a partner in a firm engaged in operating a distillery dies while the real estate is incumbered by mortgage to secure partnership debts, and while the firm is under contract, the non-performance of which involves the payment of damages, the surviving partner may, under Kentucky decisions, continue the business so as to discharge the obligations, or sell the property for cash; but he cannot convert the partnership into a corporation and convey the real property to it for shares of stock. Perin v. Megibben, 6 U. S. App. 348 (6th Cir.); TAFT, J., 1892.

VII. DUTIES OF PARTNERS, 21-22.

21. Good Faith.-A partner entrusted with the duty of selling partnership property is the agent and trustee of his partner and is under an obligation to sell such property at the best price that he can obtain for it, and to look solely to the interest of the firm while selling the same. Gunn v. Black's Adm. (1); Black's Adm. v. Gunn, 19 U. S. App. 477 (8th Cir.); SANBORN, J., 1894.

22. When Failure to Disclose is not Bad Faith.-When partners have come to an agreement as to the purchase of a partner's share in a venture under the full knowledge of the state of facts existing at the time of the agreement, but have not yet drawn up the articles or made the deed in detail, and between the time of making the agreement and of perfecting the details of the transfer the purchaser learns of a great increase in the value of the property, he is not bound to make disclosure of that fact to the selling partner, and commits no breach of faith by withholding the facts, since the rights of the seller were ended before the discovery was made. Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411; BROWN, J. (FULLER, C. J., BREWER, J., Dist.), 1893.

VIII. NOMINAL PARTIES, 23.

23. Liability after Notice Given.-Where there is a stipulation between two or more persons who hold themselves out to the world as partners that one of them shall not bear any share in the profits, nor pay any portion of the losses, he is not liable to the creditor of a firm who by means of notice to his agent, before he gave credit, knew of the stipulation. Willis v. Rector, 4 U. S. App. 288 (8th Cir.); CALDWELL, J., 1892.

IX. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 24.

24. Married Women may be Members of.-The Pennsylvania statute of June 2, 1874, Laws of 1874, p. 252, which requires not less than three persons to unite to form a limited partnership, is complied with where two of the persons uniting are married women and the others are their respective husbands. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Packard, 28 U. S. App. 84 (3d Cir.); DALLAS, J., 1894.

PASSENGERS.

See: CARRIERS, 1-11.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 25-26.
NEGLIGENCE, 47.

SHIPS AND SHIPPING, 37-40.

PATENTABILITY.

See PATENTS, 34–102.

PATENTS, 499.

See also: EQUITY, 25.

ESTOPPEL, 36.

EVIDENCE, 73.

FORMER ADJUDICATION, 6.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 6.

I. APPLICATION, 1–23.
II. ISSUE, 24-33.

III. PATENTABILITY, 34–102.
1. NOVELTY, 34–71.

2. LACK OF NOVELTY, 72–102.

IV. ANTICIPATION, 103–124.

V. DISCLAIMER, 125-131.
VI. REISSUE, 132–143.

VII. ASSIGNMENT, 144-154.

VIII. LICENSE, 155–174.

IX. INFRINGEMENT, 175–321.

1. WHAT AMOUNTS TO, 175–190.

2. WHAT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO, 191-233.

3. WHO MAY RECOVER FOR, 234-241.

4. EVIDENCE AND DEFENCES, 242–261.

5. PRACTICE, 262–275.

6. ACCOUNTING, 276-278.

7. DAMAGES, 279–295.

8. INJUNCTION, 296–321.

X. PARTICULAR PATENTS, 322-499.

I. APPLICATION, 1–23.

1. What is the "Claim."-The claim of letters patent is the statutory requirement prescribed for the purpose of making a patentee define what his invention is so distinctly and exactly as to apprise other inventors and the public of what is withdrawn from public use. It is to be read in the light of the description contained in the specification, and its literal terms may be enlarged or narrowed accordingly, but not to an extent inconsistent with their meaning. Elmira, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thomson-Houston Co., 38 U. S. App. 55 (2d Cir.); WALLACE, J., 1896.

2. Scope of, Construed.-Substituting the expression "intermediate device” for “loose or sliding device" does not enlarge the scope of the patent, when properly construed. Columbus Watch Co. Robbin, 22 U. S. App. 601 (6th Cir.); TAFT, J., 1894.

3. Claim must Set forth Prohibited Features.-The features of a device that is patented, and which it is desired to protect, must be set forth in the claims; if not covered by the claims they will not be protected by the letters. Grant v. Walter, 148 U. S. 547; JACKSON, J., 1893.

4. Claim-Reference to Drawings is not a Limitation.-A mere reference in a claim to a letter on the drawing does not of itself limit the claim to the precise geometrical shape shown in the drawing, even though the description in the specifications refers to the part by an adjective descriptive

of its shape, unless that particular shape is pointed out by the specifications, or is known in the state of the art to be the particular improvement claimed. De Lamater v. Heath, 20 U. S. App. 14 (2d Cir.); LACOMBE, J., 1893.

See Consolidated Bunging Apparatus Co. v. Metropolitan B. Co., 60 F. R.; Trant & Hine Mfg. Co. v. Waterbury, 64 F. R. 492.

5. Must Comply with Statute as to Form.-Where a patent involved the use of sulphuric acid, and dilution of the acid with water was requisite to the operations of recovering rubber from rubber waste, it was held that such letters patent were void for want of compliance with the provisions of section 4888 of the Revised Statutes, with respect to description of the manner and process of using the discovery. Chemical Rubber Co. v. Raymond Rubber Co., 39 U. S. App. 11 (3d Cir.); ACHESON, J., 1895.

6. Claim must Specify Product and Process, if Both are to be Patented.-A patent may be made to cover both the process and the product, but both must be set out in the claims; and a patent covering a process cannot be made to include the product by a mere reference to other portions of the specifications. Applied to letters paten, No. 253,721, for improvements in the production of coloring-matters for dyeing and other purposes." Durand v. Green, 17 U. S. App. 620 (3d Cir.); WALES, J., 1894.

66

7. What is Sufficient Specification. It is not material that an inventor does not describe in full all the beneficial functions to be performed by the parts of his machine, if those functions are evident in the practical operation thereof, and are seen to contribute to the success of his device. McCormick Mach. Co. v. Aultman & Co., 37 U. S. App. 299 (6th Cir.); TAFT, J., 1895. 8. Specification too Indefinite.—With the exception of the third claim, viz., for" the incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, formed of carbonized paper, substantially as described," the claims of letters patent 317,076, for an electric light, are too indefinite to be the subject of a valid monopoly. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U. S. 465; BROWN, J., 1895. 9. "Sufficient Description" Defined. The word "filament" in view of illustrations in specifications is a sufficiently definite description of the size of the burner. The patent need not detail all the methods employed; mere absence of this will not render it void for want of sufficient description. It is sufficiently described when a person skilled in the art is enabled to make it at the date of the patent. The full effect need not be understood at the time of the application. U. S. Electric L. Co. v. Edison E. L. Co., 11 U. S. App. 1 (2d Cir.); LACOMBE, J., 1892.

Illustrated in Haberman Mfg. Co. v. Lalance and Grosjean Mfg. Co., 14 U. S. App. 226 (2d Cir.) ; SHIPMAN, J., 1893.

10. Claim is Strictly Construed in Certain Cases.-An unclaimed peculiarity of construction is rarely read into a claim, the life of which consists in minor improvements upon an old article and in which the patentee has undertaken to point out minutely the distinctive features which differentiate his combination from that of pre-existing devices. Eagle Lock Co. v. Corbin Cabinet Lock Co., 26 U. S. App. 388 (2d Cir.); SHIPMAN, J., 1894. 11. "Substantially as Set Forth," Defined.-The phrase "substantially as set forth" is technical, and is equivalent to saying " by the means described in the text of the inventor's application for letters patent, as illustrated by the drawings, diagrams, and models which accompany the application." These words limit the general terms of the specification which set out the function performed by the invention, and confine the inventor's rights to his own means, or their mechanical equivalent, of performing the function. Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 25 U. S. App. 475 (4th Cir.); HUGHES, J., 1895.

12. Patentee may Claim Equivalents.-Whether a patentee specifically claims in his patent the benefits of equivalents or not, the law allows them to him according to the nature of his patent. If it is a mere improvement on a successful machine, a mere tributary invention, the range of equiva

lents is narrowly restricted; but if it is a pioneer patent, with a new result, the range is very wide, and is not restricted by the failure of the patentee to describe and claim combinations of equivalents. Language that will restrict the pioneer patentee's right in the specifications and claims must be such as to evince a positive intention to limit the scope of the invention to the exact form of the device shown. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman & Co., 37 U. S. App. 299 (6th Cir.); TAFT, J., 1895.

13. Limits upon Claim.-Where, at the date of an invention, there was no novelty in the combination of certain mechanical movements, in view of the state of art at the time, the claim must be limited to the precise mechanism employed, and is not infringed by a patented device of a new variation upon such combination. Dashiell v. Grosvenor, 162 U. S. 425; BROWN, J., 1896.

14. Description too Broad.-Letters patent were granted to S. for “improvements in split pulleys," described as follows: "A transversely divided or split pulley, having its sections constructed on their meeting surfaces to form a serpentine or zigzag joint and to receive the shaft which carries the pulley in them substantially as specified." Held, that a claim for pulleys constructed on their meeting surfaces to form a serpentine or zigzag joint is entirely too broad and unwarranted by the description in the specification or the state of the art. Dodge Mfg. Co. v. E. C. Atkins Co., 24 U. S. App. 270 (7th Cir.); HARLAN, J., 1894.

15. Claim too Broad.-Where an invention is meritorious and of a primary character, the construction should be liberal, and if it be a process, the patentee should be protected from the unauthorized practice of it by others; it is held that the complainant's claim of all means used to accomplish the same result, as in this case, far transcends the limits of this rule, and would so expand claimant's right as to be altogether inadmissible under the terms chosen to express the invention. Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Arlington Mfg. Co., 3 U. S. App. 287 (3d Cir.); ACHESON, J., 1892.

16. Matter Excluded from Claim Cannot be Held.—A patentee cannot hold, under his patent, anything excluded therefrom by him during the stages of his application for patent; but mere changes of phraseology will not operate to exclude anything not intended to be excluded, nor to defeat the patent; the inhibition refers to claiming such a broad construction of the claims allowed as to include those surrendered or abandoned at the prosecution for patent. Hillburn v. Hale & Kilburn Mfg. Co., 28 U. S. App. 525 (d Cir.); SHIRAS, J., 1895.

17. Overlapping Patents.-Where one originates a generic invention and also subordinate specific inventions and presents the whole series for patent contemporaneously, the patentee cannot enlarge each invention by use of general terms so as to obtain overlapping patents. Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Brush Elec. Co., 1 U. S. App. 320 (2d Cir.); SHIPMAN, J., 1892.

18. Burden to Show Patentability is on Patentee.-The right to improve on prior devices by making solid castings in lieu of constructions of attached parts is so universal in the arts as to have become a common one, so that the burden rests on any one who sets up this improvement in any particular instance as patentable to show especial reasons to support his claim. Consolidated Electric Mfg. Co. v. Holtzer, 33 U. S. App. 80 (1st Cir.); PUTNAM, J., 1895.

19. Burden upon Patentee to Show Prior Invention.-The presumption of validity of a patent afforded by the existence of the patent, as in ordinary cases, does not apply where the evidence shows that the device as patented had been in public use for some time prior to the date of the application under consideration. If proof be admissible to show that the applicant was the original inventor, such proof must be clear and unequivo cal. Michigan Central Rd. Co. v. Car-Heating Co., 31 U. S. App. 472 (6th Cir.); SEVERENS, J., 1895.

20. Petition for Rehearing Allowed.-Petition for rehearing was granted in this case because the court understood erroneously that the appellant had waived his assignment of error touching claim 3 of letters patent 209,960. Davis v. Parkman, 33 U. S. App. 370 (1st Cir.); PER CUR., 1895.

21. Amendment-When Allowed.-Although it is competent to amend the specification while the application is pending, so long as done within the scope of the original application, it is not competent, under color of this privilege, to introduce new matter. Michigan Central Rd. v. Consol. CarHeating Co., 31 U. S. App. 472 (6th Cir.); SEVERENS, J., 1895.

22. New Oath to Amendment to Application Unnecessary.-When an inventor makes oath to an application for a patent, filed in his lifetime, an amendment to it within the scope of the original oath and of the invention described in the original specification, made after his death without filing a new oath or a new power of attorney, is valid, and does not render the patent void. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U. S. 209; FULLER, C. J., 1893.

23. Amendment-When to be Sworn to by Administrators, etc.-The statute requiring an oath to an amendment by administrators, etc., does not apply to an amendment which would not require a new oath from the original applicant if he were still living. The test is whether the amendment is within the scope of the original application or introduces new matter. Michigan Central v. Car-Heating Co., 31 U. S. App. 472 (6th Cir.); SEVERENS, J., 1895.

II. ISSUE, 24–33.

24. Commissioner's Power to Issue. The power of the commissioner to issue a patent is dependent upon the result of his own examination—that is, on the facts as he finds them and not on facts as they actually exist. Hence his act in issuing any patent which seems to him proper to be issued cannot be ultra vires. American Bell Telephone Co. v. U. S., 33 U. S. App. 236 (1st Cir.); PUTNAM, J., 1895.

25. Two Patents to Same Person for Same Invention.-The United States sought to have letters patent 463,569 in all things recalled, repealed, and decreed absolutely null because prior letters patent 233,969 had been issued, as was alleged, for the same invention; it was held that the court was barred from taking jurisdiction of the suit by reason of the provisions of the statute which gave special remedies to an applicant whose patent is refused; also that the issue of the patent was within the scope of the authority of the Commissioner of Patents. American Bell Telephone Co. v. U. S., 33 U. S. App. 236 (1st Cir.); PUTNAM, J., 1895.

26. To One's "Heirs or Assigns."-A patent for an invention issued to the inventor, "his heirs or assigns" after his death, is a valid patent, and should be construed in the alternative as a grant to him, or his heirs or assigns. Such construction would include a grantee or grantees in being, capable of taking the patent, to whose benefit the grant would enure. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Featherstone, 147 U. S. 209; FULLER, C. J., 1893. 27. Delay in Issue not Proved-Bell Telephone.-The United States having sought to have letters patent 463,569 to the American Bell Telephone Company as assignee of the patentee, and which covered the microphone, in all things recalled, repealed, and decreed absolutely null and void for illegal delay in their issue, it was held that the proofs of the application were in accordance with the usage of the Patent Office, and on the whole the best; also that the United States had failed to prove that extreme diligence should have been exercised in speeding the issuance of the letters patent. It did not appear that the American Bell Telephone Company was guilty of laches in speeding the issuance of the letters patent. American Bell Telephone Co. v. U. S., 33 U. S. App. 236 (1st Cir.); PUTNAM, J., 1895.

28. Prior Number no Evidence of Priority in Time.-Patents were issued on the same day, and it was impossible to ascertain which was signed